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Abstract 
In this paper, I begin to develop a theory called Paradise on the Cheap — in so doing, I 
intend to provide a rival to David Lewis' modal realism. Paradise on the Cheap grounds 
possibilia in the features of the actual world; and so, it does not require realist 
commitments to the existence of non-actual worlds and individuals. I explain modality, 
counterfactuals, content, and properties in terms of recombinations of actual-world 
features, second-order mathematical schemata, and the similarity relations which hold 
between these things and parts of the actual world. Because the ontology of Paradise on 
the Cheap promotes unity and economy of theory to a greater extent than does modal 
realism's ontology, 1 argue that we should accept the former theory instead of the latter. 
Moreover, 1 address the question of whether inference to the best explanation is an 
argumentative strategy that is even available to modal realists. 
•iv-
As the realm of sets is for mathematicians, so logical space is a paradise for philosophers. 
We have only to believe in the vast realm of possibilia. and there we find what we need to 
advance our endeavours (Lewis 4). 
Paradise on the cheap, like the famous free lunch, is not to be had (Lewis 141). 
Every thing possible to be believ'd is an image of truth (Blake 37). 
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Chapter 1: Paradise on the Cheap — or, an economical alternative to modal realism 
In On the Plurality of Worlds (henceforth OPW), David Lewis purports to unify our 
analyses of, among other things, modality, counterfactuals, properties, and doxastic-state 
content by means of a well-articulated and well-defended realist theory of possible 
worlds: his modal realism. But, ironically, Lewis' own account suggests an alternative to 
modal realism, a means by which to gain all the theoretical benefits he attributes to the 
latter without commitment to the existence of possible worlds. This alternative theory 
(henceforth 'Paradise on the Cheap') arises from variants on some things to which Lewis 
himself is committed. 
Key to Paradise on the Cheap is Lewis' principle of recombination, "according to 
which patching together [duplicate] parts of different possible worlds yields another 
possible world. Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with 
anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions" (Lewis 87-
88).' Lewis claims that the principle of recombination 
requires a proviso: 'size and shape permitting'. The only limit on the 
extent to which a world can be filled with duplicates of possible 
individuals is that the parts of a world must be able to fit together with 
'Lewis rejects world-overlap and, so, he can't say that the parts, simplicter, of different 
possible worlds make up another possible world. In speaking of recombination, he 
employs the notion of duplicates, instead of counterparts, because he doesn't accept the 
idea that a counterpart of anything can coexist with a counterpart of anything else. He 
says that counterparts are united by similarity, where the relevant similarity is mostly 
extrinsic, "[b]ut extrinsic similarity is irrelevant here, so I should not speak of coexisting 
counterparts. Instead, I should say that a duplicate of the dragon and a duplicate of the 
unicorn coexist at some world, and that the attached talking head has at some world a 
separated duplicate" (89). 
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some possible size and possible shape of spacetime.2 Apart from that, 
anything can coexist with anything, and anything can fail to coexist with 
anything (89-90). 
According to the principle of recombination, then, various possible worlds and 
various parts of possible worlds (i.e., possible individuals) are made of duplicate-parts of 
p (the actual world3).4 (Likewise, various other possible worlds and possible individuals 
are composed of duplicates of duplicate-parts of p, duplicates of duplicate-duplicate-parts 
of p, and so on.) Thus, Kurt Vonnegut's character Billy Pilgrim,s who is an other-worldly 
2
"This leaves a residual problem of plenitude: what are the possible sizes and shapes of 
spacetime? Spacetimes have mathematical representations, and an appropriate way to 
state plenitude would be to say that for every representation in some salient class, there is 
a world whose spacetime is thus represented. It is up to mathematics to offer us 
candidates for the 'salient class'" (Lewis 90). I shall ignore the question of what the 
possible shapes and sizes of spacetime are — following Lewis, I leave it to be answered 
by mathematics. 
3 Pm using Lewis' terminology, according to which 'actual' is an indexical term — it 
refers at any world w to the world w. Lewis claims that "actuality [is] a relative matter: 
every world is actual at itself, and thereby all worlds are on par" (93). He takes 'actual' 
to be synonymous with 'this-worldly.' Therefore, I use 'actual' to refer to this world and 
to this-worldly individuals. 
4According to Lewis, "two things are duplicates iff (I) they have exactly the same 
perfectly natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into correspondence in such a 
way that corresponding parts have exactly the same perfectly natural properties, and stand 
in the same perfectly natural relations" (61). A clear understanding of what natural 
properties are requires a clear understanding of a number of other concepts which I don't 
want to get into here. So, I'll leave it to the reader to consult OPW, pp. 59-61, for Lewis' 
account of natural properties. 
5Throughout my thesis, I shall occasionally use parts of Kurt Vonnegut's novel 
Slaughterhouse-Five as examples. Perhaps, then, I should say something by way of 
context. Slaughterhouse-Five is, among other things, an account of Vonnegut's 
experiences as a prisoner of war during the fire-bombing of Dresden, Germany in World 
War Q. His story is fictionalized at least to the extent that it focuses on a character named 
Billy Pilgrim who, in the novel, is a fellow P.O.W. during the Dresden raid. Billy 
Pilgrim, an abductee of Aliens from Tralfamadore, has come unstuck in time. 
. 9 . 
possible individual, consists of a combination of duplicate-features6 of actual people. 
Lewis stresses that the imaginability of some state of affairs a is a poor criterion for the 
possibility of a. He says, 
We can imagine the impossible, provided we do not imagine it in perfect 
detail and all at once. We cannot imagine the possible in perfect detail and 
all at once, not if it is at all complicated. It is impossible to construct a 
regular polygon of nineteen sides with a ruler and compass; it is possible 
but very complicated to construct one of seventeen sides. In whatever 
sense I can imagine the possible construction, I can imagine the impossible 
construction just as well. In both cases, I imagine a texture of arcs and 
lines with the polygon in the middle. I do not imagine it arc by arc and 
line by line, just as I don't imagine the speckled hen speckle by speckle — 
which is how I fail to notice the impossibility (90). 
But, despite the shortcomings of our imaginations, Lewis admits that 
[w]e get enough of a link between imagination and possibility, but not too 
much, if we regard imaginative experiments as a way of reasoning 
informally from the principle of recombination. To imagine a unicorn and 
infer its possibility is to reason that a unicorn is possible because a horse 
and a horn, which are possible because actual, might be juxtaposed in the 
imagined way (90). 
We have cognitive access to some parts of our world via, e.g., observation, established 
theory, and authoritative testimony. (I say 'cognitive' access here because I wish to 
remain neutral as to whether such means of belief-formation give us epistemic, or mere 
doxastic, access to parts of p.) Because, in some instances, we can imagine parts of our 
world being recombined and, thereby, correctly infer the possibility of such 
recombinations, it follows that we have some cognitive access to the character of other 
6Features, as I use the concept, are simply elements of the factual character of worlds — 
they can be individuals (i.e., parts of worlds), kinds, properties, or relations. (I shall 
ignore any ontological concerns surrounding properties and relations, as they are beyond 
the scope of my discussion.) 
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worlds. Furthermore, through imagination, we can recombine previous recombinations 
and, thereby, correctly infer further possibilities. We gain access to the possibility of a 
talking donkey with Billy Pilgrim's personality by combining, in our imaginations, Billy 
Pilgrim — himself a product of Vonnegut's own recombinations — with an actual 
donkey, or by combining the former with a talking donkey — the latter also being a 
product of prior recombination. Cognitive access to these possibilities is gained simply 
by reasoning about the features of p. 
Of course, we can also gain access to the features of other worlds without 
appealing to the principle of recombination. The bare fact that the parts of p to which we 
have access are actual entails that they're possible! Similarly, the features of p give us 
access to at least some necessities — which are part of the character of every world — 
and impossibilities — which the character of every world lacks. We know, for example, 
that 2=2 is necessary and that 3=4 is impossible despite the fact that we're unable to 
examine the features of any non-actual world.7 (Furthermore, if Kripke is right in 
claiming that proper names and general terms designate rigidly, then we can discover 
necessary truths, such as the identity between heat and molecular motion.8) 
Hence, the features of p, in conjunction with imaginative recombination, give us 
cognitive access to a number of different non-actual possibilities. Thus, we have 
cognitive access to a variety of possible individuals — parts of possible worlds — and, 
'Ignoring ontological concerns, I shall assume that mathematical truths and falsehoods, 
like 2=2 and 3=4 (respectively), are part of the factual character of this world. 
8See Naming and Necessity, especially lectures II and HI. 
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indeed, to a variety of possible worlds less-inclusive than p. For example, we have access 
to possible worlds in which only a duplicate of our solar system exists — no other 
duplicate stars, planets, asteroids, &c. — as well as to possible individuals which are 
perfect duplicates of our known universe except that humans live on Venus instead of 
Earth. 
Our cognitive access extends to relations of similarity between the worlds and 
individuals (possible and actual) we have cognitive access to. Lewis claims that a 
relation of closeness holds between p and other worlds. Closeness figures prominently 
into his account of verisimilitude, which he outlines as follows: 
Closeness to worlds can also help us to say what it means for a false theory 
of nature to be close to the truth. False is false — and it takes only a trace 
of error to make a theory false — but false theories are not all on par. We 
may reasonably think that present-day scientific theories, if not entirely 
free of error, are at any rate closer to the truth than previous theories were. 
We may hope that future theories will be closer still. How can we explain 
this? 
... [W]e might explain closeness to the truth (or 'truthlikeness' or 
'verisimilitude') in terms of closeness of possible worlds.... A theory is 
close to the truth to the extent that our world resembles some world where 
that theory is exactly true.9 A true theory is closest to the truth, because 
our world is a world where the theory is true. As for false theories, the 
ones that can come true in ways that involve little dissimilarity to the 
world as it really is are theories closer to the truth than those that cannot 
(Lewis 24). 
Thus, theories which are close to the truth at p just are theories which are true 
(simpliciter) at possible worlds 'close' to p. Because it is the factual character of this 
9It seems unlikely that Lewis is speaking of a resemblance-relation which our world as a 
whole bears to other worlds as wholes. Rather, a local sort of resemblance is probably 
what's being suggested here, such that certain aspects of p resemble certain aspects of the 
non-actual world(s) in question. 
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world that makes theories closer to, or further from, the truth at p, it is also the features of 
this world which make it the case that some worlds are closer to p while others are farther 
from it. 
Lewis acknowledges that his analysis of truthlikeness in OP fV is merely skeletal, 
that "[t]o put flesh on the bones, we need to say something about what an appropriate 
similarity ordering of worlds might be — what sort of respects of comparison are the ones 
that count" (24). And he's skeptical that something cleaner than the "messy business of 
comparative similarity" (24) can be found. It's evident that Lewis considers closeness to 
be a similarity relation, according to which, given the relevant respects of comparison, a 
possible world w is close to p to the extent that it is similar to p. Lewis deems it unlikely 
that the same similarity relation can be used for his analyses of both truthlikeness and 
counterfactuals. Indeed, he points out that 
[w]e have many and varied relations of comparative similarity. Some 
differ from others because they put different weights or priorities on 
different respects of (intrinsic or extrinsic) qualitative similarity; and even 
if they are alike in the respects of comparison they stress, they can still 
differ because one is more stringent than another (2S4). 
This passage is directed at counterparts — according to Lewis, then, relations of 
similarity hold between individuals as well as worlds. Based on a variety of similarity-
criteria,10 we can, at least in principle, establish various different orderings of how similar 
other worlds and individuals are to p and p-individuals (call these p-relative similarity 
'"Evidently for Lewis, as well as for myself, similarity is a relation in which individuals 
(including worlds) stand just in case they have certain specified characteristics in 
common. A similarity ordering is determined with respect to a particular individual (or 
individuals)—other individuals are 'ordered,' or ranked, according to the extent to 
which they share particular characteristics with the latter. 
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orderings). 
But we needn't restrict ourselves to p-relative similarity orderings — we can 
establish similarity orderings in general. Determinations of similarity are based on 
comparisons of features of the actual and non-actual worlds and individuals to which we 
have cognitive access. The degree of similarity which a cognitively-accessible world w 
(or a w-individual) bears to p (or a p-individual) is judged by comparing their relevant 
features in a given context. If the criterion of similarity is number of humans, then if p 
has 6,000,000,000 humans, worlds most similar to p also have 6,000,000,000 humans, 
worlds which are second-most similar to p have either 5,999,999,999 humans or 
6,000,000,001 humans, and so on. Likewise, the degree of similarity which w (or a w-
individuat) bears to another non-actual yet cognitively-accessible world w' (or a w'-
individual) is judged by comparing their relevant features in a given context. If w has 
seven humans, then worlds most-similar to w also have seven humans, worlds second-
most similar to w have either six or eight humans, worlds third-most similar have either 
five or nine humans, and so on. We have cognitive access to parts of p, to parts of other 
worlds, and to the totality of some worlds that are less inclusive than p — and we can 
compare any features of these worlds and individuals to any others. Therefore, similarity 
orderings can be determined even if they are not relative to p." 
Still, whatever the similarity conditions are in a given situation, the factual 
character of this world determines which cognitively-accessible worlds and individuals 
1
 'As will become evident in Chapter 2, the notion of similarity figures prominently into 
the explanatory capabilities of Paradise on the Cheap. 
-7-
we judge to be more and less similar to each other. Worlds are isolated from one 
another12 — we cannot so interact with other worlds as to form beliefs about, or gain 
knowledge of, their features.13 Hence, our cognitive access to non-actual worlds and 
individuals can only be a product of phenomena at this world. Given these limitations, it 
follows that the only non-actual worlds and individuals we have access to are those which 
consist of duplicates of p-features and recombinations thereof — we haven't the mental 
capacity to conceive of anything beyond such duplicates and recombinations.14 So, all we 
have to 'go on' in assigning similarities between worlds and individuals are the features 
of p, duplicates thereof, and recombinations of these duplicates. And since our cognitive 
access to these duplicates and recombinations is given exclusively by the features of p, 
the only basis we have for assigning similarities is given exclusively by the features of p. 
Consequently, the characteristics of worlds and individuals we emphasize in any 
similarity-judgement must be possessed by entities to which we have cognitive access, 
from which it follows that the characteristics we emphasize must also be grounded in the 
1 2As Lewis says, "there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things that belong 
to different worlds. Nor does anything that happens at one world cause anything to 
happen at another. Nor do they overlap; they have no parts in common, with the 
exception, perhaps, of immanent universals exercising their characteristic privilege of 
repeated occurrence" (2). Lewis argues against trans-world causation in § 1.6, and against 
overlap in §4.2, of OPW. 
l 3See the next chapter, in which I present a more-detailed argument in favour of such 
doxastic and epistemic limitations. 
1 4We may, however, acknowledge the existence of non-actual phenomena which don 7 
consist entirely of duplicates of p-features and recombinations thereof as well as grasp the 
schematic structure of such phenomena via a second-order mathematical apparatus. At 
various points below, I discuss how, with respect to Paradise on the Cheap, a second-
order mathematics yields cognitive access to the structure of possibilities. 
-8-
features of p. Therefore, our judgements regarding which cognitively-accessible worlds 
and individuals are more and less similar to one another depend very much on the factual 
character of p. Moreover, because our judgements on which more worlds and individuals 
are more and less similar to one another are what establish the similarity orderings, it is 
the factual character of this world that determines the similarity orderings which we 
assign. In sum, then, our cognitive access to the features of non-actual worlds and 
individuals is grounded in the features of p; and since it is the features of these accessible 
worlds which determine similarity orderings, it follows that the features of p (i.e., the 
ones to which we have cognitive access) are what ultimately determine the similarity 
orderings we assign. Ergo, not only our cognitive access to the features of other worlds 
and other individuals, but also our access to various similarity relations between such 
worlds and individuals, and between the latter and p and p-individuals, are solely 
products of this world. 
So, we can appeal to real possible worlds as representations of various ways in 
which p and its parts might have been, and we can appeal to a variety of similarities and 
differences between these ways, despite the fact that our access to such representations is 
restricted to what we can extrapolate from this world. However, because our access to 
non-actual worlds and individuals is so limited — i.e., because it depends solely on the 
features of this world — I believe that we don't have to use other worlds or non-actual 
individuals to make these representations. Rather, I shall argue, all we need is the factual 
character of p — such representations can be made without asserting the existence of 
non-actual worlds and individuals (and, indeed, without asserting the existence of any 
-9-
parts of p to which we lack cognitive access). Hence the principal proposal of Paradise 
on the Cheap: possibilia can be based exclusively on the features of this world — a 
plurality of real worlds needn't be brought into the picture. The latter claim is quite a 
bold one, suggesting that we need only features of p, suitably recombined, to bear the 
explanatory load which Lewis purports to be born by modal realism (a point which will 
be argued for in due course). In other words, I intend to argue that the theoretical benefits 
which Lewis claims for modal realism can be successfully achieved (at least in principle) 
without commitment to any supposedly real possible worlds. As I shall argue in Chapter 
2, to realize these benefits, we need only the features of p and recombinations of them 
(plus a second-order mathematical apparatus which can schematically represent those 
possibilities we can't gain access to via imaginative recombination). 
One thing is clear about Paradise on the Cheap from the outset: it cannot 
represent every possibility that Lewis claims his plurality of worlds can represent. As 
Lewis argues, 
Among all the possible individuals there are, some are parts of this world; 
some are not, but are duplicates of this world; some, taken whole, are not 
duplicates of any part of this world, but are divisible into parts each of 
which is a duplicate of some part of this world. Still other possible 
individuals are not thus divisible: they have parts, no part of which is a 
duplicate of any part of this world. These I call alien individuals. (That is, 
they are alien to this world; similarly, individuals could be alien to another 
world. For instance, many individuals in this world are alien to more 
impoverished worlds.) A world that contains alien individuals — 
equivalently, that is itself an alien individual — I call an alien world. 
... I defined an alien natural property as one that is not instantiated by any 
part of this world, and that is not definable as a conjunctive or structural 
property built up from constituents that are instantiated by parts of this 
world. Anything that instantiates an alien property is an alien individual; 
-10-
any world within which an alien property is instantiated is an alien world 
(91). 
With only some of the features of p to work with, we can't have access to the complete 
character of every world Lewis purports there to be. From the features of p to which we 
have access, we can't generate all possible states of affairs — not even close! "We can't 
get the alien possibilities just by arranging the non-alien ones. Thus our principle of 
recombination falls short of capturing all the plenitude of possibilities" (Lewis 92). 1 5 
Alien properties, and even some non-alien ones, simply can't be accounted for. 
Lewis points out that u[a] world to which no individuals, worlds, or properties are 
alien would be an especially rich world" (92); and he is right to claim also that we have 
no reason to believe that such a world is our world. He says, immediately afterwards, 
that an acceptable account of possibility must make provision for alien possibilities. In a 
sense, Paradise on the Cheap does provide for alien possibilities. We have a second-order 
mathematics by means of which we can give schematic representations of the structure of 
alien individuals and the relations in which they stand. Via the mathematical 
specification of relations — monadic, dyadic, triadic, &c. — we may grasp the possibility 
of alien properties, alien individuals, and alien relations.16 However, we cannot say 
I SLewis considers revising the principle of recombination, saying that "[a] principle which 
allowed not only recombination of spatiotemporal parts of the world but also 
recombination of non-spatiotemporal parts — universals or tropes — would do a bit 
more. It would generate those alien individuals that do not instantiate alien properties. 
But I say (1) that such a principle, unlike mine, would sacrifice neutrality about whether 
exist universals or tropes, and (2) that it still wouldn't go far enough, since we also need 
the possibility of alien properties" (92). 
l 6For example, a property is described schematically by the mathematical expression of a 
monadic relation: "Oa." Moreover, two-place and three-place relations are schematically 
-11-
anything further about these individuals, properties, and relations — our understanding of 
them has to remain solely schematic. Because the means we have for generating 
possibilities are p-bound, any precise talk we engage in regarding the way the world, or 
its parts, might have been must be p-bound. 
Modal realism's capacity to make provision for alien possibilities is just as limited 
as Paradise on the Cheap's. Indeed, as stressed above, any possible world or possible 
individual (in its entirety) that we, at p, think precisely about must, in Lewis' terms, 
consist completely of duplicate-features of p or recombinations thereof. To consider (in 
precise terms) worlds made of anything else is beyond our limitations! It follows, then, 
that any possible worlds or individuals precisely appealed to must be made of p-
duplicates or their recombinations. Moreover, any precise (as opposed to schematic) 
similarity orderings that Lewis refers to in his explanations — including those pertaining 
to counterparts — must be based on p-duplicates and recombinations thereof. Therefore, 
Lewis' analyses of counterfactuals, content, verisimilitude, modality, &c , inasmuch as 
they involve precise specifications of properties, individuals, and worlds, must ultimately 
described by "Oa&" and "Qa6c," respectively. And we may even imagine, schematically, 
ties between these properties and relations like those expressed by laws of nature. These 
Maws' would be specified by axioms defining a set of properties, but only up to 
isomorphism. Nothing more specific can be said about such laws, save that for any two 
interpretations that could in principle be given for the axioms, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence by which the objects, properties, functions, &c. asserted by one 
interpretation are mapped exactly onto those asserted by the other. (A more detailed 
account of how the second-order framework handles alien possibilities is given in 
Chapter 2.) In contrast, non-alien properties and relations are described in what I shall 
call precise terms — e.g., "a is a talking donkey," "a is jumping over b" and "a and b are 
the parents of c," where a, b, and c are interpreted as actual individuals or as 
recombinations of actual individuals and properties. 
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be p-bound. Of course, Lewis can say that there are alien worlds with alien properties 
and alien individuals — i.e., he can assert their existence (just as proponents of Paradise 
on the Cheap recognize that there are ways this world and its individuals might have been 
which our imaginative limitations prohibit us from grasping). He can even use a second-
order mathematics to gain a schematic understanding of the structure of alien worlds and 
alien individuals.17 (Such a mathematics is presumably what Lewis refers to in saying 
that it's up to mathematics to determine the possible shapes and sizes of spacetime and 
spacetime analogues.) But he certainly can't say anything precise about these alien 
phenomena.18 
As the resources for any theory of possibility are limited to those supplied by our 
"Even an actually-false theory of physics provides a means by which one can grasp the 
structure of some alien worlds and individuals. Modal realism implies that there must be 
various alien worlds (and parts of alien worlds) in which classical Newtonian mechanics, 
for example, is true. With respect to such worlds, the false physics provides us with an 
understanding of their structures. Such a theory of physics may likewise be of service to 
proponents of Paradise on the Cheap, as it specifies the structure of various alien 
possibilities for p and its parts. 
'"Though Lewis can't say anything precise about alien phenomena, the latter still play an 
explanatory role in his theory. Modal realism would be significantly less coherent if 
Lewis failed to acknowledge the existence of properties, individuals, and worlds 
completely unlike the properties and individuals of p. This being the case, Lewis would 
be forced to account for the absence of alien worlds even though we have no reason to 
believe that there aren't any alien possibilities. Similarly, proponents of Paradise on the 
Cheap (which may include just myself.) must, for the sake of coherence, acknowledge 
that there are possibilities which we could not have gained access to via any 
recombination of any p-feature. 
But, coherence is not the only motivation for proponents of modal realism and 
Paradise on the Cheap to recognize alien possibilities — the latter play explanatory roles 
in each theory. Some of Lewis' analyses, e.g., of modality, make reference to the entire 
plurality of possible worlds, including the alien ones. Likewise, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, in performing analyses of modality, counterfactuals, content, properties, &c. 
with Paradise on the Cheap, one might make reference to alien structures. 
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world, it's too much to ask of any such theory that it account, in precise terms, for alien 
phenomena. Paradise on the Cheap provides for alien phenomena to the same extent as 
modal realism does — namely, schematically. So, given that the ability to furnish alien 
possibilities is one necessary condition of an acceptable theory of possibilia, if modal 
realism satisfies this condition, then so must Paradise on the Cheap. Therefore, assuming 
with Lewis that modal realism satisfies the condition, we have it that Paradise on the 
Cheap satisfies it as well. 
Paradise on the Cheap is not a form of ersatzism19 — at least it is not of a kind 
with any of the forms of ersatzism Lewis considers in OPW. It doesn't provide 
representations of the ways this world might have been via linguistic, pictorial, or 
'magical' worlds. Furthermore, it does not provide abstract representations of the way p 
might have been. If successful, Paradise on the Cheap explains the phenomena Lewis 
seeks to explain exclusively in terms of the factual character of this world. Of course, 
there's a common-sense reading of 'abstract' such that, when a person generates a 
possibility — e.g., that there might have been barking cats — she, in a sense, 'abstracts' 
features from the world and recombines them in her imagination. Were a person so 
inclined, she could even write down the products of these 'abstractions' Oust as I did in 
giving the 'barking cat' example), or otherwise record them. However, it is not these 
'abstractions' which represent possibilia — the latter are represented by the world itself. 
t9Broadly speaking, ersatzism is the view that "instead of having an incredible plurality of 
concrete worlds, we can have one world only, and countless abstract ways of representing 
ways that this world might have been" (Lewis 136). 
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That there might have been barking cats is represented20 by the fact that the 
recombination of a certain part2 1 of p (cats) with a certain other part of p (the ability to 
bark) is acceptable to us, as human agents.2 2 When someone says "There might have 
been barking cats," she refers to the fact — itself a feature of p — that the recombination 
of cats with the ability to bark is acceptable. According to Paradise on the Cheap, then, 
the phenomena Lewis seeks to explain can be explained in terms of recombinations (of 
varying complexity) of p-features and, thus, satisfactory analyses of the former can be 
grounded in the factual character of this world.23 
(It is important to note that the notion of recombination which I use in regard to 
Paradise on the Cheap is quite different from Lewis' use of recombination. Basically, my 
2 0It is important to note that although I borrow the term 'representation' and its variants 
from Lewis, I use it in a different sense when discussing Paradise on the Cheap. In regard 
to the latter theory, I don't mean to suggest that the features of p, or their recombinations, 
somehow provide us with images of possibilia in the way that Lewis' possible worlds and 
individuals, or the ersatzer's abstract structures, allegedly do. Rather, throughout this 
paper, whenever I speak of p-features and/or recombinations as representing possibilities, 
I mean that the latter are grounded in the former. 
2 1The notion of a part is extremely vague, but I think Lewis intends it to be that way. He 
claims that a possible individual is any part of a world, whether it be a collection of dogs 
or cats, or an individual human, or a collection of various dogs and cats and humans and 
telephone poles and scrap pieces of aluminum siding, or even an entire duplicate of p 
which belongs to a more inclusive world. So, I shall take a part of p to be anything that 
can be imagined as separate from whatever it's actually conjoined with — such as my 
basketball (which is conjoined with my closet floor), the ability to bark, and the left half 
of my right eyeball — or combinations thereof. 
2 2
 A recombination is acceptable if and only if there is some actual state of affairs suitably 
similar to it, where the relevant criteria of similarity varies with context. The notions of 
acceptability and suitable similarity will be explicated much further in the next chapter. 
^Paradise on the Cheap's explanatory power will be demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
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position is that a relation of similarity holds between a recombination — which represents 
some individual or state of affairs—and an actual truth. Furthermore, I hold that when 
an recombination is suitably similar to some actual truth, it represents a possibility — i.e., 
the individual and state of affairs reported by a sentence describing the recombination is 
possible. In contrast, Lewis uses 'recombination' to denote a kind of metaphysical 
rearrangement of individuals, properties, relations, &c. which, given a possible size and 
shape of space-time, must represent a possibility. In short, all recombinations represent 
possibilities for Lewis, while some of Paradise on the Cheap's recombinations represent 
states of affairs and individuals which are impossible for p and/or its parts.) 
Practically speaking, Paradise on the Cheap cannot provide us with every way in 
which the cognitively-accessible parts of p might have been recombined in reality. The 
principle of recombination could, in principle, be applied to the features of p and to 
previous recombinations indefinitely, thereby correctly deriving myriad possibilities 
(perhaps even an infinitude of them) — a task which exceeds our human limitations. 
Furthermore, this-worldly analyses of, e.g., certain counterfactuals or certain modalised 
expressions may turn out to be too difficult for any human to perform. But, in spite of 
these intractabilities, the fact that a theory such as Paradise on the Cheap can in principle 
be constructed implies that there's something which can perhaps carry the explanatory 
load just as well (if not better) than modal realism without requiring realist commitments 
to possible worlds. 
Lewis says we should accept modal realism because it provides the best 
explanation of various things. Let's assume for now that (a) Lewis is justified in using 
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inference to the best explanation (a question to be taken up in Chapter 4), (b) modal 
realism succeeds in providing coherent explanations for all the phenomena Lewis seeks to 
explain in OPW, and (c) the fact that a theory qualifies as the best explanation of certain 
phenomena constitutes sufficient justification for believing in its truth. Therefore, we're 
justified in believing in the existence of other worlds and non-actual individuals only if 
modal realism does, in fact, constitute the best explanation of those things. But if 
Paradise on the Cheap gives us the best explanation — or if modal realism and Paradise 
on the Cheap are explanatorily equivalent and there are other theoretical considerations, 
such as increased unity and economy, that make the latter preferable — then we have 
better reason to subscribe to its ontology, and less reason to accept the existence of 
anything non-actual. The success of Paradise on the Cheap over modal realism warrants 
us in believing, at most, in the existence of this world and its constituents.24 
If the theoretical virtues of Paradise on the Cheap are superior to those of modal 
realism then, provided we're justified in applying Occam's razor in the present case,2 5 the 
view that there's a world (among various others) in which Billy Pilgrim exists, has come 
unstuck in time, is abducted by Tralfamadorians, survives the Dresden raid, and so on can 
only play the role of a heuristic device. In other words, modal realism could at best serve 
as a convenient way of talking and thinking about recombinations of the parts of p. But, 
2 4It 's important to note that I am speaking in local terms here, ignoring other potential 
reasons why one could perhaps be justified in accepting Lewis' ontology (e.g., the success 
of other theories which employ the latter). I've been assuming that there are no 
philosophical reasons, other than those touched upon by Lewis, why one might assert the 
existence of a plurality of worlds. 
^In Chapter 3,1 will argue that we are justified in applying Occam's razor here. 
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as I shall argue in Chapter 3, the heuristic convenience of modal realism is not adequate 
ground for committing oneself to the existence of other worlds. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical benefits—modal realism versus Paradise on the Cheap 
A. In Chapter 1,1 expressed my belief that Paradise on the Cheap is at least equal to 
modal realism in explanatory power. In the present chapter, I'm going to argue that this 
belief is true. When first planning my approach to the latter task, I was under the illusion 
that possible-worlds talk can be reduced somehow to Paradise-on-the-Cheap talk. In 
particular, I sought to construct an argument like the following: 
(1) Our cognitive access to non-actual worlds and non-actual individuals is 
gained, without exception, by means of our access to the features of p and our 
imaginative recombinations of such features. 
(2) Therefore, in describing possible worlds and possible individuals, we're just 
describing certain collections of p-features and recombinations of p-features. 
(3) Ergo, Lewis' modal-realistic analyses of modality, counterfactuals, content, 
properties, &c. are just analyses of such phenomena in terms of particular 
combinations of p-features and recombinations of p-features. 
Obviously, 2 does not follow from 1. The fact that our cognitive access is restricted to 
the features of p and recombinations thereof does not imply that our possible-worlds talk 
refers simply to p-features and p-recombinations — in using the language of modal 
realism, regardless of our doxastic and epistemic limitations, we may still be speaking 
about possible worlds and possible individuals (although there are views on semantics 
which would rule out this sort of reference). Therefore, 3 is not established since if our 
possible-worlds talk is not just Paradise-on-the-Cheap talk, we cannot conclude that 
modal realistic analyses are just analyses made in terms of p-features and -
recombinations. The language of modal realism is not synonymous with the language of 
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Paradise on the Cheap—they're not semantically equivalent. Lewis specifies truth 
conditions for the former in terms of a plurality of non-actual worlds and individuals, 
while I hold that the truth of statements made in terms of the latter depend on features of 
p and certain activities of human agents (in particular, imaginative recombinations and 
similarity-assignments).26 Hence, the former cannot be paraphrased into the latter. For 
the same reason, the former cannot be reduced to the latter — e.g., possible worlds and 
individuals cannot be reduced to constructions of actual features and recombinations of 
these features.27 
As mentioned in the last chapter, our doxastic and epistemic limitations are such 
that our cognitive access to possibilia is restricted to what we derive from the individuals 
and properties belonging to p and recombinations of the individuals and properties 
belonging to p. 2 8 This assertion is key to my argument that Paradise on the Cheap is at 
2 6 0 f course, Paradise on the Cheap also makes use of second-order mathematical 
language. (The latter will be discussed in greater detail in Section B of this chapter.) But 
the latter needn't require us to add other entities to the Paradise-on-the-Cheap ontology, 
such as some kind of'mathematical objects.' In Chapter 3,1 discuss a naturalist view of 
semantics and, in so doing, suggest that we might characterize an ontology for 
mathematics in terms of the natural features of this world (though I don't go so far as to 
suggest a form which such an ontology might take). 
2 7This same point is suggested by Ian Hinckfuss in the following passage: "I have stressed 
that the fictionalist need not, indeed must not regard propositions which entail the 
existence of prodigal entities as being semantically equivalent to any economical 
counterpart. Hence it is absurd to demand that economicalists either provide an analytic 
reduction of prodigal discourse in economicalist terms or give up their economicalism" 
(613). 
2 8
 And, of course, our second-order mathematics yields a schematic understanding of alien 
possibilia. Henceforth, unless specified otherwise, I shall take it as tacit that such a 
mathematics provides us with cognitive access to the structure of alien properties and 
relations. Thus, when I speak of our access being limited the features of p and 
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least equal to modal realism in explanatory power; so, though its truth might seem 
obvious to some, I will spend some time establishing it. I pointed out in Chapter 1 that 
Lewis claims that possible worlds are completely isolated from one another — in 
particular, there are no spatiotemporal relations whatsoever between worlds or between 
the parts of different worlds,2 9 there is no causal interaction between worlds or the parts 
of different worlds, and different worlds do not have any common parts. (Indeed, trans-
world causation is precluded by Lewis' analyses of causation and counterfactuals. See 
0 / W p p . 78-81.) Therefore, any cognitive access we have to other worlds and 
otherworldly individuals is not provided to us by causal interaction with these worlds or 
individuals. Moreover, I take it that under the concept of causal interaction is included 
"a priori' interactions like those Kurt Godel posits between us human agents and real 
mathematical objects. Consider what Godel says in the following passage, quoted in Paul 
Benacerraf s "Mathematical Truth": 
... the objects of transfinite set theory... clearly do not belong to the 
physical world and even their indirect connection with experience is very 
loose... 
recombinations thereof, it's to be understood that our access is limited to the latter 
features and recombinations as well as the schematic understanding given to us by 
second-order mathematics. 
29Lewis doesn't say that the parts of every world are united by spatiotemporal relations 
properly so-called. Rather, he claims that "each world is interrelated (and is maximal 
with respect to such interrelation) by a system of relations which, if they are not 
spatiotemporal relations rightly so-called, are at any rate analogous to them.... When a 
system of relations is analogous to the spatiotemporal relations, strictly so called, let me 
call them analogically spatiotemporal" (75-76). We speak more accurately, then, by 
saying that neither spatiotemporal relations nor their analogues exist between worlds or 
the parts of different worlds. See 0/W74-78 for further details. 
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But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have a 
perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the 
axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see why we should 
have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical 
intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical 
theories and to expect that future sense perceptions will agree with them 
and, moreover, to believe that a question not decidable now has meaning 
and may be decided in the future (415). 
Provided, then, that we at p can't have these sorts of a priori perceptions of other worlds, 
or their parts, it follows that we cannot so interact with any non-actual worlds or 
individuals as to gain cognitive access to them. (Against the possibility of such a priori 
interaction with other worlds, we can insist that possible worlds are concrete — not 
abstract — and, so, that we have access to possible worlds, if at all, causally.30) 
The only things we causally interact with are the things which exist at our world. 
So, if modal realism is true, our cognitive access to the character of other worlds, as well 
as to the similarity orderings between possible worlds and possible individuals, is 
provided exclusively by the features of p (along with our second-order mathematics, 
which gives us a language wherein we can quantify over properties and/or speak of 
properties of properties). Hence, as discussed in Chapter 1, any of the non-actual worlds 
and non-actual individuals that we're able to describe precisely must, in Lewis' terms, 
consist exclusively of duplicates of p-individuals and p-recombinations. (Indeed, we're 
only able to describe alien properties, alien individuals, or alien worlds schematically.) 
Because we have no interaction with non-actual worlds or parts, and because we cannot 
Lewis himself seems to concede that possible worlds are concrete, despite the 
difficulties he raises for the notions of abstractness and concreteness in § 1.7 of OPW. See 
the final paragraph of § 1.7, on page 86. 
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have access to anything alien (precisely speaking), it's evident that any talk of possible 
worlds and individuals in which Lewis, or anyone else, engages is based without 
exception on p-individuals, recombinations of p-individuals, and our grasp of 
mathematics. There are no other ways in which we can have access to other worlds and 
other-worldly individuals! Therefore, as conjectured in the last chapter, any precise non-
actual worlds and individuals (and precise similarities orderings between them) which 
Lewis appeals to in his explanations must consist of p-duplicates or their recombinations 
(and similarity orderings between them), it's evident that Lewis' analyses of, e.g., 
counterfactual conditionals, modality, content, and properties are, to the extent that they 
involve a precise understanding of possibilities, based ultimately on p-individuals and 
their recombinations. 
B. We now have it that any application of modal realism is limited to the extent that 
our cognitive access to the various possibilia is limited. Hence, in analysing for example 
modality, counterfactuals, verisimilitude, content, and properties in terms of modal 
realism, our non-schematic — or precise — resources are limited in all cases to the 
possible worlds and individuals to which we are provided access by the features of this 
world and recombinations thereof. Lewis says that modal realism provides satisfactory 
analyses of, for example, modality, counterfactual conditionals, verisimilitude, the 
content of doxastic and epistemic states, and properties. Because our modal-realistic 
analyses are bound, in all instances, to the features of this world and their recombinations, 
I believe that we can analyse modality, counterfactuals, content, &c. at least as well as 
modal realism without appealing to possible worlds — we need only make reference to 
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the features of this world, recombinations thereof, and our schematic understanding of 
alien phenomena. Now let's take a look at how some of the phenomena which Lewis 
purports to be explained by modal realism are explained with Paradise on the Cheap. 
Put briefly, Lewis analyses modality as quantification over possible worlds. 
Accordingly, a proposition is possible just in case it's true in at least one world, 
impossible just in case it's not true in any worlds, necessary just in case it's true in all 
worlds, and contingent just in case it's true in some, but not all, worlds. In contrast, the 
alternative analysis of modality proceeds as follows. Consider the proposition "Possibly, 
there are barking cats." This proposition is true because certain actual states of affairs, 
such as barking dogs, meowing cats, and mooing cows, are suitably similar to the 
recombination specified in the proposition. (Here, a similarity ordering is invoked — for 
which the relevant criterion is, say, being an animal which regularly emits a particular 
noise from the mouth.) Thus, we say that the sentence "Possibly, there are barking cats" 
expresses a truth if and only if the sentence obtained by removing the possibility operator 
— i.e., "There are barking cats" — is an acceptable substitute of some actually-true 
sentence — e.g., "There are mooing cows." "There are mooing cows" is suitably similar 
to "There are barking cats" and, so, the latter is what we may call a true image of the 
former. A sentence s is a true image of another sentence s* if and only if s is actually true 
and expresses a state of affairs suitably similar to that expressed by s*. Similarly, s* is an 
acceptable substitute of s just in case the state of affairs expressed by s is suitably similar 
to that expressed by s*. Therefore, whether an unactualised state of affairs (access to 
which is gained by recombination) is possible ultimately depends on whether there are 
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actual states of affairs that are suitably similar to the former; and whether a statement of 
possibility, Os*, is true depends on whether there is an actually-true statement, s, which 
expresses a state of affairs suitably similar to that expressed by the unmodalised s*. Of 
course, because what we regard as suitably similar can vary from context to context, what 
we count as possible can also vary between contexts. This variance parallels the 
flexibility of the similarity orderings which Lewis' asserts between possible worlds and 
individuals. For example, on certain construals of the accessibility relation — which 
holds between worlds (as opposed to the counterpart relation, which holds between 
individuals) — the statement "Possibly, Jim is a grapefruit" is true. 
Based on the alternative analysis of possibility — i.e., the analysis of possibility 
made in terms of Paradise on the Cheap — it's obvious that a state of affairs (access to 
which is gained by recombination) is impossible if and only if there are no actual states of 
affairs which are suitably similar to the former. Thus, we say that it's impossible for an 
object's surface to be both completely red and completely green at the same time, since 
there are no actual objects whose surfaces are both completely one colour and completely 
another colour at the same time. Moreover, a statement of impossibility, ~0s* (or CKs*), 
is true just in case there is no actually-true statement, s, expressing a state of affairs 
suitably similar to that expressed by unmodalised s*. Accordingly, "It is impossible that 
an object's surface be both completely red and completely green at the same time" is true 
because there are no actually-true sentences which are suitably similar to "An object's 
surface is both completely red and completely green" (where a suitably similar sentence 
would be of the form "Object o's surface is both completely colour\ and completely 
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colour2 at the same time"). The fact that there are no actual objects whose surfaces are 
both completely one colour and completely another at the same time is not known 
empirically; rather, it is known structurally. The bare structure of colour talk is such that 
there couldn't be such states of affairs; and thus, we know that any suitably similar state 
of affairs (where the relevant criterion is being an object whose surface is both completely 
colourx and completely colour2 at the same time) must be false. 
A state of affairs is necessary just in case all states of affairs suitably similar to it 
are also actually-true. Furthermore, a statement of necessity, Ds*, is true if and only if 
every statement, s, expressing a state of affairs suitably similar to that expressed by 
unmodalised s*, is true. Consider the simple arithmetical statement "7+2 = 9"; and let's 
say that the relevant similarity-criterion is being a true expression of arithmetical 
equivalence. All true statements expressing arithmetical equivalences are, of course, true; 
and therefore, "7+2 = 9" is necessary and "Necessarily, 7+2 = 9" is true. We can make 
the criterion more general — say, being an expression of a mathematical truth or being 
an appropriate combination of symbols. (It is our understanding of mathematical 
language that, for the most part, tells us which mathematical statements are true, which 
combinations of symbols are appropriate, and that all such combinations are true. The 
latter fact, especially, is not known empirically.) 
In addition, assuming that Kripke is correct in asserting that proper names and 
general terms are rigid designators,31 we can use Paradise on the Cheap to analyse the 
truth of statements of a posteriori necessity like "Necessarily, Hesperus is Phosphorus" 
3
'See Naming and Necessity. 
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and "Necessarily, water is H 2 0." Unlike instances of mathematical truths, there are 
counterfactual situations (i.e., recombined states of the world) in which neither water nor 
the planet Venus exist. Still, our analyses proceed by means of quantification over states 
of affairs.32 Regarding the necessary identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus, the relevant 
similarity-criterion is being a state ofaffairs in which the planet Venus exists?2 Thus, for 
all suitably similar states of affairs — both the actual one and all the recombined ones — 
it is the case that the object actually referred to with the proper name 'Hesperus' and the 
object actually referred to with the proper name 'Phosphorus' are identical. Similarly for 
water and H,0. Given that the relevant similarity-condition is being a state of affairs in 
which water exists, in all suitably similar states of affairs the stuff we refer to with the 
mass term 'water' is identical to the substance referred to with the mass term 'H 2 0 . ' 3 4 
Finally, a situation is contingent if and only if some, but not all, states of affairs 
suitably similar to the former are actual. That there are barking cats is a contingent state 
of affairs because certain situations, like the existence of mooing cows, are this-worldly 
while certain others, like the existence of screeching grasshoppers, are not. Likewise, a 
32Unless otherwise indicated, by 'states of affairs' and 'situations,' I mean both actual and 
unreal states of affairs, the latter being recombinations of p-features as well as 
possibilities represented schematically by our second-order mathematics. Of course, 
depending on our similarity-criteria, some recombinations will not be possibilities for p 
or any of its parts. 
3 3Such a criterion of similarity runs parallel to the strategy, discussed by Lewis, of 
restricting the accessibility relations of each world. Thus, a proponent of modal realism 
may restrict accessible possible worlds to just those in which water exists. 
3 4
 As we shall see in Section D of this chapter, Paradise on the Cheap has an advantage 
over modal realism in that the former is flexible enough to allow coherent acceptance of 
Kripke's views on rigid designation, a posteriori necessity, and haecceitism. 
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statement of contingency, Qs* (or, Os* A ~Os*), is true just in case some but not all 
statements, s, expressing states of affairs suitably similar to that expressed by 
unmodalised s* are actually-true. In other words, s* expresses a contingent truth if and 
only if some s are true and some s are not. Consider again the example for the alternative 
analysis of possibility, "There are barking cats." This sentence expresses a contingency 
because there are some acceptable substitutes for it which are actually true — e.g., "There 
are mooing cows" — and some which aren't actually-true — e.g., "There are growling 
ants." Likewise, the sentence "There are mooing cows," along with the situation it 
denotes, is contingent because there are both actual and non-actual states of affairs 
suitably similar to that situation, such as the existence of mooing cows itself and the 
existence of growling ants, respectively. 
Thus, like the modal-realistic analysis of modality, the alternative analysis of the 
same relies upon quantification (which guarantees a lot of the formal features we want). 
But, unlike the modal-realistic analysis, the alternative quantifies over situations (both 
actual and recombined35), instead of possible worlds. To this point, my discussion of the 
modalities has been limited to modality de die to. With respect to modality de re, Lewis 
says, 
As other worlds are alternative possibilities for an entire world, so the 
parts of other worlds are alternative possibilities for lesser individuals. 
Modality de re, the potentiality and essence of things, is quantification 
over possible individuals. As quantification over possible worlds is 
commonly restricted to accessibility relations, so quantification over 
possible individuals is commonly restricted by counterpart relations. In 
both cases, the restrictive relations usually involve similarity (8). 
See note 32. 
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The alternative analysis of modality de re is very straightforward, given that it's very 
similar to the alternative analysis of modality de dicto. According to Paradise on the 
Cheap, de re modality is not to be analysed in terms of quantification over states of affairs 
per se but in terms of quantification over individuals (both actual individuals and those 
unreal individuals grasped via imaginative recombination or mathematics). Whether I, 
Jim Morris, am necessarily human depends on the individuals to which I'm to be counted 
as suitably similar. If we allow that I'm suitably similar to individuals which fail to 
posses the property of being human — such as walruses or grapefruits or talking donkeys 
— then it is not the case that I am necessarily human. Rather, because I am suitably 
similar to individuals which don't have the property of being human, in addition to those 
which do posses it (one such individual being myself), I am merely contingently human. 
If, however, I am not regarded as suitably similar to any individuals failing to posses the 
property of being human, then every individual to which I am suitably similar will be 
human; and therefore, this being the case, I am necessarily a human. And, if I am suitably 
similar to no individual lacking the property of being human, it follows that it is 
impossible for me to not-posses this property — in other words, it follows that I'm 
impossibly non-human. 
Based on the alternative analysis of de re modality just given, we have it that the 
truth and falsity of assertions of de re modality is to be analysed in terms of quantification 
over individuals. "Jim is necessarily human," is true just in case every individual to 
which I'm suitably similar has the property of being human, and false if not every 
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individual I'm suitably similar to has this property. "Jim is contingently human" is true if 
and only if some, but not all, individuals to which I'm suitably similar have the property 
of being human. "Jim is impossibly a walrus" is true if and only if none of the 
individuals that I'm suitably similar to have the property of being a walrus. In addition, 
"Jim is possibly a walrus" is true just in case at least one individual to which I am 
suitably similar has this property. 
Before I move onto the alternative analysis of counterfactuals, I'd like to address 
an objection which some might raise against my account of suitable similarity as it 
pertains to modality.36 It may be stated as follows: 
Consider a recombination with respect to which the actual individual, or state of 
affairs, most similar to it is not very similar at all. Suppose we judge this meagre 
degree of similarity to be a merely accidental fact. This being the case, we'll be 
reluctant to assert that a recombination represents a possibility if and only if there 
is a very similar actual individual or state of affairs, as we may consider the non­
existence of a very similar individual or state of affairs to be just as accidental as 
the non-actuality of a possible individual or state of affairs. 
In response to such an objection, I must first point out that my account makes no use of 
the notion of something being 'very' similar. Indeed, an actual individual or state of 
affairs may, in principle, be regarded as very similar without being regarded as suitably 
similar, and vice versa. Second, I must reiterate that judgements of suitable similarity are 
highly context-relative — they depend on the person making judgements and her interests 
in making them. Thus, though an individual or state of affairs may not be deemed 
suitably similar according to one criterion, it may be so deemed according to another. 
Which criteria are the ones that count in a given context will, again, depend on who's 
3 6The following objection was brought to my attention by Bryson Brown. 
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making the judgements and her interests in doing so." Therefore, even though we surely 
all agree that it's impossible for Caesar to be a prime number—because the fact that 2 is 
a prime number is not suitably similar to the recombination which represents Caesar as 
being a prime number — given some perverse criterion of similarity, we might assert that 
2 being a prime number is suitably similar to Caesar being a prime number. (Likewise, 
we could so gerrymander the counterpart relation as to establish that grapefruits or rocks 
or even numbers are possibilities for me.) However, I doubt we would ever, in all 
seriousness, so construe a criterion of similarity — I can't see any interests which would, 
practically speaking, motivate one to do so. In all likelihood, we would judge that Caesar 
being a prime number is impossible because all other states of affairs suitably similar to it 
(say, contradictions in terms) are actually-false. 
Moreover, as Brown has pointed out, similarities can be 'linked' at various levels. 
As we recognize what kinds of things (individuals or states of affairs) are suitably similar 
to which, we get a better sense of which rearrangements of properties and relations 
(schematically speaking) respect the nomological or other constraints on similarity in a 
given context. As our commitments to such similarity-constraints become clearer, we are 
able to bridge quite large gaps between what is actual and what is possible. Thus, we 
needn't appeal solely to precise similarity-criteria to determine whether or not something 
is possible — we may also use criteria which emphasize structural similarities. So, even 
"Similarly, according to Lewis, similarity orderings vary from context to context, 
depending on the kind of similarity in which one is interested. Furthermore, for Lewis, 
counterpart and accessibility relations vary with context, depending on the sorts of 
similarities between worlds and individuals we wish to deal with. 
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though it may accidentally be the case that, according to some precise similarity-
condition(s), no actual situations are suitably similar to a particular recombination, we 
can insist that the recombination is possible on the basis of certain schematic-structural 
similarities it has to certain actual states of affairs. 
With respect to counterfactual conditionals, the modal-realistic analysis proceeds 
in the following way: a counterfactual "A > C" is true at our world if and only if some 
world at which both A and C are true (or, some A-and-C-world) is 'closer' — i.e. more 
similar — to our world than any world in which A is true and C is false (or, any A-and-
not-C-world). For example, the statement "Were I to drop my computer from two stories 
up, it would break" is true at this world if and only if some world in which the antecedent 
and consequent are both true is closer to this world than any world in which the 
antecedent is true and the consequent is false. The relation of closeness Lewis speaks of 
is evidently a similarity relation. Instead of appealing to similarities between worlds, the 
alternative analysis of counterfactuals appeals to the similarities such conditionals bear to 
actual situations. Consider the counterfactual conditional "Were I to drop my computer 
from two stories up, it would break upon impact." With respect to counterfactuals, two 
similarity-criteria need to be invoked. The first is derived from the conditional's 
antecedent (call it the 'A-criterion') — it specifies the set of actual situations in regard to 
which the truth of the counterfactual is to be evaluated (call these the ' A-situations*). 
Let's say that the first criterion is that of being a situation in which another computer — 
or suitably similar object—is droppedfrom two stories. So, in the present case, the A-
situations are those in which computers or suitably similar objects are dropped from two 
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stories. The second similarity-criterion is determined by emphasizing certain events in 
the A-situations (call it the 'C-criterion') —the conditional is taken to be true if and only 
if the recombination it expresses is more similar to the A-situations, with respect to the C-
criterion, than any recombination in which A is true but C is false. Let's assume (very 
plausibly) that, in the A-situations, the computers in question break upon impact. Hence, 
we may specify the C-criterion to be that of being a situation wherein a computer — or 
suitably similar object — breaks upon impact. Therefore, the recombination in which my 
computer is dropped from two stories and breaks upon impact obviously satisfies the C-
criterion to a greater extent than any recombination in which my computer is dropped 
from two stories yet survives the impact. Thus, "Were I to drop my computer from two 
stories up, it would break upon impact" is true. Counterfactuals whose antecedents are 
never actually-true are to be treated in the same way. Consider the conditional "Were 
water to decrease in volume when frozen, my water bottle wouldn't have broken in the 
freezer last night," which is true because we know of certain liquids which do decrease in 
volume when frozen and, thus, do not so expand as to break the containers they're frozen 
in. The A-situations here are those which involve the freezing of liquids which decrease 
in volume when frozen. Assuming that, in such situations, the liquids' containers do not 
break when the liquids freeze, we can specify the C-criterion as that of being a situation 
in which the breakage of the container that a liquid is frozen in does not coincide with the 
liquid's change-in-state to solid. Given this criteria, the recombination described by the 
conditional is more similar to the A-situations than any recombination in which water 
decreases in volume when frozen and my water bottle still breaks when its contents 
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freezes. (It's important to note that a counterfactual specifies a recombination, and that 
the latter embodies at least two sub-recombinations, namely those specified by the 
antecedent and the consequent.) 
Like the alternative analysis of modality, the alternative analysis of 
counterfactuals suggests that the similarities between recombinations and actual states of 
affairs determine the truth or falsity of counterfactual conditionals. Moreover, the 
alternative analysis of counterfactuals allows similarity to be context-relative. Though 
the A-criterion must emphasize some characteristic of the state of affairs specified by the 
antecedent, and the C-criterion must emphasize some event occurring in the A-situations, 
there is a great deal of flexibility regarding what can be emphasized. The characteristics 
we choose to emphasize, and thus our similarity-criteria themselves, are functions of our 
interests in a given context. Therefore, a given counterfactual may be deemed true in one 
context while false in another. Suppose, for example, that my computer is encased in 
inch-thick titanium. So, in regard to the same counterfactual as above — i.e., "Were I to 
drop my computer from two stories up, it would break upon impact" — let's specify our 
A-criterion as that of being in a situation in which an object clad in inch-thick titanium is 
dropped from two stories. This being the case, our A-situations are just those in which 
objects clad in inch-thick titanium are dropped from two stories. Suppose that, in these 
A-situations, the objects which are dropped do not break on impact. This being the case, 
let's have as our C-criterion that of being a situation in which an object survives impact. 
Hence, in the present case, the counterfactual "Were I to drop my computer from two 
stories up, it would break upon impact" fails to satisfy the C-criterion. So, the 
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recombination expressed by this conditional is less similar to the A-situations, according 
to the C-criterion, than recombinations in which I drop my (titanium clad) computer from 
two stories and it survives the impact, from which it follows that the counterfactual is 
false. 
Let's now consider how Lewis analyses the content of our doxastic states. Lewis 
says that the entire content of one's belief system is captured 
by a class of possible individuals — call them the believer's doxastic 
alternatives — who might, for all he believes, be himself. Individual X is 
one of them iff nothing that the believer believes, either explicitly or 
implicitly, rules out the hypothesis that he himself is X. These individuals 
are the believer's doxastic possibilities. But they are not different possible 
ways for the world to be; rather, they are different possible ways for an 
individual to be, and many of them may coexist within a single world... 
Suppose that all of someone's doxastic alternatives have a certain 
property; then he believes, explicitly or implicitly, that he himself has that 
property. 
One property that an inhabitant of a world may have is the property of 
inhabiting a world where a certain proposition holds.... So if all of 
someone's doxastic alternatives inhabit worlds where a certain proposition 
A holds, then he himself believes that A holds at his world, whichever 
world that may be. We may say, simply, that he believes the proposition A 
(28-29).38 
I will now give the alternative analysis of doxastic-state content. Obviously, an actual 
individual possesses many properties, both intrinsic and extrinsic. Among such extrinsic 
properties are those of inhabiting a world where such-and-such is the case—e.g., p may 
Similarly, in an essay entitled "Propositional Objects," Quine characterizes the content 
of propositional attitudes in terms of possible worlds. His efforts here are motivated, in 
large part, by the difficulties he takes to arise from conceiving of propositional objects in 
sentential terms. Quine does not take a modal-realist stance — his view is a sort of 
ersatzism according to which the relevant characteristics of'worlds' are represented 
mathematically. 
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be a world where there exist barking cats or mooing cows or talking donkeys. We have 
opinions about whether or not we possess certain properties — for example, I believe that 
I am six-feet tall and that I inhabit a world in which white-furred polar bears exist. With 
respect to certain other properties, we have no opinions — for example, I have no idea if I 
live in a world which includes talking donkeys (say, on some distant planet) or if I live in 
a world of one- or two-way eternal recurrence. And, there are other properties which 
we're simply unable to consider, being so unlike any of the properties to which we do 
have cognitive access that no amount of imaginative recombining would enable us to 
grasp them. (It's very likely that there are some properties of the latter kind present in our 
world.)39 There are obviously many ways that an actual individual might have been, 
many properties — both intrinsic and extrinsic — she might have possessed but actually 
doesn't. Let's call these an individual's non-actual possibilities. (Access to non-actual 
possibilities is provided either precisely by the features of p and recombinations thereof 
or schematically by our second-order mathematics.) For some of an individual S's non-
actual possibilities — let's use the letter ' P ' to denote this subset of non-actual 
possibilities — S believes nothing (either implicitly or explicitly) which rules out the 
hypothesis that she herself is among P. The subset, P, of S's non-actual possibilities is 
comprised of those possible individuals which coincide perfectly with the properties S 
3 9The only way we can grasp properties of the latter sort is schematically, by means of our 
second-order mathematics. Let's call properties of this kind foreign properties, by which 
is meant either properties that we can't gain cognitive access to by recombining any 
features of p — i.e., alien properties—or properties to which we cannot gain cognitive 
access by recombining any features of p to which we already have cognitive access. The 
difference between the former subset of foreign properties and the latter is, of course, that 
the latter may be instantiated in p. 
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believes herself to possess and not-possess. These individuals are S's doxastic 
alternatives. All possibilities belonging to P, with respect to myself, have the properties 
of, e.g., being six-feet tall and inhabiting a world in which white-furred polar bears exist, 
and fail to possess such properties as being blonde-haired. But, of course, being (non-
actual) ways in which S might have been, the members of P possess properties with 
respect to which 5 has no opinion (i.e., she neither believes nor disbelieves that she 
possesses them) and properties which are completely foreign to her. For instance, I have 
no opinion for or against the hypotheses that I live in a world with talking donkeys or a 
world of one-way eternal recurrence.40 Similarly, I have no idea as to my precise weight 
— I believe that I weigh somewhere between 180 and 185 pounds, but I believe nothing 
that rules out the conjecture that I weigh 181 pounds or that I weigh 183 pounds. 
Therefore, an individual S's doxastic alternatives possess all the properties which S 
believes herself to possess, and fail to possess all of those properties which S believes she 
doesn't possess; but each of S's doxastic alternatives also possesses certain properties 
with respect to which S herself has no opinion and, perhaps, certain properties which S 
cannot fathom in any precise way. S believes nothing which rules out the hypothesis that 
she is any one of these doxastic alternatives. 
To this point in my analysis of doxastic-state content, I've said nothing that's 
incompatible with Lewis' modal realism. What distinguishes Paradise on the Cheap's 
account of doxastic alternatives from the modal-realistic one is that the former, instead 
40Assuming that I do believe that I live in a world of one-way eternal recurrence, I may 
believe nothing which rules out the idea that I inhabit the 19* or the 1027* epoch of the 
world. 
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appealing to possible worlds, makes appeal to recombinations of features of this world. 
Doxastic alternatives are simply possible recombinations of p-features, which are all 
similar in that a certain subset of their properties perfectly match all of the beliefs an 
actual individual has regarding her own properties (including what kind world she lives 
in). In regard to the other properties possessed by these recombinations, an individual, S, 
neither believes nor disbelieves that she possesses them. Therefore, in all that S believes, 
there is nothing to rule out the hypothesis that she herself is the actualization of one of 
these recombinations. There is nothing in what I believe that rules out the conjecture that 
I am actually combined with the property of being in a world with talking donkeys or with 
the property of weighing 184 pounds or with that of being in a world of one-way eternal 
recurrence. Moreover, assuming (a) that p is a world of one-way eternal recurrence, (b) 
that I live in the 19 , h epoch — yet have no opinion as to which epoch I live in — and (c) 
that there can be recombinations of p-features which are also actually the case,4' it 
follows that there's nothing among my beliefs to rule out the thesis that I am the 
recombination existing in the 10l9 , h epoch. 
So, according to Paradise on the Cheap, the entire content of a doxastic agent's 
belief system is to be characterized as the set consisting of (a) recombinations, R, with 
4
' I take it to be fairly obvious that there can be actual recombinations of other actual 
phenomena, such as talking donkeys or barking cats. (In the same way, Lewis allows that 
actual individuals may have some possibilities that are likewise actual.) This being the 
case, as we don't have a complete list of the actual recombinations, there will be 
instances in which we have trouble determining whether or not a recombination is actual. 
But such cases don't pose problems for my account since (with Lewis) I wish to say that 
the actual is itself possible and, therefore, that the distinction between actual and non-
actual recombinations is irrelevant to my semantics. 
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respect to which there is nothing in what the agent believes to rule out the possibility that 
she is any one member, and (b) herself.42 All recombinations R pertaining to a particular 
doxastic agent, S, are similar in a very specific way: they, along with S herself, constitute 
S 's doxastic alternatives. Hence, S is similar to each member of R in that she is likewise 
a doxastic alternative. In regard to content, we're dealing with a very large — perhaps 
infinite — number of recombinations for any one agent's belief system. It is practically 
impossible for us to grasp all such recombinations individually and, thereby, to figure 
them into our explanations. For this reason, it might be better to refrain from talk of 
individual recombinations here and, instead, speak of similarity-projections? Classes of 
similarity projections can be represented formally, e.g, {x | nothing in what S believes 
eliminates the hypothesis that she herself is x). The latter thus represents all of S 's 
doxastic alternatives — all elements in the set satisfy the property indicated (they're all 
similar in that they possess this property) and, therefore, the set represents the entire 
content of S 's belief system. Though, due to practical limitations, we're unable to grasp 
every individual one of S 's doxastic alternatives (and, hence, the entirety of S 's belief 
system), we grasp the constraint on membership in the set of doxastic alternatives and can 
see in this constraint the potential for an infinity of doxastic alternatives. One may also, I 
presume, provide an interpretation for the objects in the set itself and thus specify, for 
example, that they are either recombinations or S herself. Roughly, one might specify the 
set in the following way: 
42Presumably, an agent is herself among her own doxastic alternatives. 
43Bryson Brown is to be credited for introducing me to the concept of projections. 
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{x I [(x=S) V (x=possible recombination)] & nothing in what S believes eliminates 
the hypothesis that she herself is x} 
It appears, then, that the similarity projections provide a way by which to represent the 
totality of one's belief system in terms of recombinations. 
Like modal realism, Paradise on the Cheap also gives an analysis of the content of 
individual beliefs. One is said to believe, explicitly or implicitly, that one possesses a 
certain property A if all of one's doxastic alternatives — or recombinations R — possess 
that property. (Such properties include the property of inhabiting a world in which a 
particular proposition a holds.) All of my doxastic alternatives possess the properties of 
being six-feet tall and of inhabiting a world in which white-furred polar bears exist. 
Therefore, I am said to believe that I have such properties and, hence, that I'm six-feet tall 
and that white-furred polar bears actually exist. In terms of similarity projections, we say 
that S believes she inhabits a world in which a particular proposition a holds just in case 
all members of her projection class (defined immediately above) represent individuals 
who occupy worlds at which a holds. 
Lewis takes a property to be the set of all its instances — "a// of them, this- and 
other-worldly alike" (50). By analysing properties as the set of all their actual and non-
actual instances, Lewis avoids a common objection to taking properties to be the sets of 
their instances, namely that different properties may happen to be coextensive. The set of 
renates and the set of cordates, for example, only appear to be accidentally-coextensive 
when we ignore their other-worldly instances. Lewis analyses relations in the same way. 
An instance of a dyadic relation is an ordered pair of related things; then 
we may take the relation again to be the set of its instances—all of them, 
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this- and other-worldly alike.... In the same way, a triadic relation can be 
taken as a set of ordered triples, and so on. Also we can include relations 
of variable degree, since there is no reason why pairs and triples, for 
instance, cannot both belong to a single set (52). 
One way we might try to analyse properties in terms of Paradise on the Cheap is by 
claiming that a property, or n-adic relation, is just the set of its actual instances and its 
instances occurring in recombinations. Thus, the property of being six-feet tall is to be 
analysed as the set of all the six-foot tall things existing in p coupled with all of the six-
foot tall things that we gain access to via our imaginative recombinations of features of p. 
Furthermore, the relation mother of is to be analysed as the set of all ordered pairs, xy — 
x being the mother of y — both in the actual world and grasped by means of imaginative 
recombination. As was the case with content, similarity projections might be a better way 
in which to represent properties as the set of all their actual and non-actual instances. 
Thus, we may analyse the property of being six-feet tall by means of the set {x | x is six-
feet tall}, and relation of mother of with {xy | x is the mother ofy}. 4 4 Again, such sets 
don't give us cognitive access to each instance of a property, but they do give us access to 
the constraints on set membership — which are just the relevant similarity-criteria — 
and, thereby, to the characteristic(s) definitive of an instance of a property.45 (And, by 
"Presumably, as discussed in regard to content, we can provide interpretations for the 
objects of such sets in terms of, e.g., actual and recombined instances of properties. For 
example, {x | [(x=possible recombination) V (x=actual individual)] & x is six-feet tall}. 
4 5Because we, at p, have cognitive access to conditions of membership in property sets, 
and because our cognitive access is limited to what's provided by the features of p, it 
follows that the information supposedly 'encoded' in the other-worldly extensions is 
really a matter of what, here at this world, we grasp as a property (in terms of what is 
required or equivalent to getting the similarity relation right). 
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considering the set of properties as a whole, we can grasp its potential infinitude.) 
Projection classes can even specify any spatiotemporal constraints which apply to 
particular properties and relations — for example, membership constraints may only 
allow certain properties/relations to occupy certain spatiotemporal positions, and they 
may assert that certain properties/relations can only occupy certain sizes and shapes of 
space-time. 
Of course, the non-actual things which instantiate properties in our 
recombinations are, ex hypothesi, not real. Hence the main point of contrast between the 
modal-realistic and the alternative analyses of properties and relations: the latter considers 
many property- and relation-instantiations to be unreal but acceptable projections of what 
is real. (The latter instantiations are 'acceptable projections' because they are suitably 
similar to actual instantiations — as suggested above, the criterion of suitable similarity 
with respect to any property is just the constraint on membership into the set of 
projections.) And, of course, there are many properties and relations to which we lack 
precise cognitive access and, of the properties and relations to which we do have precise 
cognitive access, there are many instantiations to which we lack such access; but the 
same limitations apply under modal realism. Moreover, just as modal realists posit the 
existence of a plurality of real possible worlds and possible individuals, proponents of 
Paradise on the Cheap acknowledge that there are myriad ways in which the actual world 
and actual individuals might have been. We are able to grasp some of these ways 
precisely by imaginative recombination and the others schematically by means of our 
second-order mathematics. Thus, Paradise on the Cheap makes provision for just as 
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many properties, relations, and instantiations as does modal realism; and the former 
affords the same degree of cognitive access to such properties, relations, and 
instantiations as does the latter. So, one might conclude that if modal realism avoids the 
objection that a property or relation may be coextensive, then so does Paradise on the 
Cheap. 
There is, however, a significant problem with the alternative analysis of properties 
just discussed. Andrew Irvine, in commenting on a mature draft of this paper, argues 
that, with respect to Paradise on the Cheap, identifying properties with the sets of all their 
actual and non-actual instances will not avoid coextensionality problems such as that 
between the set of renates and the set of cordates. He says, 
if by 'instances' we mean thin individuals (i.e., haecceities), then both 
'being a renate' and 'being a cordate' will be identified with the same set, 
{a, b, c, . . .}. In contrast, if by 'instances' we mean thick individuals (i.e., 
facts or states of affairs), then 'being a renate' will be identified with {Ra, 
Rb, Rc,...} and 'being a cordate' will be identified with {Ca, Cb, Cc}, but 
we won't have succeeded in eliminating properties. 
Because, according to Paradise on the Cheap, possibilities — and, hence, possible 
individuals — are grounded in the features of p, we have it that any given individual 
represents itself in all recombinations of which it is a part (including those 
recombinations which consist exclusively of the individual in question). Therefore, an 
individual has the same haecceity (or 'thisness') in any recombined state of affairs.46 
Let's specify the similarity-criterion as that of being a renate or a cordate or both (a very 
plausible condition, I think). Thus, any individual which is both a renate and a cordate is 
4 6For an account of Paradise on the Cheap's amenability to Kripkean views on haecceities 
and haecceitism, see Section D of the present chapter. 
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possibly just a renate and possibly just a cordate. Similarly, all just-renate individuals are 
possibly just-cordate individuals, and all just-cordate individuals are possibly just-renate 
individuals. Moreover, all just-renate and just-cordate individuals are possibly renate-
and-cordate individuals. And since individuals represent their own possibilities, it 
follows that all individuals which are in the set of renates are also in the set of cordates, 
and vice versa. So, the set of renates and the set of cordates are coextensive. It's 
important to note that modal realists are not faced with this result. For Lewis, an 
individual only ever represents one possibility for itself, namely the one that it itself 
actualizes. All the other possibilities for an individual are represented by its 
counterparts. Thus, if we require that two individuals must each be renates or cordates or 
both in order to be counterparts, it follows that the possibilities for any particular renate-
and-cordate, just-renate, and just-cordate will consist of myriad different individuals. 
Therefore, the set of all renates and the set of all cordates will not have the same 
membership, from which it follows that the two sets will not be coextensive. 
One might think that the present difficulties over properties can be resolved by 
specifying renate- and cordate-instances more robustly, instead of just in terms of 
haecceities. Thus, one may specify the members of the set of renates and the set of 
cordates, respectively, as individuals with properties in addition to those of having a 
kidney and having a heart. This being the case, one could distinguish the individuals in 
the set of renates and the set of cordates by the other properties they possess. So 
although, according to Paradise on the Cheap, individuals represent their own 
possibilities, one would be able to say that there are instances of the property of having a 
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kidney which are distinct from instances of the property of having a heart (because the 
former have different properties than the latter), and vice versa. However, this strategy 
fails because, in following it, we analyse the properties of having a heart and having a 
kidney by appealing to other properties; and to use properties to explain properties is just 
circular. 
I have two suggestions as to how this dilemma might be avoided. First, we may 
choose to abandon Paradise on the Cheap's analysis of properties. But, assuming that this 
course of action is undesirable, our second option (in my opinion) is to leave 
quantification, over actual individuals and non-actual recombinations, out of the analysis 
and focus instead on the similarity conditions which allow us to distinguish between 
recombinations bearing just the one property and those bearing just the other.4 7 Indeed, in 
contrast to my interpretation of Irvine's objection, Bryson Brown sees the latter as a 
rejection of my use of quantification over recombinations period. Recombinations do not 
exist — and, so, cannot be the values of any bound variables — from which it follows 
that, in quantifying over all renates or all cordates, I quantify over just the actual renates 
or the actual cordates. Hence, assuming that all actual renates are also cordates, and that 
all actual cordates are also renates, we have it that the set of all renates is coextensive 
with the set of all cordates (regardless of whether we understand the property-instances to 
be 'thick' or 'thin' individuals). I don't wish to debate whose interpretation — Brown's 
4 7 I am indebted to Bryson Brown for suggesting this response to Irvine and for 
contributing, in large part, to its articulation. 
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or mine — is the correct one; 4 8 and I don't really have to because the solution to be 
proposed immediately (the one that doesn 't involve complete abandonment of an 
alternative analysis of properties) neutralizes Irvine's objection on either view! 
Based on what was said in note 45, it is clear that an understanding of a property, 
in terms of the relevant similarity-criteria (which we can distinguish from other similarity 
relations associated with, or based on, different properties) is essential to any cognitive 
access we have to Lewis' multi-world property extensions and how/why they differ across 
worlds even though they overlap at p. Given this grasp, our understanding of the 
metaphysics of properties is grounded in the actual world, in the distinct similarity-
relations which link cordates qua cordate and renates qua renate. Our ability to correctly 
use Lewis extensional account of properties (whether as realists or fictionalists) 
presupposes that we, at p, can grasp the difference between the properties of being a 
renate and being a cordate without having to observe that their extensions are distinct. 
(All we need in order to grasp the difference between the two properties is access to the 
relevant similarity-criteria.) Therefore, the features of p are what provide us with the 
wherewithal to use modal realism to explain properties. With our this-worldly access to 
similarity-criteria we may, as suggested by Ian Hinckfuss, speak as //there are instances 
of renates which are not instances of cordates, and vice versa, by supposing modal 
realism to be true — as opposed to asserting its truth. Hinckfuss argues, roughly, that we 
can suppose modal realism to be true without committing ourselves to the existence of 
4 8In fact, it appears that each interpretation could be classified as a distinct objection to 
the Paradise-on-the-Cheap analysis of properties suggested above. 
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non-actual worlds and individuals. In using modal realism suppositionally to analyse 
properties, we employ a sort of 'quasi-quantification' over property-instances, i.e., we 
talk as if there really are non-actual individuals to quantify over; and thus, in the set of 
renates and the set of cordates, we include suppositional individuals which are just-
renates and just-cordates, respectively. (It does no harm to speak or think in this way, so 
long as don't confuse quasi-quantification with real quantification, as the latter applies 
exclusively to really-existing phenomena.) This being the case, and because the 
suppositional just-renates and just-cordates are ex hypothesi different individuals, it 
follows that the set of renates includes some supposedly-extant instances which the set of 
cordates does not, and vice versa. Thereby, we are able to analyse properties as the sets 
of their instances while avoiding problems of coextensionality and without committing 
ourselves to the truth of modal realism (even though we don't need modal realism to 
understand the distinctness of properties).50 
Hinckfuss also claims that "it is frequently useful to express certain economical 
truths using sentences exhibiting a false prodigal ontology and hence [that] it is absurd to 
demand of the economicalist that she amend her speech to mirror her economical beliefs" 
4 9If we use modal realism in a suppositional context, we commit ourselves to truth of 
certain conditionals, the antecedents of which consist of something like "If modal realism 
is true,..." and the consequents of which consist of assertions made in modal-realistic 
language. See Section C of the present chapter, in which I discuss Hinckfuss' views in 
far greater detail. 
S0Quasi-quantification does nothing to help Paradise on the Cheap avoid problems of 
coextensionality. Even if we suppose that non-actual recombinations really exist — and, 
hence, that there exist just-renate and just-cordate instances — it remains that, according 
to Paradise on the Cheap, an individual, S, is part of every recombination which is a 
possibility for S. Thus, we fall prey to Irvine's objection as / interpret it. 
-47-
(596). Thus, proponents of Paradise on the Cheap can use modal realism to give a 
suppositional analysis of properties while adhering consistently to their economical 
convictions. However, our grasp of similarity constraints, in virtue of which we're able 
to correctly employ Lewis' extensional analysis of properties, is also what yields 
cognitive access to recombinations which are just-renates and those which are just-
cordates. Indeed, the fact that there are suitably similar recombinations — with respect to 
either being a renate or being a cordate — which have one property but lack the other (a 
point which Irvine does not contest) indicates that these two similarity-criteria are 
distinguishable. So, although quantifying over recombinations (whether we use real or 
quasi-recombination), and thereby identifying properties with sets of the latter, gets us 
into trouble with coextensionality in the ways discussed above, we can still identify a 
property with the similarity-criteria that allows us to distinguish between recombinations 
which possess it and those which don't. Thus, we are able to give a Paradise-on-the-
Cheap analysis of properties in terms of such similarity-criteria — an analysis which 
doesn't encounter the problems which Irvine points out for the earlier one. 
1 should present a more detailed picture of how, in general, we judge states of 
affairs to be suitably similar. Evidently, we grasp (epidemically and/or doxastically) how 
properties, natural kinds, and objects behave based on how we see them behave in this 
world. In general, these actual phenomena constitute our only precise means of gaining 
cognitive access to what is possible and impossible for p-individuals and p itself. In 
judging whether or not a sentence is possibly true, we 'bridge out,' so to speak, from the 
individuals, properties, and kinds dealt with therein to certain actual individuals, 
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properties, and kinds.51 We thus judge whether or not the former are suitably similar to 
the latter and whether the arrangement of the former is suitably similar to the way in 
which the latter are arranged. The arrangement of properties, individuals, and kinds is 
key here since we, of course, regard certain applications of properties to individuals and 
kinds (via recombination) as permissible while we regard others as impermissible. For 
example, to the natural kind cat corresponds the property of being a cat. Hence, one may 
assert of any individual cat — or each individual in the set of all cats — that it possesses 
the property of being a cat. Moreover, in addition to the property of being an individual 
which barks, there exist particular instances of barking (whether the latter be identified 
with certain sounds or physiological processes or something else). Thus, one may say of 
any particular bark that it possesses a property of having a particular pitch, registering 
certain levels on a recording device, or being causally linked with certain physiological 
processes. However, it's very unlikely that we'll assert the possibility of a bark which 
has the property of being a cat. Instead, we'll deny that recombinations in which the 
property of being a cat is applied to an individual occurrence of barking are suitably 
similar to any actual property-individual combination. Our linguistic conventions, and 
conceptual schemes, are such that to speak of a bark which has property of being a cat is 
to talk nonsense. By contrast, to speak of barking cats — whether in regard to individual 
cats or the natural kind corresponding to the set of all cats — is to speak of a possible 
state of affairs (as opposed to an impossible one) since the arrangement of properties, 
5 lThanks go to Bryson Brown for the 'bridging out' metaphor, as well as for suggestions 
which led me to this view of how we determine suitable similarity. 
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individuals, and kinds is suitably similar to certain actual arrangements of properties, 
individuals, kinds (in which, e.g., dogs and cats possess the properties of being able to 
bark and meow, respectively). 
This account of how we judge states of affairs to be suitably similar emphasizes 
the limits we have with respect to alien individuals and alien properties. But, as 
mentioned at various points above, we are able to grasp alien possibilities schematically 
via second-order mathematical structures. It's time that I give a more detailed account of 
the second-order apparatus employed by Paradise on the Cheap. Brown has suggested 
that we might characterize the schematic descriptions in terms of Ramsey sentences.52 I'll 
illustrate by means of a simple example: the geometrical truth that, given any two points, 
there is one and only one line joining them. Instead of expressing this idea in first-order 
language, like so 
(Vx<y) [(Pointtx) & Point(y) & ~(x=y)) a (3r) (Line(z) & On(x,z) & On(y+) & 
(Vw) (Line(w) & On(x,w) & On(y,w) = w=z))] 
we express it in second-order quantified language: 
3(P,L,0): (Vx,y) [(P(X) & P(y) & ~(x=y)) = (3r) (L(z) & 0(x,z) & 0(y*) & (Vw) 
(L(w) & 0(x,w) & 0(y,w) 3 w=z))]. 
Thus, we abstract from any particular identification of what these properties are. The 
latter formulation specifies neither the properties Point or Line nor the relation On — it 
"According to Brown, Ramsey's idea was to abstract away from any particular 
identification of the properties to which we refer in scientific theories and just assert the 
existence of some properties satisfying the relations that the theories' properties must. 
See FP. Ramsey, The Foundation of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, 212-15, 
231. (Page references provided by Hempel in note 60 of "The Theoretician's Dilemma," 
page 216.) 
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merely asserts the existence of some properties (whatever they are) which satisfy a certain 
relation. This second-order abstraction describes, schematically, the structure of some 
alien states of affairs, as does the following: 
3(A,B,C): (Vxjv) (A(x,y) & B(x,z) a C(z<y)). 
No interpretation is given to the properties quantified-over in such Ramsey sentences; and 
thus, the latter allow us to recognize the structure of ways which p and/or its parts might 
have been even though there are specifications of these properties, and the individuals 
which instantiate them, to which we do not have cognitive access. 
Via the process of Ramsification, we are able to represent, in a highly vague and 
schematic way, many possibilities which we cannot grasp by means of precise 
imaginative recombinations. In giving my alternative analyses of modality, 
counterfactuals, doxastic-state content, and properties, I didn't say very much about alien 
phenomena or how they're handled by Paradise on the Cheap — I focused, instead, on 
those possible states of p and p-individuals to which we have precise cognitive access. 
My intent was not to mislead — I had resolved to get more specific about alien 
phenomena and second-order structures only after showing the full use to which the 
notion of recombination, along with similarity projections, can be put with respect those 
things to which we have precise cognitive access. (The latter entities do figure more 
prominently in our alterative analyses.) In any event, I will now survey some ways in 
which alien phenomena, as they pertain to modality, counterfactuals, content, and 
properties, can be handled by Paradise on the Cheap. 
We can regard a second-order structure as representing possibilities if and only if 
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p is suitably similar to it in certain ways (as when certain specifications of its properties 
yield actual truths). Recall the sentence "3(A,B,C): (Vxov) (A(x,y) & B(x,r) a C(z^))" 
— its properties might be deemed possible because the relations in which they stand 
resemble the structure of the following actual truth "(Vx,y,z) (Mother(x,y) & Daughter(x,z) 
3 Grandmother(z,y))" We may even evaluate the truth and falsity of counterfactuals 
which deal with alien phenomena — either or both the antecedent and consequent of such 
conditionals are specified in schematic terms. All one has to do is come up with an A-
criterion and a C-criterion, specify a set of A-situations, and judge whether the latter 
satisfy the C-criterion with respect to the state of affairs that the counterfactual describes 
(whether the counterfactual is given in precise terms, schematic terms, or a combination 
of the two is unimportant). 
Alien phenomena figure more importantly in Paradise on the Cheap's analysis of 
content. A person, 5, most likely has some beliefs about what sorts of relations hold 
between properties (unspecified) in the world; and surely S has no opinion concerning 
whether various relations in which alien properties can exist actually hold at p. These 
relations — or structures — are part of what determine an individual's doxastic 
alternatives, as S believes nothing to rule out the hypothesis that she lives in a world 
where some of these relations hold. We lack precise cognitive access to many of these 
structures and, so, we can only grasp them schematically and specify them using our 
second-order mathematical apparatus. Therefore, contrary to what I might have 
insinuated earlier on in this section, it takes schematic mathematical representations, in 
addition to p-features and recombinations thereof, to fully specify one's doxastic 
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alternatives and, hence, one's belief system. This being the case, if we want to give an 
interpretation to the objects in our sets of similarity projections, we should give a 
characterization like the following: {x | [(x=S) V (x=(recombination V schematic 
structure))] & nothing that S believes rules out the possibility that she is x}. The actual 
properties, recombined properties, and second-order schemas which together represent 
the content of S's entire belief system are all similar to one another in that they all 
represent properties which, given what S believes, she cannot rule out the conjecture that 
she possesses them. 
Paradise on the Cheap can also yield analyses of alien properties. We can 
characterize the latter as the sets of all their instances via sets of similarity projections. 
Thus, we may say of an unspecified property that it is, for example, quadradic, that it 
stands in certain relations to other properties, or it's instantiated only in certain parts or 
kinds of space-time. Consider the following sets: 
{A | 3(wjy*) [A(wjcy^)] & and A is alien} 
{P | (Vx,y) [(P(x) & P(y) & ~(x=y)) 3 (3z) (L(s) & 0(x,r) & Otjv) & (Vw) (L(w) 
& 0(x,w) & 0(v,w) 3 w=z))] & P is alien}. 
It must be specified, as part of the membership constraints of the set, that P is alien — 
otherwise non-alien properties will be allowed into the set, which is not what we want. 
Therefore, just like actual individuals and non-actual recombinations, the second-
order structures appealed to in our explanations of modality, counterfactuals, content, and 
properties can be judge in terms of similarity. Our second-order mathematical structures 
provide a basis on which I can respond to an objection that some will likely raise against 
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the central role which imaginative recombination plays in Paradise on the Cheap. Bryson 
Brown stated this objection very well in some comments he addressed to me: 
[T]he possibilities here, in broad, are infinite, but we can only imagine 
things one at a time. So our semantics for possibility will intuitively fall 
short of capturing the infinity of possibilities, unless we include things we 
don't imagine, but could. And if we include those, how shall our 
semantics for them go? Do we imagine them, and find mem sufficiently 
similar to things we do imagine? But that won't work, since we're trying 
to get hold of the possibilities we don't ever imagine!53 
My reply is to stress that we do grasp those possibilities which aren't imagined 
specifically by recombination. Some of these are given schematically by our second-
order mathematics and are suitably similar to features of the actual world and/or to things 
which we do specifically imagine by recombination (e.g., their properties may be judged 
to share the same structure). 
Moreover, we can expand our grasp of possibilities beyond that which is provided 
by individual imaginative recombinations and schematic structures via sets of similarity 
projections. What we do here is construct sets whose members are all and only those 
elements satisfying particular similarity-criteria. For example, we can represent all 
talking donkeys with {x | x is a talking donkey}, or all dyadic properties with {P | 3(x,y) 
P(x^)}. (We might wish to be more specific when we define a set like that of the talking 
donkeys, as follows: {x | [(x=actual individual) V (x=recombination)] &x represents a 
This objection is rooted in Descartes "Meditation Two," in which he emphasizes, 
among other things, that "I [Descartes] grasp that the wax is capable of running through 
innumerable changes of this sort, even though I am incapable of running through these 
innumerable changes by using my imagination" (22). 
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talking donkey}.54) So, in grasping constraints on membership in these similarity sets, we 
also acknowledge that their members (both actual and non-actual) may be infinite in 
number. Of course, because possibilities are grounded in this world, one must be able to 
grasp the totality of the actual and recombined individuals, or states of affairs, included in 
such sets. This grasp is achieved via vague mental recombinations — thereby, many 
actual and recombined possibilities are apprehended in one act of imaginative 
recombination. For example, I can consider the possibility of someone, or something, 
being less than six-feet tall (say, from S'6" up to, but not including, 6') — a possibility 
under which many actual individuals and recombinations are subsumed — without 
resorting to a continuum of thoughts. Likewise, one act of imaginative recombination 
gives me access to the similarity-criteria constraining membership in the set of talking 
donkeys. This act of mental recombination is so vague that, in performing it, 1 don't 
imagine any particular talking donkeys; but, in its vagueness, it 'covers' each actual or 
recombined talking donkey. Thus, I leave similarity to carry the ultimate semantic 
burden. But, as Brown has suggested, our ability to make similarity judgements is both 
fundamental enough (in, for example, learning, induction, and how we judge possibilities 
and the truth values of counterfactuals) and, perhaps, rich enough a notion to carry the 
load. 
Overall, then, the possibility of alien properties, individuals, and states of affairs is 
54Recall that, in note 20,1 use the term 'represent' (with respect to Paradise on the Cheap) 
in such away that it's synonymous with 'ground.' Thus, to say that a set represents all 
talking donkeys is to say that all possible talking donkeys are grounded in, or constituted 
by, that set (the latter being, in turn, grounded in the features of p). 
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adequately grasped via an understanding of their structure (i.e., the relations which hold 
between them). Indeed, to the extent that alien phenomena are important to our 
alternative analyses of modality, counterfactuals, content, and properties, we need nothing 
more than a schematic understanding of them; and we needn't assert their existence. The 
challenge for Lewis is to show the philosophical need for alien properties and individuals 
to exist and constitute the semantic value of sentences concerning alien phenomena 
(which must, of course, be formulated in schematic terms). 
There's an epistemological appeal to the alternative analyses of modality, 
counterfactuals, content, and properties which modal-realistic analyses of the same 
phenomena lack. The alternative analyses make appeal to actual situations, actual 
individuals, second-order mathematical structures, and recombinations, and similarity-
based projections, not to possible worlds. Actual situations, actual individuals, and 
recombinations are far more epistemically accessible than any truths about other worlds 
(and, given a naturalized ontology for mathematics, so are our projection sets and second-
order mathematical structures). For one thing, we can be caused to be aware of the 
existence of the former things as well as truth and falsity of sentences about them. The 
fact that the means of analysis which Paradise on the Cheap employs are much more 
cognitively accessible than those employed by modal realism perhaps constitutes an 
explanatory advantage of the former theory over the latter. 
C. It should now be clear the approach one ought to take in using Paradise on the 
Cheap to analyse modality, counterfactuals, doxastic-state content, and properties. 
Though I have shown that Paradise on the Cheap provides satisfactory explanations of 
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these phenomena, I have not demonstrated explicitly that Paradise on the cheap can 
explain everything which Lewis claims to explain via modal realism (call these Lewis-
phenomena). I have not provided alternative explanations for, among other things, 
verisimilitude, causation, and epistemic-state content.55 To give explanations of all such 
phenomena in terms of Paradise on the Cheap would require me to match, or come close 
to matching, the 60-odd pages which Lewis spends discussing the theoretical benefits of 
modal realism (in §§1.2-1.5 ofOPW). Due to the spatial and temporal limitations I'm 
currently under, pursuing this strategy simply isn't feasible. But, not to worry: this 
infeasible strategy is also unnecessary, as the arguments of this section will make 
apparent. 
Instead of providing an explicit account of all the theoretical benefits of Paradise 
on the Cheap, I shall employ a strategy based on material presented by Ian Hinckfuss, in 
his excellent paper "Suppositions, Presuppositions, and Ontology" (henceforth "SPO"). 
This strategy (call it the Hinckfussian strategy) allows one to give alternative analyses of 
all the phenomena with which Lewis is concerned by using modal realism as a 
suppositional theory, as a hypothetical deductive tool for deriving conclusions in the 
language of Paradise on the Cheap. Key to the Hinckfussian strategy are the notions of 
supposition and presupposition. Suppositions, Hinckfuss says, are "dialectical 
commitments of a sort. Any participant whose locution is governed by a supposition is 
5SLewis discusses verisimilitude and causation in OPW, §1.3, and epistemic-state content 
in §1.4. 
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reasonably expected to speak as if the supposition is true" (600). Suppositions are to the 
assertions they govern as the antecedent of a conditional locution is to its consequent. 
Presuppositions are inherited by dialogues via suppositions which have been operative in 
a large majority of dialogues within the larger dialectical community.37 As with 
suppositions simpliciter, the commitment generated by an assertion governed by an 
appropriate presupposition is merely a conditional with the presupposition as antecedent 
and the expressed proposition as consequent — the conditional may well be true even 
though its consequent is false. Only if there are no suppositional or presuppositional 
commitments does an assertion overtly expressing a proposition, p , commit every 
participant in a dialogue to p. (The distinction between suppositions and presuppositions 
needn't concern us any further here — in the discussion which follows, it's of no matter 
whether an assertion is governed by a supposition or by a presupposition. For the latter 
reason, I shall henceforth use the terms 'supposition' and "suppositional commitment,' 
and their variants, in discussing both suppositions and presuppositions.) 
Thus, assertions do not always commit us to the propositions overtly expressed by 
them; "[r]ather, assertions made under the scope of a supposition commit us to a 
conditional of which the proposition expressed is the consequent and the supposition is 
the antecedent" (Hinckfuss 597). According to Hinckfuss, "nobody has to commit 
56According to Hinckfuss, suppositional commitments should be communal — if any 
participant in a dialogue has them, then all participants in the dialogue should have them. 
5 7By dialectical community is meant the union of "all the dialogues in which everybody in 
a community is or has been engaged into one big dialogue — the community dialogue" 
(Hinckfuss 602). Presuppositions, then, are the set of all those suppositions which a very 
large proportion of the community's dialogues have in common. 
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themselves to the existence of events, properties, or possible worlds simply because they 
say something that entails the existence of events, properties, or possible worlds — given 
that what they say is governed by appropriate presuppositions" (617). We can treat 
ontologicaUy-prodigal statements like those made in the language of modal realism as 
suppositional and, in this way, we can make ontologicaUy-prodigal assertions about 
possible worlds, possible individuals, &c. without committing ourselves to the truth of 
modal realism. For example, the statement "There are other worlds at which polar bears 
are rurless" may be governed by the supposition that modal realism is true. Making the 
former assertion under the latter supposition commits one neither to the existence of non-
actual worlds nor rurless polar bears but to the truth of the conditional "If modal realism 
is true, then there are other worlds at which polar bears are rurless." 
It may turn out that, in general, modal realism is easier to use than Paradise on the 
Cheap, i.e., that the former's analyses of modality, counterfactuals, &c. are heuristically 
simpler than those of the latter. I will now demonstrate how modal realism can be used 
suppositionally to deduce the economical conclusions of Paradise on the Cheap. 
Consider the following passage, in which Hinckfuss specifies how such deductions are 
carried out: 
[constructions with lean ontological commitments are equated by what 
Field calls bridge laws with propositions quantifying over items such as 
possible worlds and truth values, all couched in a syntax whose logic is 
learnt on mother's knee involving no more than individual variables, 
predicates, simple propositional operators and a couple of simple 
quantifiers. Assumptions with a lean ontology are then transformed via 
the bridge laws to corresponding propositions concerning an item or items 
of the fictional ontology. These may be supplemented by further premises 
gleaned from a false but presupposed auxiliary theory about the fictional 
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ontology. Deduction then proceeds. The presupposed bridge laws then 
allow an ontologically economical substitution for the ontologically 
prodigal conclusion.... 
More generally, the picture is this. We have some economical 
propositions, E„ E n ( e ) . We have some bridge laws, B „ B n ( b ) , which 
equate economical propositions to propositions concerning the fictional 
items within the prodigal ontology and perhaps, though not necessarily, 
some non-fictional items as well, and which, together with E „ E n ( e ) 
entail the prodigal propositions, P„. . . P n ( p ) . We also have some 
propositions, A „ A n ( a ) , which derive from a presupposed auxiliary 
theory A concerning fictional items. From these and P„. . . P n ( p ) , we deduce 
our prodigal conclusion P c . Finally, we have a bridge law, B r, which 
allows us to deduce an economical conclusion E c (607-8). 
I had two motives in Section B. First, I wanted to show, by way of example, how 
analyses are carried out in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. Second, I wanted to develop 
certain key concepts of Paradise on the Cheap (e.g., recombination, suitable similarity, 
and second-order schematic structures), concepts which are vital to the formulation of our 
economical propositions E„ E n ( e ) and bridge laws B„ B n ( b ) . These concepts 
comprise the bulk of the apparatus needed to employ modal realism as a suppositional 
theory in performing alternative analyses of Lewis-phenomena. In regard to Paradise on 
the Cheap, E„ E n ( e ( are propositions concerning the features of p, recombinations of the 
features of p, schematic representations, and suitably similar states of affairs. B„ B n ( b ) 
are principles equating propositions about p-features, p-recombinations, schematic 
representations, and suitably similar states of affairs to propositions about possible 
worlds, possible individuals, and similarity orderings relevant to such phenomena. Of 
course, the propositions P „ P ^ , have to do with possible worlds, possible individuals, 
and similarity orderings. Our auxiliary theory, A, is modal realism; and the propositions 
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A „ A „ ( a ) are propositions deriving from the latter. 
In order to, a la Hinckfuss, use modal realism as a suppositional theory to provide 
a perhaps simpler method for analysing modality, counterfactuals &c. in terms of 
Paradise on the Cheap, we must modify Hinckfuss' account somewhat. We must 
introduce a class of phenomena to be analysed — for example, particular instances of 
necessities, contingencies, counterfactual conditionals, instances of verisimilitude, 
causation, and doxastic- and epistemic-state content. Furthermore, two different sets of 
bridge laws (instead of just one) must be introduced — both suppositional. First, those 
asserting false-yet-supposedly-true equivalencies between the things to be analysed, e.g., 
Op, and items in the prodigal ontology, e.g., 3x (Possible world x & p is true in x). 
Second, those asserting false-yet-supposedly-true equivalencies between items in the 
prodigal ontology and items in the economical ontology, e.g., 3.x (Possible world x & p is 
true inx) = p',p (suitably similar I p' is actual).58 Analyses proceed in the following way: 
(1) Op 
(2) Op & (Op = 3x (Possible world x&pis true in x)) 
(3) 3x (Possible world x&pis true in x) & (3x (Possible world x&pis true in x) 
= p',p (suitably similar/p' is actual) 
(4) p',p (suitably similar / p' is actual) 
The two sets of bridge laws derive, respectively, from two suppositional theories. The 
5 8I.e., the actual state of affairs p' is suitably similar to the recombination/schematic 
structure p. As a recombination, p may be actual (and therefore real)—such as talking 
donkeys which exist on, say, some distant planet — or non-actual and ex hypothesi 
unreal. Moreover, being ex hypothesi alien, the individuals, states of affairs, or properties 
represented by schematic structures are not real. 
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first—modal realism — equates Lewis-phenomena with entities in the prodigal 
ontology. (To put the point another way, the first suppositional theory specifies the usual 
possible-worlds semantics for expressions of modality, counterfactuals, doxastic and 
epistemic states, truth-like theories, &c. in terms of ontologicaUy-prodigal entities like 
possible worlds and possible individuals.) The second theory — a false theory which 
we're supposing to be true — links entities in the prodigal ontology with entities in the 
economical ontology of Paradise on the Cheap. (It's interesting to note that the second 
set of bridge laws — specified below — suggest how to carry out analyses strictly in 
terms of Paradise on the Cheap; and they indicate the kinds of items in the economical 
ontology which, in one way or another, do the relevant explanatory work. Indeed, if these 
bridge laws do yield analyses then Paradise on the Cheap stands completely independent 
of modal realism, except for any heuristic convenience which the latter may afford. And, 
even if they don't yield analyses, they may at least indicate the direction in which 
analyses may be sought.) The deduction's conclusion — 4 — is, of course, the 
economical analysis of the phenomenon to be analysed in 1. Thus, the deduction from 1 
to 4 serves to analyse Lewis-phenomena in terms of economical entities. (I must stress 
that I am not trying to reduce modal realism to Paradise on the Cheap here. I am merely 
illustrating how, by supposing (falsely) that certain equivalencies hold between the 
entities of my ontology and the entities of Lewis' ontology, we can use modal realism as a 
deductive tool for carrying out alternative analyses of Lewis-phenomena.) 
The class of things to be analysed is given to us by Lewis in OPW, as is the theory 
which explains these things via entities in the prodigal ontology (i.e., Lewis' theory of 
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modal realism). Hence, in constructing the suppositional model for analysing Lewis-
phenomena via Paradise on the Cheap, the only thing left for proponents of Paradise on 
the Cheap to do is develop the theory which asserts equivalences to hold between the 
items of the prodigal ontology and those of the economical one. I won't attempt to give a 
precise logical formulation of this false-yet-supposedly-true theory here. Rather, I shall 
simply account for the bridge laws which arise from it; for it is the latter, in particular, 
which we require for our analyses. 
The first two bridge laws can be specified as follows: 
(1) A possible world is equivalent to a recombination of p-features to which the 
actual world is suitably similar plus, perhaps, certain schematic structures. 
(2) A possible individual is equivalent to a recombination of p-features to which 
the actual world is suitably similar plus, perhaps, certain schematic structures. 
(The second-order schematic structures, of course, serve to represent alien components in 
possible states of p.) The reader will notice right away that the Paradise-on-the-Cheap 
equivalent to a possible individual is the same as the Paradise-on-the-Cheap equivalent to 
a possible world (which is perfect since, for Lewis, worlds just are another kind of 
individual.)39 One might object that to assert the same alternative equivalent for both 
possible worlds and possible individuals is disadvantageous, since in doing so we lose the 
39Indeed, in one context, we may treat a recombination/schematic structure as equivalent 
to a possible world and, in another context, we may treat the same 
recombination/schematic structure as equivalent to a possible individual (in much the 
same way as, according to modal realism, one possible world may be duplicated as part of 
another, more-inclusive world). 
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distinction between modality de dicto and de re,60 but according to Paradise on the Cheap, 
the distinction between de dicto and de re modality does not run parallel to modal 
realism's version of the distinction, according to which de re modality is quantification 
over possible individuals and de dicto modality is quantification over possible worlds. 
Therefore, for Paradise on the Cheap, the difference between modality de dicto and de re 
does not depend on anything like a distinction between different types of 
recombinations/schematic structures; rather this distinction corresponds to a distinction 
between a state of affairs included in a recombination/schematic structure and a property 
possessed by a recombination/schematic structure. The alternative analysis of de dicto 
modality requires us to emphasize the states of affairs included in 
recombinations/schematic structures — the alternative analysis of de re modality requires 
us to emphasize the properties possessed by recombinations/schematic structures.61 
Consider a particular recombination, r, according to which a is the case. If certain actual 
states of affairs are suitably similar to r in the relevant respect(s) — respects which may 
60De dicto modality pertains to states of affairs, while de re modality pertains to the 
properties possessed by individuals. Consider (a) a state of affairs in which barking cats 
exist and (b) an individual cat (say my cat, Roy) which possesses the property of being 
able to bark. To (a), the sentence "Possibly: barking cats exist" (de dicto) applies, and to 
(b) applies a sentence like "My cat, Roy, possibly barks" (de re). Therefore, in de dicto 
position, modal operators modify entire sentences (e.g., "Barking cats exist") while, in de 
re position, they modify predicates (e.g., 'barks'). 
6 1I am not suggesting that recombinations/schematic structures are somehow maximal 
individuals. My distinction between de dicto and de re modality corresponds simply to 
the parts of recombinations/schematic structures which one emphasizes in a given 
context. For example, the recombination of a talking donkey can be seen as representing 
a state of affairs — namely the existence of a talking donkey—as well as an individual 
— namely a donkey which talks. Modality de dicto and de re emphasize the former and 
latter, respectively. 
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or may not involve the presence of a—then we say that the former states of affairs are 
suitably similar to r (according to which a is the case), which allows us to conclude that 
possibly a is the case, in the de dicto sense. For example, imagine a recombined state of 
affairs, r, in which our solar system is the same as it actually is except in one respect: that 
Jupiter is the fourth planet from the sun and Mars is the fifth. Given that our actual solar 
system is suitably similar to r, we have it that possibly (de dicto) Jupiter is the fourth 
planet from the sun and Mars is the fifth. By contrast, consider a recombination, r\ in 
which a particular property, A, is specified. If certain actual individual-property 
combinations are suitably similar to r \ then we're permitted to conclude that r' possibly 
possesses A, in the de re sense. Let's take, for instance, a this-worldly cat — say my cat, 
Roy — and recombine it with the ability to bark. Obviously, this is a recombination 
according to which Roy has the property of being able to bark. If we consider certain 
elements of p to be suitably similar to this barking-Roy recombination (e.g., barking dogs 
and meowing cats), then Roy possibly barks (de re). 
For clarity of exposition, let's call the recombinations/schematic structures which, 
depending on context, we suppositionally treat as equivalent to possible worlds 
'recombinations/schematic structures,' and the recombinations/schematic structures 
which, depending on context, we suppositionally treat as equivalent to possible 
individuals 'recombinations/schematic structures,.' Furthermore, let's speak of 
recombinations/schematic structures in general simply by using the term 
'recombinations/schematic structures.' 
By definition, recombinations include no alien phenomena. In contrast, some 
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possibilities consist of nothing but alien phenomena — these are expressed exclusively in 
terms of our second-order schematic structures. Regarding any of the 
recombinations/schematic structures which we consider in our analyses, it is precise and 
schematic characteristics to which we do have cognitive access that we use to judge 
suitable similarity. Naturally, there are in principle many recombinations/schematic 
structures, and recombinations/schematic structures, which are so complex that, 
practically speaking, we can't grasp them in their entirety (i.e., we can't entirely imagine 
them in any practical length of time) — and the same goes for many possible worlds and 
possible individuals. But, still, in each case of analysis, it is just the parts of the 
recombination/schematic structure which we do grasp (whether precise or schematic) that 
figure significantly into our judgements of suitable similarity. We determine that the 
actual world, or parts of it, are suitably similar (or not) to a recombination/schematic 
structure in virtue of the fact that certain aspects of the actual world, or the parts of it in 
question, are suitably similar (or not) to certain grasped-characteristics of the 
recombination/ schematic structure. For example, we deny that either p or any of its parts 
are suitably similar to a recombination which includes an object, the surface area of 
which is both completely red and completely green at the same time t. And, we may 
judge p, or a certain part of it, to be suitably similar to a recombination which includes 
barking cats and ex hypothesi no elements which violate our conditions on suitable 
similarity. Likewise, modal realists decide how similar non-actual worlds and individuals 
are to p and parts thereof based on certain features of those worlds and individuals to 
which they have cognitive access (including the structural characteristics of alien 
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phenomena which can be grasped via second-order mathematics). And, of the worlds and 
individuals which are too complex to understand in their entirety but which they still 
regard as possible, modal realists hypothesize—implicitly or explicitly — that these 
worlds and individuals do not contain any impossible elements (such as logical 
contradictions).62 
The third bridge law, which has to do with similarity orderings, asserts the 
following equivalences: 
(3a) Similarity orderings between the non-actual world andp are equivalent to 
similarity orderings between recombinations/schematic structures, and p. 
(3 b) Similarity orderings between non-actual worlds are equivalent to similarity 
orderings between recombinations/schematic structures,. 
(3c) Similarity orderings between non-actual individuals and actual individuals 
are equivalent to similarity orderings between recombinations/schematic 
structures2 and parts ofp (i.e., between recombinations/schematic structures, and 
actual individuals). 
(3d) Similarity orderings between non-actual individuals are equivalent to 
similarity orderings between recombinations/schematic structures;. 
"Impossible worlds and individuals — for the modal realist — and non-suitably-similar 
recombinations/schematic structures — for the proponent of Paradise on the Cheap — 
vary depending, respectively, on how the modal realist construes counterpart and 
accessibility relations and how the proponent of Paradise on the Cheap construes the 
principles of suitably similarity. If, for example, we consider walruses to be suitably 
similar to humans in certain respects (or, to be counterparts of humans), we may judge p, 
or certain p-parts, to be suitably similar to recombinations according to which I am a 
walrus (or, worlds in which I have walrus-counterparts). On the other hand, if we don't 
regard walruses as suitably similar to humans (or, if we refrain from regarding walruses 
as counterparts of humans) we'll say that p, or the relevant parts of p, are nof-suitably 
similar to a recombination in which I am a walrus (or, that there are no possible worlds in 
which I have a walrus-counterpart). In much the same way, Kripke teaches us in Naming 
and Necessity that a counterfactual state of affairs is possible or impossible depending on 
what we take to be the essential and accidental properties of the individuals involved 
(assuming that we're willing to attribute accidental and essential properties to things). 
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Moreover, the fourth and final bridge law asserts 
(4a) Accessible worlds are equivalent to recombinations/schematic structures, 
which are suitably similar to one another and/or the actual world. 
(4b) Counterparts are equivalent to recombinations/schematic structures2 which 
are suitably similar to one another and/or parts of the actual world. 
Of course, all judgements of similarity carried out in our analyses will be based on just 
those features of recombinations and features of p to which we have cognitive access. 
Likewise, modal realists judge similarities — including those which determine 
counterpart and accessibility relations — on the basis of just those aspects of worlds and 
individuals to which they have cognitive access. (Among such aspects are various 
structural characteristics, some of which hold of the actual world and while others hold at 
alien worlds. Those which hold at p are known naturally — via, for example, induction 
from the behaviour of this-worldly features — and those which hold at alien worlds are 
know stipulatively by means of the second-order abstractions discussed towards the end 
of Section B.) 
With these bridge laws established, we are now ready to carry out alternative 
analyses of Lewis-phenomena using modal realism suppositionally. At this point, one 
might ask why I would want to use this suppostional apparatus, given that I've already 
formulated enough economical concepts — recombinations, similarity projections, 
schematic structures, and similarity — to explain Lewis-phenomena without appeal to 
modal realism. (In other words, I've specified a wholly distinct semantics for Lewis-
phenomena in terms of recombinations, similarity projections, schematic structures, and 
similarity.) The reason is that I wish to take advantage of the heuristic fertility of the 
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latter. Modal realism may be believed to be logically simpler (and more transparent) than 
Paradise on the Cheap — a point recognized by Hinckfuss in saying that "[t]here seems 
little doubt that a presupposed increase in ontology can bring us logical simplicity" (607). 
For one thing, modal realism's extravagant language can encode consequence relations in 
its syntax that are not (or not so easily) encoded in the economical language of Paradise 
on the Cheap. The greater simplicity enjoyed by the conceptual apparatus of modal 
realism makes it easier to use than Paradise on the Cheap; and therefore, by using the 
former suppositionally, we can more easily perform our alternative analyses of Lewis-
phenomena. 
Possible worlds, possible individuals, similarity orderings, and counterpart and 
accessibility relations constitute the fundamental explanatory concepts of modal realism 
— in OPW, all Lewis phenomena are explained by appeal to just these entities. 
Therefore, given the (false) equivalences which the second set of bridge laws assert 
between modal realistic and alternative entities, it follows that we can use the 
suppositional apparatus outlined above to analyse all of the phenomena Lewis is 
concerned with in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. Before moving on, I'll give a few 
examples to illustrate. 
Using the suppositional apparatus, I will give a more expedient analysis of a 
counterfactual conditional than the one given in Section B above. The thing to be 
analysed here is the truth of a statement "A > C." Again, Lewis equates the truth of this 
statement with the fact that some world at which both A and C are true (or, some A-and-
C-world) is more similar to p than any world in which A is true and C is false (or, any A-
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and-not-C-world), given the relevant similarity-criteria. By means of the second set of 
bridge laws — the ones equating modal-realistic and alternative entities — we translate 
Lewis' analysis and, thereby, arrive at the alternative one: "A > C" is true because, given 
the relevant criteria of similarity, at least one recombination/schematic structure, 
according to which both A and C are the case is more similar to p (i.e., certain 
characteristics of it) than any recombination/schematic structure, according to which A is 
the case but C is not. Thus, we say that an A-and-C-recombination/schematic structure, is 
suitably similar to p because it satisfies the similarity-criteria to a greater degree than does 
any A-and-not-C-recombination/schematic structure,. Notice how many of the concepts 
used in the straight Paradise-on-the-Cheap analysis are not used in the suppositional 
analysis; but the results of the two analyses are the same. For we can stipulate that the 
relevant similarity-criteria are determined, respectively, by some attribute of A and 
certain events which take place in the world-parts specified by A. These criteria single 
out the parts of p to which A-and-C (i.e, the state of affairs described by the entire 
counterfactual) must be suitably similar. 
Lewis' analysis of counterfactuals is key to his account of causation. Consider the 
following passage: 
Suppose that two wholly distinct events occur, C and E; and if C had not 
occurred, E would not have occurred either. I say that if one even depends 
counterfactually on another in this way (and if it's the right sort of 
counterfactual, governed by the right sort of closeness of worlds) then, E 
depends causally on C, and C is a cause of E. To be sure, this is only the 
beginning of a counterfactual analysis of causation. Not all 
counterfactuals are of the right sort, and it is a good question how to 
distinguish the ones that are from the ones that aren't.... And not all 
effects depend counterfactually on their causes;... (23). 
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Despite the shortcomings that Lewis identifies in his preliminary analysis of causation, 
we can still use our suppositional apparatus to give a counterfactual analysis of causation 
in terms of Paradise on the Cheap.6 3 The counterfactual relevant to C and E is "not-C > 
not-E," the truth of which Lewis would analyse in terms of the fact that at least one not-
C-and-not-E-world is more similar to p than any not-C-and-E-world. According to our 
second set of bridge laws, we have the following analysis of the truth of "not-C > not-E": 
given the relevant criteria of similarity (which depend on certain characteristics of not-C), 
at least one recombination/schematic structure, according to which both not-C and not-E 
are the case is more similar to p than any recombination/schematic structure, according to 
which not-C is the case but not-E isn't. So, a not-C-and-not-E-recombination/schematic 
structure, is suitably similar to p because it satisfies the similarity-criteria to a greater 
degree than does any not-C-and-E-recombination/schematic structure,; and since the not-
C-and-not-E-recombination/schematic structure, is suitably similar to p, we say that "not-
C > not-E" is true and, therefore, that C is the cause of E. 
Let's now look briefly at verisimilitude. As indicated in Chapter 1, Lewis claims 
that a theory is close to the truth, with respect to p, to the extent that p resembles some 
6 3Lewis seems optimistic that a viable counterfactual analysis of causation can be given, 
as attests the following passage: 
You may or may not share my optimism about an analysis of causation in 
terms of counterfactual dependence of events. But even if you give up 
hope for an analysis, still you can scarcely deny that counterfactuals and 
causation are well and truly entangled. 
Causal theories of this, that, and the other have been deservedly popular in 
recent years. These theories are motivated by imagining cases where 
normal patterns of counterfactual dependence fail (Lewis 23). 
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world where that theory is exactly true. The alternative analysis of verisimilitude is very 
straightforward: given certain similarity conditions, we say that a theory is close to the 
(actual) truth to the extent that p is similar to some recombination/schematic structure, 
according to which that theory is exactly true.6 4 Furthermore, it would seem that truthlike 
theories themselves specify, at least in part, the appropriate recombinations/schematic 
structures, in regard to which we're to judge similarity; and the applications of such 
theories select the relevant regions of similarity in both p and recombinations/schematic 
structures. 
Lewis doesn't say much about epistemic-state content — he chooses, rather, to 
concentrate on belief states, "passing over the added complications that arise when we 
distinguish someone's knowledge from the rest of his system of belief' (Lewis 28). 
Based on the modal realistic analysis of belief-state content, coupled with what Lewis 
does say about knowledge, we can put together a partial modal-realistic analysis of 
epistemic-state content as follows: 
The content of someone's total system of knowledge is to be characterised by a 
class of possible individuals — call them the knower's epistemic alternatives — 
who might, for all she knows, include herself. Individual X is one of them iff 
nothing that the knower knows, either explicitly or implicitly, rules out the 
hypothesis that she herself is X. These individuals are the knower's epistemic 
"It 's important note, in regard to both modal realism and Paradise on the Cheap, that 
verisimilitude can be construed locally as well, in which case we speak of theory being 
true or close-to-true (as the case may be) for a certain parts of recombinations/schematic 
structures, and worlds. 
Furthermore, it's interesting to note that we can Ramsify the sentences of our 
theories — and thereby abstract from the particular properties they deal with — in order 
to grasp structural Maws' (i.e., second-order relations between properties) which are 
exactly true for certain alien possibilities (whether represented via schematic structures or 
worlds). 
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possibilities, and are different possible ways for an individual to be, and many of 
them may coexist within a single world. 
To provide a more complete account of epistemic-state content, particularly an account of 
individual instances of knowledge, is beyond the scope of my discussion here. (I aim 
merely to provide satisfactory alternatives to explanations which Lewis gives for certain 
phenomena — my task, at present, does not include filling in gaps in Lewis' 
explanations.) So, I'll simply use the suppositional apparatus to give a partial analysis of 
epistemic-state content in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. Our second set of bridge laws 
implies that we're to analyse one's total system of knowledge as a set of 
recombinations/schematic structures;. A certain subset of the properties represented by 
each of these recombinations/schematic structures, match perfectly the properties, 
intrinsic and extrinsic, which a knower, S, knows herself to possess.63 Each of these 
recombinations/schematic structures, posses other properties which exceed S's 
knowledge of herself; but there's nothing in what S knows to rule out the hypothesis that 
she is, in fact, one of these recombinations/schematic structures,. Of course, we cannot, 
practically speaking, grasp each individual recombination/schematic structure, relevant to 
a S's total system of knowledge; and so, we may choose to represent the latter in a set like 
the following: {x | [(x=S) V (x=(recombination, V schematic structure^))] & nothing that S 
knows rules out the possibility that she is x\. 
We can more closely follow Hinckfuss' model of deduction ("SPO" 608) to 
deduce economical conclusions from economical premises. Taking our bridge laws, B„ 
6 5 I shall ignore any questions concerning what counts as satisfactory conditions for 
knowledge, as they're irrelevant to the task at hand. 
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B n ( b ) , to be those which we specified just above — which assert equivalencies to hold 
between modal-realistic entities and alternative entities — and the propositions, A„ 
A„ (a ), of our auxiliary theory to be propositions of modal realism, we can make inferences 
from premises, E „ E m , stated in terms or Paradise to the Cheap to conclusions, E c, 
also stated in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. (Of course, B„ B n ( b ) and A are to be 
regarded as suppositional in the present case.) To perform our deductions from 
economical premises to economical conclusions may, in some cases, be heuristically 
superior to using strictly the conceptual apparatus afforded by Paradise on the Cheap (in 
the way I discussed on p. 67). Consider, for example, the following deduction, which 
proceeds from the alternative account of "Necessarily p" to that of "Possibly p": 
(1) "All actual states of affairs suitably similar to a recombination/schematic 
structure, r (including r itself66) are actual" [economical premise] & ("All states 
of affairs suitably similar to a recombination/schematic structure, t, are actual" = 
"a state ofaffairs, q, is true of all possible worlds " [bridge law]6 7) 
(2) "q is true of all possible worlds " [prodigal premise] & "q is true ofall 
possible worlds oqis true of at least one possible world" [auxiliary proposition] 
(3) "q is true of at least one possible world" [prodigal conclusion] & ("q is true 
ofat least one possible world" = "Some states of affairs suitably similar to a 
recombination/schematic structure, r, are actual" [bridge law]) 
(4) "Some states of affairs suitably similar to r are actual" [economical 
conclusion] 
This example is very simple — so simple, in fact, that the deductive detour though the 
suppositional apparatus may hardly seem necessary. But, while it is easy enough to infer 
T assume that the relation is a recombination of is reflexive. 
'The bridge laws used in this deduction are variants on the ones given above. 
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"Some states of affairs suitably similar to r are actual" from "All states of affairs suitably 
similar to r are actual," there might be some deductions from economical premises to 
economical conclusions which, if carried out strictly in the language of Paradise on the 
Cheap, would be very complex and difficult to perform. In such cases, the suppositional 
apparatus supplied by our bridge laws and auxiliary theory may come to our rescue by 
giving us a simpler logical structure by which to carry out our inferences. Therefore, I'm 
not saying that the suppositional apparatus is needed, in all cases, to reason with 
considerable ease in terms of Paradise on the Cheap; I'm merely pointing out, rather, that 
this apparatus is available to us should we find it more difficult to reason strictly in terms 
of Paradise on the Cheap. 
So, we have now seen how modal realism can be used to as an aid to performing 
the analyses of Paradise on the Cheap. But, as discussed towards the beginning of the 
present section, that we so employ modal realism does not commit us to its truth. As 
Hinckfuss points out, economically-minded theoreticians (like myself), if they don't 
believe in the truth of the bridge laws (as I don't believe in the truth of those equating 
modal-realistic entities with alternative entities), can at least suppose them to be true. In 
using a bridge law suppositionally, we are not committed to its truth, but merely to a 
conditional, the antecedent of which is composed at least partly of the bridge law. 
Moreover, when we use modal realism as a suppositional theory, we don't use it to 
deduce any conclusions which cannot, in principle, be deduced using just Paradise on the 
Cheap. Rather, as mentioned above, owing to the fact that modal realism may well be 
logically simpler, and thus easier to use, than Paradise on the Cheap, we use modal 
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realism suppositionally into order to more-easily deduce conclusions (i.e., perform 
analyses) in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. 
Hinckfuss suggests that it's often useful to express and/or derive certain 
economical truths using sentences exhibiting a false prodigal ontology, like the one 
provided by modal realism. I don't mean to imply that modal realism has been (or even 
can be) shown 'flat-out' to be false. Rather, Hinckfuss's lesson, I think, is that a theory's 
usefulness is something quite independent of its truth. So, we could remain undecided as 
to the truth of theories like modal realism and mathematical plantonism yet still use their 
conceptual apparatuses as heuristically-fruitful suppositional frameworks. We can 
assume, for all intents and purposes, that modal realism is false and still take advantage of 
it suppositionally. This being the case, it follows that false theories can be serviceable 
and, so, that serviceability is not a good reason for belief Even if prodigal statements 
are useful in providing explanations of true propositions —just as modal realism plays a 
useful role in giving alternative analyses of Lewis-phenomena — their being so useful 
needn't be regarded as evidence for their truth.68 
Obviously the economical and prodigal statements which are equated by the 
bridge laws in the present case do not, on my account, have the same truth values; and 
therefore, they are not synonymous. As pointed out by Hinckfuss, "[t]he bridge laws do 
not even provide the conditions under which the expressions in question are true, for the 
ontologically excessive truth conditions are false [so we assume] regardless of the truth or 
68Cf. OPW, page 3, in which Lewis says "Why believe in a plurality of worlds? — 
Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is reason to think that it is true." I shall 
return to this issue in Chapter 3. 
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falsity of their ontologically economical counterparts" (609). Thus, outside of the 
suppositional context, we cannot take statements made in terms of modal realism to be 
equivalent to statements made in terms of Paradise on the Cheap. According to 
Hinckfuss, because fictionalists and economicalists need not, indeed must not, take 
prodigal propositions to be equivalent to any economical counterparts, 
[i]t is absurd to demand that economicalists either provide an analytic 
reduction of prodigal discourse in economicalist terms or give up their 
economicalism. Should the appropriate bridge laws be presupposed, this 
demand is clearly misplaced and any acceptance of this challenge by 
economicalists is equally unnecessary and lacking in an appreciation of the 
role of supposition and presupposition in discourse. But it is not just that 
the reduction is unnecessary.... There is absolutely no reason to expect 
that such a reduction will be possible. The traditional ontological game is 
loaded against the economicalist (613). 
Paradise on the Cheap (as it has been presented up to this point) is, schematically 
speaking, just such a reduction of modal realism — my discussion thus far indicates that 
the bare structure of the two theories is the same (i.e., their individuals and properties 
exist in the same schematic relations). The bridge laws stated in this section indicate that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the entities and properties dealt with by 
each theory — they show that modal realism and Paradise on the Cheap can be 
represented via the same set of Ramsey-sentences.69 However, because the semantics for 
Paradise on the Cheap are ex hypothesi distinct from those of modal realism, we can insist 
that even though these theories share a schematic structure, to precisify the latter in 
modal-realistic terms yields far different truth conditions than does precisifying it in terms 
But, as we shall see in the next section, the isomorphism falls apart when we apply 
Kripke's view on rigid designation, a posteriori necessity, and haecceitism to Paradise on 
the Cheap. 
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of Paradise on the Cheap. So, assuming that Hinckfuss is correct, the fact that we cannot 
reduce modal realism to Paradise on the Cheap (in any way that preserves the former's 
semantics) is not reason for us to disfavour the latter. (In Hinckfuss' words: "the job [of 
the economicalist] is not to find non-existent semantic equivalences" (614; emphasis 
added).) 
Hinckfuss also believes that it's absurd to demand that economicalists even 
amend their speech to match their economical beliefs, let alone provide economical 
substitutes for the prodigal ontology which they reject. In regard to Paradise on the 
Cheap, we are able to speak in a way which reflects our economical beliefs but, 
admittedly, speaking in terms of recombinations and schematic structures is much more 
complicated (and less concrete) than speaking in terms of possible worlds and possible 
individuals.70 The conceptual apparatus supplied by Lewis's modal realism gives us a 
convenient way to reason about the possibilities we grasp by imaginative recombination 
and second-order structures. In thinking and speaking of particular ways in which p, or 
its individuals, might have been we can suppose them to be actualized at other 'worlds'; 
and, via our bridge laws, we can also characterize such possibilities in terms of 
recombinations and schematic structures. 
D. As promised earlier (in note 34 of the present chapter), I will now illustrate a 
significant advantage which Paradise on the Cheap possess over modal realism: the 
former is flexible enough to allow one to coherently accept all of Kripke's theories on 
70According to Hinckfuss, "it is incorrect to demand... that any economicalist discourse 
must be as perspicuous as its prodigal counterpart—if the whole point of prodigal 
discourse is to enhance our perspicuity' (618). 
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rigid designation, a posteriori necessity, and haecceitism (as they're presented in Naming 
and Necessity).11 As we shall see, if Paradise on the Cheap allows for these things — 
which modal realism cannot allow for, on pain of incoherence — the former ceases to 
constitute a schematic reduction of the latter. I shall begin by showing why modal realists 
cannot accept Kripke's views while maintaining any sort of theoretical coherence. 
According to Kripke, in describing a counterfactual situation in which, for 
example, my cat Roy is sleeping on the couch at time t (instead of sitting at the window 
— what he's actually doing at /), we are not stipulating a situation in which another cat, 
qualitatively-similar or -identical to Roy, is sleeping; rather we're stipulating a state of 
affairs wherein Roy himself (this particular cat I call 'Roy') is sleeping on the couch. In 
contrast, according to Lewis, no two worlds have any parts in common. For Lewis, any 
non-actual possible world that represents Roy as sleeping on my couch is not a world in 
which Roy himself is now sleeping on the couch — it is a world in which a counterpart 
of Roy, a cat qualitatively-similar or -identical to Roy, is sleeping on a counterpart of the 
particular couch in my living room.7 2 So, if we're committed to the truth of modal 
realism, we must reject the idea that proper names are rigid designators. Neither 'Roy' 
nor any other proper name refers to the same individual in all possible worlds since, in 
7 1
 [ am not suggesting here that one ought to accept Kripke's view on haecceitism, rigid 
designation, and the necessary a posteriori—I'm merely arguing that, with Paradise on 
the Cheap, one has the option of such acceptance. 
"To say that a world w 'represents,' in the way specified by Lewis, that Roy is now 
sleeping on the couch is to say that 'according to' w Roy is sleeping on the couch, though, 
in fact, it isn't Roy sleeping on the couch at w but one of his counterparts. Only the 
actual world — the world in which the particular cat I call 'Roy' exists — represents 
Roy himself. 
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non-actual worlds, proper names designate mere counterparts of the individuals they refer 
to at this world. Not even terms like 'this table,' uttered in certain contexts, refer to the 
same individual in all possible worlds, according to modal realism — in non-actual 
worlds, 'this table' refers to a counterpart of this actual table. 
Furthermore, part of Kripke's second argument for a posteriori necessity — the 
part pertaining to ordinary individuals — fails under Lewis' modal realism. From 
Kripke's claim that an object's origins are essential to that object, it follows that, 
necessarily, a table fwas made from the block of wood b. However, Lewis tells us that 
actual objects don't exist at any other worlds, which implies that their origins don't either. 
On Lewis' account, non-actual worlds represent Tas having been made from b; but such 
worlds contain only counterparts of T and b, not the particular actual table we at this 
world call T nor its particular actual origins b. Kripke's conception of how possible 
worlds represent is incompatible with Lewis' — Kripke would insist that a possible world 
which represents Fas having origins b must be a possible world which includes the 
particular table fand its particular origins. Therefore, if one both accepts Kripke's 
constraints on representation and believes, with Lewis, that non-actual worlds contain 
only counterparts of this-worldly individuals, then one is compelled to the conclusion that 
statements such as 'Twas made from wood bn are true only at the actual world and, so, 
do not express necessary truths. Similarly, assuming both Lewis' counterpart theory and 
Kripke's views on representation, the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is true only at 
this world and, as such, expresses a merely contingent truth. According to Lewis' modal 
realism, the planet we call both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' at this world doesn't exist at 
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any non-actual world — only its counterparts exist at such worlds; and hence, only 
counterparts of Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical at other worlds. Therefore, 
because Lewis asserts that actual individuals do not exist at other worlds (and that non-
actual individuals don't exist at this world), his modal realism cannot accommodate 
Kripke's second argument for a posteriori necessity as it pertains to ordinary individuals. 
Among the cases of a posteriori necessity excluded by Lewis' modal realism are 
the Kripkean haecceities mentioned earlier. The haecceity, or 'thisness,' possessed by an 
individual like my cat, Roy, consists of the property of being the cat who, at this world, is 
called 'Royi.e., the property of being this cat. According to Lewis' modal realism, 
any counterpart of Roy at any other world is not the cat who's called 'Roy' at this world. 
Accordingly, it is only at this world that Roy possesses the property of being this cat and, 
therefore, the statement 'Roy has the property of being this cat' is not necessary, though it 
is known a posteriori. To be sure, modal realism allows for individuals to possess 
Kripkean haecceities: any individual x at any world w can possess the property of being 
the individual referred to as x ' at w, or being this individual. However, though the latter 
are non-qualitative properties of individuals, they still supervene on the qualitative 
character of the worlds in which they occur. For example, suppose that, in world w, my 
counterpart calls my cat's counterpart 'Boy.' In w, then, my counterpart and Roy's 
counterpart exist in certain spatial and temporal proximities to one another, and my 
counterpart makes certain utterances and/or writes down certain symbols in referring to 
"Of course,4being the cat called "Roy"" is shorthand for being the cat named Roy' at 
such-and-such time by so-and-so in such-and-such place. 
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Roy's counterpart as 'Boy.' Indeed, were such qualitative facts not among the features of 
w, Roy's counterpart would fail to the have property of being the cat called 'Boy' at w. 
Thus, the haecceitistic differences which follow from Kripke's account in Naming and 
Necessity (henceforth NN) simply don't occur according to Lewis' modal realism. Ergo, 
Lewis' modal realism does not allow Kripkean haecceitism. 
Lewis rejects the idea that possible worlds have overlapping parts — that's the 
principal reason why his modal realism is incompatible with Kripke's haecceitism, his 
theory of rigid designation (as it pertains to proper names), and his second argument for a 
posteriori necessity74 (as it pertains to individuals). Lewis uses the following example to 
describe world-overlap: 
The simplest way that part of another world could represent [Hubert] 
Humphrey — our Humphrey — is by identity. He might lead a double 
life, in two worlds at once. He himself, who is part of the actual world, 
might be part of the other world as well.... The other world represents him 
as existing because he is part of it. He exists at the other world because, 
restricting our quantification to the parts of that world, he exists. This 
leading of double lives is what best deserves to be called 'trans-world 
identity' (198). 
Lewis goes on to say that world-overlap "is the only view that fully respects the 'he 
himself intuition: rival views say that Humphrey himself might have won, and that he 
himself is somehow represented as winning, but only this view says that he himself does 
win" (199). Indeed, in NN, Kripke is an outspoken advocate of the 'he himself intuition 
— he would insist that a counterfactual situation in which Humphrey wins the 
presidential election is a situation in which Humphrey himself, the man referred to as 
7 4Kripke's first argument for a posteriori necessity is given on pp. 35-37 of NN. 
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'Hubert Humphrey' at this world, wins the presidential election. Lewis gives strong 
reasons why modal realists should not accept world-overlap. I don't want to get into 
these reasons here, as they would take the present discussion too far off its intended 
course.7 5 I assume (rightly, I think) that Lewis arguments against world-overlap establish 
conclusively that modal realists ought not subscribe to the latter. Therefore, because 
Lewis' modal realism does not accommodate overlap, it cannot accommodate the 'he 
himself intuition; and because it can't accommodate the latter, it can accommodate 
neither Kripke's haecceitism nor his views on rigid designation and a posteriori necessity 
in their entirety. 
As implied earlier, Lewis' modal realism rules out Kripke's theory of rigid 
designation and his second argument for necessary a posteriori truth only as they pertain 
to proper names and ordinary individuals, respectively. The idea that general terms 
designate rigidly is perfectly compatible with Lewis' modal realism. According to 
Kripke, the term for a natural kind, k, refers in any possible world to any individual 
possessing the essential properties, P, of the right kind (the latter being determined at this 
world). Thus, the members of k are united across possible worlds by their possession of 
P. The relation which unites the members of k, then, is just a relation of similarity — 
7 SBut I should say something about Lewis' most significant argument against world-
overlap, which has to do with the accidental intrinsic properties of individuals. He says, 
"[W]hat I do find problematic — inconsistent, not to mince words — is the way the 
common part of two worlds is supposed to have different properties in one world and in 
the other" (199). The problem of accidental intrinsics is thus the problem of finding an 
intelligible way for an individual's intrinsic properties to differ from one world to 
another. If, for example, I exist at more than one world: how can I have five fingers on 
my right hand at this world and six fingers on my right hand at another world? For 
Lewis' complete arguments against overlap, see OPW, §4.2. 
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they all have P in common. The members of k at other worlds needn't be the particular 
members of k in the actual world. Non-actual individuals, mere counterparts of k-
members, can belong to k so long as they possess P. Hence, even if there are no actual 
individuals at other worlds, the general term *&' refers to the same kind in all possible 
worlds. In this way, Lewis' modal realism allows for general terms to be rigid 
designators (regardless of whether Lewis himself believes that general terms designate 
rigidly), and if a general term designates rigidly in the way specified by Kripke, then 
all members of the natural kind k possess properties P in all possible worlds, which 
implies that the statement "All k possess P" expresses a necessary truth which is known a 
posteriori. So, even if a person is committed to Lewis' modal realism, she can still 
accept Kripke's second argument for a posteriori necessity as it applies to natural kinds. 
But, of course, Kripke wants his theory of rigid designation and his second argument for 
necessary a posteriori truth to succeed not only for general terms and natural kinds but 
also for proper names and individuals. Therefore, neither Kripke nor anyone who adheres 
to his position can be committed to modal realism. 
One might object, however, to the remarks I made earlier about Kripke's 
haecceitism being incompatible with modal realism. Lewis purports to explain away 
apparent instances of haecceitistic difference.76 He claims that the only way a modal 
realist who rejects world-overlap can handle haecceitistic differences is by asserting some 
kind of non-qualitative counterpart relation. But Lewis argues that "[t]here is no way to 
make sense of a non-qualitative counterpart relation" (230) — in fact, he regards the 
7 6 SeeOP» r 23l-35. 
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phrase "non-qualitative counterpart relation" as a contradiction in terms.7 7 He then 
proceeds to argue that apparent cases of haecceitistic difference really aren 't cases of 
haecceitistic difference. He begins by claiming that "lesser possible individuals, 
inhabitants of worlds, proper parts of worlds, are possibilities too. They are ways that 
something less than an entire world might possibly be. A possible person, for instance, is 
a way that a person might possibly be" (230). Furthermore, he says, 
I might have been one of a pair of twins. 1 might have been the first-born 
one, or the second-born one. These two possibilities involve no qualitative 
difference in the way the world is. Imagine them specified more fully: 
there is the possibility of being the first born twin in a world of such-and-
such maximally specific qualitative character. And there is the possibility 
of being the second-born twin in exactly such a world. The haecceitist 
says: two possibilities, two worlds. They seem just alike, but they must 
differ somehow. They differ in respect of'cross-identification'; that is, 
they differ in what they represent de re, concerning someone. Hence they 
must differ with respect to the determinants of representation de re; and 
these must be non-qualitative, since there are no qualitative differences to 
be had. I say: two possibilities, sure enough. And they do indeed differ in 
representation de re: according to one I am the first-bom twin, according 
to the other I am the second born. But they are not two worlds. They are 
two possibilities within a single world. The world contains twin 
counterparts of me, under a counterpart relation determined by intrinsic 
and extrinsic similarities (especially, match of origins). Each twin is a 
possible way for a person to be, and in fact is a possible way for me to be. 
I might have been one, or I might have been the other. There are two 
distinct possibilities for me. But they involve only one possibility for the 
world: it might have been the world inhabited by two such twins. The 
haecceitist was quite right when he thought that purely qualitative worlds 
gave us too narrow a range of distinct possibilities. He concluded that 
worlds must not be purely qualitative. He'd have done better to conclude 
that worlds gave us too narrow a range of possibilities. The parts of 
worlds must also be put to use (231). 
"For the purposes at hand, I'll assume (with good reason) that Lewis successfully refutes 
the position that there are non-qualitative counterpart relations. See OiW229-30 for his 
arguments. 
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Consider also how Lewis deals with another apparent instance of haecceitistic difference: 
Likewise for the apparent haecceitistic differences that arise if we live in 
the seventeenth epoch of a world of eternal recurrence. The possibility 
which represents me de re as living instead in the 137 th epoch is not some 
other world that differs haecceitistically from ours; it is my this-worldly 
duplicate in the 137 t h epoch. Insofar as he is my counterpart (that is, on 
those resolutions of vagueness that make him my counterpart despite the 
fact that we are worldmates) he is a possibility for me; that is all I need 
mean when I say that I might have been him (232). 
Kripke would reject both of these examples outright, as they both violate the 'he himself 
intuition. He would say that the world with the twins, vv„ doesn't represent any 
possibilities for Lewis, let alone two, since ex hypothesi the twins are counterparts of 
Lewis and, as such, neither of them are the particular person who we, at this world, call 
'David K. Lewis.' Similarly, Kripke would say that, supposing that the actual world is a 
world of eternal recurrence, Lewis' duplicate in the 137 th epoch fails to represent a 
possibility for Lewis because ex hypothesi the duplicate is Lewis' counterpart and, so, 
isn't Lewis himself. 
If we allow that the exact same individual can exist in two epochs of this world, 
then perhaps, on Kripke's account, we can say that the Lewis in the 137 th epoch 
represents a possibility for the Lewis of the 17 th epoch; and thus, we can avoid having to 
assert a haecceitistic difference. But if the exact same individual cannot exist in different 
epochs, then Kripke's account tells us that the possibility that Lewis might have existed 
in the 137 th epoch must be represented by other worlds. One of these worlds, w2, is 
qualitatively-identical to the actual world and differs from the latter only insofar as a 
person in the 137 t h epoch (instead of the seventeenth) has the property of being the person 
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who, at this world, is called 'DavidK. Lewis'. Thus, the actual world would differ from 
w2 haecceitistically. Likewise, the only way that world w, (the one with the twins) can 
represent two possibilities for Lewis is if both twins are Lewis himself. However, 
assuming that Lewis himself cannot be both twins, then w, represents, at most, one 
possibility for Lewis. (Let's say w, represents the possibility of Lewis being the first­
born twin.) Accordingly, the second possibility has to be represented by other worlds, 
one of these worlds, w3, being qualitatively-identical to w, but differing from w, 
haecceitistically, i.e., in the fact that the second-born twin has the property of being the 
person who, at this world, is called David K. Lewis'. 
Lewis discusses other examples of apparent haecceitistic difference, and his 
success in demonstrating that they aren't, in fact, instances of haecceitistic difference 
depends on his appeal to counterparts. Moreover, let's take a look at another example. 
Imagine two non-actual worlds, w, and w2, which are identical in every qualitative 
respect. Ex hypothesi, table T— this table, the one I'm currently sitting at — exists at w„ 
but instead of being in my kitchen at time / (where it actually is at t) it is in my front 
room. Ex hypothesi, Tdoes not exist at w2 — at w2, there's another table, V, which is 
qualitatively identical to Fin every respect, including in the qualitative aspects of its 
origins.78 Thus, there are no qualitative differences between Tand V. The only difference 
between them is that Ihas the property of being the table that I, at this world, refer to as 
T — the property of being this table — while Pdoes not. In describing (part of) w,, I 
7 8I.e., Tand Pwere made from qualitatively-identical pieces of wood taken from 
qualitatively-identical positions in qualitatively-identical piles, the wood was taken from 
qualitatively-identical places in qualitatively-identical forests, and so on. 
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stipulated a situation in which the table I call T is placed in my front room at /. In 
describing (part of) w 2,1 merely stipulated a situation wherein a table, not T, is placed in 
my front room at t. In stipulating the existence of Tat w„ I implicitly stipulated Ts 
origins as well, since T couldn't exist at w, without its origins. These origins (and origins 
generally) have their own haecceities — for example, T was made from particular pieces 
of wood taken from particular trees in a particular forest. Hence, in stipulating the 
existence of Tat vv„ I also stipulated the existence ofthese pieces of wood, these trees, 
and this forest. But, in stipulating the existence of Vai w2,1 implicitly stipulated origins 
different from those of T— Vis not T; and so, the former does not share the origins of the 
latter. Kdoes not come from the particular wood/trees/forest that T comes from. So, 
though Vs origins are qualitatively-identical to Ts origins, the former aren't the same as 
the latter. Therefore, the property of being T, at w„ doesn't supervene on the qualitative 
character of Ts origins. The worlds w, and w2 are qualitatively-identical; but they're 
distinct in how they represent de re the table in my front room at / — w, represents the 
table as being T, or this table, while w2 represents it as being V, which is a table other 
than this one. The worlds w, and w2 differ haecceitistically. Lewis would say that the 
table at a non-actual world w, isn't really table T—the table I'm actually sitting at — but 
is instead a counterpart of T (call the latter 7"); he'd say that table V, at w2, is likewise a 
counterpart of T. Accordingly, Lewis would argue that T doesn't have the property of 
being the table which, at this world, is called'T' and, therefore, that there is no 
haecceitistic difference between w, and w2. But, of course, if counterpart theory is 
replaced with the 'he himself intuition (or, in the present case, the 'it itself intuition), 
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the haecceitistic difference between w, and w2 stands. Therefore, Kripke's haecceitism 
cannot be reconciled with modal realism. 
However, Paradise on the Cheap is amenable to the 'he himself intuition. Under 
Paradise on the Cheap, in describing a recombination in which my cat, Roy, is sleeping 
on the couch instead of sitting at the window, I am ex hypothesi describing a 
counterfactual situation in which Roy himself is combined with a different activity and a 
different spatial location. And since, according to Paradise on the Cheap, Roy represents 
himself in any recombination, it follows that the proper name 'Roy' designates rigidly. 
Indeed, any actual individual x represents itself in any recombined situation which it is 
part of; and so, Paradise on the Cheap allows for any proper name 'x' to designate the 
same individual in all recombinations. Similarly, the fact that any individual x represents 
itself in any recombination implies that, in any recombination that counts as possible (i.e., 
that's suitably similar to certain parts of p), x has the properties we take to be essential to 
it. Therefore, for any individual x belonging to any natural kind k, any recombination 
which represents x is a situation in which x itself possesses the properties P essential to its 
natural kind. In any recombination, then, the general term 'fc' refers to individuals of the 
same kind, namely those individuals which possess P; and thus, in all recombinations, *&' 
designates the same natural kind. Hence, Kripke's views on rigid designation can be 
accomodated in the framework supplied by Paradise on the Cheap. 
Moreover, because Paradise on the Cheap accommodates rigid designation, it also 
allows for the success of Kripke's second argument for the necessary a posteriori. If 
individuals are represented by themselves in recombinations, then in any recombination 
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any individual x possesses its essential properties, which implies that x possess these 
properties necessarily. So, provided these properties are known empirically, the fact that 
x possesses them is a necessary a posteriori truth, and if in every recombined situation, 
every member of a natural kind k possesses the properties P essential to its kind, then it is 
necessarily the case that things belonging to k possess P. Provided it is known by 
experience that P comprises at least part of the essence of k, the statement "All members 
of have P" expresses an a posteriori necessity. 
Finally, the fact any individual x represents itself in recombination implies that, in 
any recombination, x has the property of being the individual referred to as x ' at the 
actual world, or of being this individual™ Thus, Kripkean haecceities are allowed by 
Paradise on the Cheap; and so are Kripke's haecceitistic differences. Via imaginative 
recombination, I can in principle stipulate two qualitatively-identical recombinations 
which consist solely of our solar system and the earth's inhabitants. Each of these 
recombinations contains a certain cat which lives in Moncton, New Brunswick. These 
cats are qualitatively-identical in every respect (including in their origins); but one of the 
cats is the cat that I, at this world, call 'Roy.' So, though the cats are qualitatively-
identical, they differ in that one has the property of being the called who, at p, is called 
'Roy' while the other doesn't. I stipulated one recombination in which my cat, Roy, lives 
in Moncton and another in which a cat with origins qualitatively-identical to Roy's lives 
"One proviso: for any individual x to have the property of being the individual called *x' 
at this world, x must be designated by a proper name, whether it be 'Roy' or T or simply 
'this table' or 'this rock.' 
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in Moncton.80 Only one of these counterfactual situations — the former—is one in 
which a cat has the non-qualitative property of being Roy. Therefore, these 
recombinations differ haecceitistically. 
Thus, because modal realism rules out Kripke-style views on modality while 
Paradise on the Cheap does not, it's evident that Paradise on the Cheap does not have the 
same consequences as modal realism in regard to necessity and possibility. Paradise on 
the Cheap cannot be a reduction of modal realism, not even schematically! The former 
allows that the exact same property-instances can be found in various different 
recombinations, actual and non-actual — the latter insists that no one property-instance 
can exist in two different worlds. Hence, the relations which exist between properties 
according to modal realism is different from the relations which exist between properties 
according to Paradise on the Cheap. This being the case, the two theories do not share the 
same set of Ramsey-sentences. 
It isn't really recombinations, schematic structures, or projection-sets which 
ground possibilia;81 rather, it is the features of p and the characteristics they possess 
which, given certain criteria, make them similar to our recombinations, projection sets, 
and schematic structures.82 (It is only for simplicity that I sometimes speak as though it is 
8 0By imaginative recombination, I can consider the possibility of a cat which is 
qualitatively identical to Roy by applying consistently in my imagination, e.g., the 
qualitative character of Roy's mother and father to other cats and the qualitative character 
of Roy's development, birth, and growth to another cat. 
"'This point was mentioned in regard to recombinations in the first chapter. 
^Please note that the present comments on the foundation of possibilities are provided, in 
part, to clarify and revise some of the remarks I made on representation, or grounding, in 
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these last three things which are themselves the bases for possibilia.) Recombination is a 
mental activity and recombinations are mental phenomena (which, depending on how one 
views the mind, may be equated to particular brain states). Like second-order schemas 
and projection sets, they are merely tools for grasping the ways in which p and its parts 
might have been, p and its parts are what recombinations, schematic structures, and 
projection sets are ultimately based on — they provide us with things to recombine, 
structures to both abstract from and recombine, and similarity-criteria with which to 
define set-membership. Furthermore, the features of p provide us with the wherewithal to 
determine suitable similarity: the characteristics we emphasize, the things we deem more 
important than others in certain contexts. Given, then, that p itself is what possible 
individuals and possible states of affairs are grounded in, it's not surprising that actual 
individuals represent themselves in counterfactual situations. 
Moreover, just because modal realism violates the 'he himself intuition doesn't 
imply that we cannot use the former suppositionally without violating the latter. The 
fourth bridge law asserts an equivalence between counterparts and 
recombinations/schematic structures, which are suitably similar to each other. This law, 
along with the others, is ex hypothesi fictitious; and therefore, as any recombination is 
suitably similar to itself, there is no reason why we cannot take actual individuals to 
represent themselves in recombinations. So, there is no reason why we cannot use modal 
Chapter 1. I must also stress that, in saying that the actual world is what grounds 
possibilia, I am not specifying the truth conditions for Paradise on the Cheap strictly in 
terms of the features of p — other things are needed for the semantics, including 
recombinations of these features and relations of suitable similarity. 
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realism suppositionally while still abiding by the 'he himself intuition. 
That modal realism can be employed suppositionally in the way described in 
Section C is testament to the heuristic fertility of the theory. But, as Hinckfuss 
emphasizes, any heuristic conveniences afforded by modal realism do not constitute any 
good reason to think that it is true — the theory can be convenient even when we take it 
to be false. I will now turn to arguing that, save perhaps in its heuristic/suppositional 
role, we should abandon modal realism and replace it with Paradise on the Cheap as our 
preferred theory of possibilia. 
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Chapter 3: Relinquishing realist commitments to modal realism, but entertaining 
instrumentalist ones 
We have just seen, in the last chapter, that Paradise on the Cheap can bear the explanatory 
load which Lewis purports modal realism to bear. Thus, the groundwork has been laid 
tor a theory that can explain modality, counterfactuals, content, and properties just as well 
(if not better) than modal realism without requiring realist commitments to possible 
worlds. Perhaps there are some instances in which the alternative analysis of certain 
phenomena is just too complex for any human agent to carry out; but the existence of 
such cases would not imply that Paradise on the Cheap is in any way inferior to modal 
realism with respect to explanatory power. As was established in Chapter 2, Section C, 
modal realism can be employed as a suppositional tool for carrying out the analyses of 
Paradise on the Cheap. With our four bridge laws, we can derive alternative explanations 
of modality, counterfactuals, doxastic and epistemic states, and properties and relations 
directly from modal realistic explanations of the same. If the conceptual apparatus of 
Paradise on the Cheap is too complex to use for a given analysis, then perhaps we can 
employ the suppositional apparatus discussed in the previous chapter, according to which 
we take the modal-realistic analysis of a phenomenon and translate it via our bridge laws 
into an alternative analysis of the phenomenon. But if the suppositional method is also 
too complex, practically speaking, to use in this analysis, then modal realism is likewise 
too complex to be used. With the suppositional apparatus available to the alternative 
theorist, Paradise on the Cheap is limited only to the extent that modal realism is limited. 
Because the explanatory power of Paradise on the Cheap is equal to that of modal 
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realism, I shall argue below that modal realism can at best serve as a valuable heuristic 
device for dealing with various philosophical problems. In other words, the view that 
there really is a world in which Billy Pilgrim exists, has come unstuck in time, is 
abducted by Tralfamadorians, survives the Dresden raid, and so on can only play the role 
of a convenient fiction, as one step in an expedient means of deriving alternative analyses 
of Lewis-phenomena. But that modal realism is heuristically convenient is not sufficient 
ground on which to commit oneself to the existence of other worlds. We don't have 
sufficient reason to take Slaughterhouse-Five as anything more than a fairly large 
recombination. 
I use the term 'heuristic device' to denote a theory which is convenient — one that 
makes particular goals we have somehow easy to achieve. It may or may not be the case 
that a heuristic device H is necessary in order to achieve such goals — the latter might be 
realizable without the use of H, though with greater difficulty. In other words, relative to 
our goals, heuristic devices may or may not be dispensable (practically speaking, since 
they are always dispensable in principle). As a heuristic device, then, modal realism 
could perhaps bring of all the benefits which Lewis purports that it brings to Philosophy 
more easily than could Paradise on the Cheap. And we might even need modal realism to 
reap these benefits, despite the fact that, in principle, they can be reaped by means of the 
conceptual apparatus supplied by Paradise on the Cheap. 
Lewis' modal realism is a theory asserting the existence of possible worlds — in 
arguing for it, Lewis presupposes a realist conception of theories. It will be useful, then, 
to establish, for the purposes of this discussion, what a realist conception of theories is. 
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According to Mary Hesse, "Realism is a generic term for a number of views, all holding 
that theories consist of true or false statements referring to 'real' or 'existing' entities" 
(407). And, as Carl G. Hempel points out, "[t]o assert that the terms of a given theory 
have factual reference, that the entities they purport to refer to actually exist, is 
tantamount to asserting that what the theory tells us is true..." (220). So, a realist about 
theories would say that a statement like "Billy Pilgrim is a member of world w t r a l f" 8 3 refers 
to actual entities, namely Billy Pilgrim and world w l r a l f, and that its truth or falsity depends 
on whether or not Billy Pilgrim in fact exists at w^f.84 Furthermore, to assert that the 
terms 'Billy Pilgrim' and 'w t r a l f ' (along with various other terms denoting various possible 
worlds and possible individuals) have factual reference is to say that modal realism's 
claim that possible individuals exist at possible worlds (along with the many other claims 
that modal realism makes) is true.8 5 
Lewis argues for modal realism via a strategy of inference to the best explanation. 
He claims that the fruitfulness of modal realism gives us good reason to think that it's 
8 3
 World w t r a l f is a world which includes the planet Tralfamadore. 
"I wish to ignore issues surrounding Lewis' so-called 'counterpart' relations here, as they 
are not relevant to the present discussion. Rather than speaking of the existence of a 
counterpart of Billy Pilgrim, or a. counterpart of Tralfamadore, at w ^ , I'll speak of the 
existence of Billy Pilgrim and Tralfamadore simpliciter at w^f, even though (according to 
Lewis) the Billy Pilgrim of w^is not the same individual as the Billy Pilgrim of other 
worlds and the Tralfamadore of wmir is not the same planet as the Tralfamadore of other 
worlds. 
"Presumably, to say that the things a theory tells us are true is just to say that the theory 
itself is true. 
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true (4). He argues that because modal realism furnishes the best available explanation 
of certain phenomena (such as counterfactuals and future contingents) we are justified in 
believing in its truth. Setting aside, until Chapter 4, concerns surrounding the standards 
of inference to the best explanation, let's assume (with plausibility, I think) that inference 
to the best explanation is justification-conferring, that a theory's ability to provide the 
best explanation of a particular set of phenomena is good enough reason to believe in the 
existence of the entities posited by the theory and, therefore, good enough reason to 
believe that the theory is true. That a theory provides the best available explanation of a 
particular set of phenomena implies that there are no alternative theories providing better 
explanations (and that there are no alternative theories whose explanations are just as 
good) of that set of phenomena. But, the arguments of Chapter 2 have shown us that 
Paradise on the Cheap must succeed, that the phenomena Lewis purports modal realism 
to explain can be explained without asserting the existence of non-actual worlds or non-
actual individuals. Therefore, there is an alternative theory which accounts at least as 
well for the phenomena that modal realism is supposed to account for and which doesn't 
have the heavy ontological baggage of Lewis' theory. And because Paradise on the 
Cheap doesn't have a controversial ontology, it is preferable to modal realism. 
Before I argue this last point, 1 should point out that perhaps it is more accurate to 
say that the ontology of recombinations isn't as controversial as that of modal realism. 
As mentioned toward the end of Chapter 2, recombinations are a kind of mental 
phenomena; and how we ultimately characterize these phenomena depends on our theory 
" I take 'best explanation' and 'best available explanation' to be synonymous. 
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of the mind. Despite the fact that recombinations aren't tangible (unless, of course, 
they're identical to brain states), they belong to the realm of the actual; and we can hardly 
deny that we ourselves perform imaginative recombinations. However, Andrew Irvine 
has suggested to me that to identify the concept of a recombination with that of a mental 
recombination will cause difficulties for Paradise on the Cheap. In particular, Irvine 
argues that to identify recombinations with mental artifacts of one kind or another is 
extremely limiting, as we simply don't have enough mental activity to produce all 
possibilities for p and p-individuals. Moreover, if possibilia are grounded strictly in 
terms of mental phenomena, it would follow that there would be no possibilia in a world 
without sentient creatures — a consequence I don't want for my theory. It seems, 
therefore, that I should ground possibilia more explicitly in terms of the features of p and 
weaken the status of mental recombination to that of a means by which we gain access to 
such possibilia. Accordingly, I could say that a possibility consists in the fact that certain 
parts of p can be recombined with certain other parts of p in a way which is acceptable to 
us (and, of course, such a recombination is acceptable just in case it's suitably similar to 
certain actual states of affairs). Along these lines, it is arguable that possibilities are 
rooted in the features of p and, thus, that there would be possibilities for this world and its 
parts even if there were no sentient creatures to gain cognitive access to them. 8 7 
"Though, in my opinion, Irvine's objection stands, it should be noted that imaginative 
recombinations are not as limited a way of representing possibilia as one might suspect. 
It is not the case that a recombination represents just one possibility. In imagining a 
particular talking donkey, for example, we represent the possibilities of various other 
talking donkeys, if only vaguely. Likewise, in imagining—as Vonnegut did — that 
Billy Pilgrim was abducted by aliens from Tralfamadore, we imagine various 
recombinations; and assuming that these recombinations are suitably similar to features of 
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Lewis makes an analogy between set-theoretic realism and modal realism. 
Regarding the former, he says, 
Philosophers might like to see the subject reconstructed or reconstrued; 
but working mathematicians insist on pursuing their subject in paradise, 
and will not be driven out. Their thesis of plurality of sets is fruitful; that 
gives them good reason to believe that it is true. 
Good reason; I do not say it is conclusive. Maybe the price is higher than 
it seems because set-theory has unacceptable hidden implications — 
maybe the next round of set-theoretical paradoxes will soon be upon us. 
Maybe the very idea of accepting controversial ontology for the sake of 
theoretical benefits is misguided — so a sceptical epistemologist might 
say, to which I reply that mathematics is better known than any premise of 
sceptical epistemology. Or perhaps some better paradise might be found. 
... Conceivably we might find some way to accept set theory, just as is and 
just as a nice home for mathematics, without any ontological commitment 
to sets. But even if such hopes come true, my point remains. It has been 
the judgement of mathematicians, which modest philosophers ought to 
respect, that //that is indeed the choice before us, then it is worth believing 
in vast realms of controversial entities for the sake of enough benefit in 
unity and economy of theory' (4). 
Regarding modal realism, Lewis says, 
[It] is fruitful; that gives us good reason to believe that it is true. 
Good reason; I do not say it is conclusive. Maybe the theoretical benefits 
to be gained are illusory, because the analyses that use possibilia do not 
succeed on their own terms. Maybe the price is higher than it seems, 
because modal realism has unacceptable hidden implications. Maybe the 
price is not right; even if I am right about what theoretical benefits can be 
had for what ontological cost, maybe those benefits are just not worth 
those costs. Maybe the very idea of accepting controversial ontology for 
the sake of theoretical benefits is misguided. Maybe — and this is the 
p in certain specified ways, it follows that in representing the possibility of Billy Pilgrim 
being abducted by Tralfamadorians we also represent various other possibilities, like 
those of Billy Pilgrim and the planet Tralfamadore. Furthermore, by imagining Billy 
Pilgrim to be abducted by aliens from Tralfamadore, we represent — in a vague fashion 
— the possibilities of numerous other individuals being abducted by numerous other 
beings from numerous other planets. 
-99-
doubt that most interests me — the benefits are not worth the cost, because 
they can be had more cheaply elsewhere (4-5). 
If all the benefits brought to mathematics by set-theoretic realism can be had without 
ontological commitment to sets and constructions thereof, then it makes no sense to say 
(as Lewis does) that it's worth it for working mathematicians to subscribe to set-theoretic 
realism 'for the sake of enough benefit in unity and economy of theory." Provided that 
mathematics can be explained just as well without reference to real sets as it can by 
appealing to them, it seems that one's theory of mathematics would be more unified and 
economical without a messy ontology!88 Similarly, it appears that Paradise on the Cheap 
is more unified and more economical than modal realism. 
It should be emphasized that I'm not simply concerned with the superiority with 
which set-theoretic realism explains mathematics or modal realism explains Lewis-
phenomena. Rather, I'm concerned with total views, with how theories like modal 
realism and set-theoretic realism 'fit' into our overall system of belief and knowledge. 
That is to say, I'm concerned with how unified and economical modal realism is relative 
to our overall system of belief and knowledge. Paul Benacerraf exemplifies a 'total-view' 
approach. Regarding mathematical platonism, he says, 
One of its primary advantages is that the truth definitions for individual 
mathematical theories thus construed will have the same recursion clauses 
as those employed for their less lofty empirical cousins. Or to put it 
another way, they can all be taken as parts of the same language for which 
we provide a single account for quantifiers regardless of the sub-discipline 
under consideration. Mathematical and empirical disciplines will not be 
distinguished in point of logical grammar. I have already underscored the 
importance of this advantage: it means that the logico-grammatical theory 
8 8See H. Field, Science Without Numbers. 
-100-
we employ in less recondite and more tractable domains will serve us well 
here. We can do with one, uniform, account and need not invent another 
for mathematics. This should hold true in virtually every grammatical 
theory coupled with semantics adequate to account for truth. My bias for 
what I call a Tarskian theory stems simply from the fact that he has given 
us the only viable systematic general account we have of truth. So, one 
consequence of the economy attending the standard view [i.e., platonism] 
is that logical relations are subject to uniform treatment: they are invariant 
with subject matter. Indeed, they help define the concept of'subject 
matter' (411). 
Thus, in discussing the advantages of platonism, Benacerraf points out how well the latter 
unifies with our general account of truth, with how we specify truth conditions for 
empirical propositions, for example. Similarly, in discussing platonism's shortcomings, 
he points out that "it appears to violate the requirement that our account of mathematical 
truth be susceptible to integration into our over-all account of knowledge" (412). 
Therefore, Benacerraf isn't just concerned with the implications of platonism for 
mathematics — he discusses platonism's implications for our theories in general. 
Likewise, when I consider whether modal realism (or set-theoretic realism) provides the 
best available explanation, I consider whether it does so relative to our total system of 
belief and knowledge, that the value obtained by subtracting its total explanatory 
shortcomings from its total explanatory benefits™ is greater than that of any rival theory.90 
Of course, 'unity' and 'economy' are comparative terms. Rather than calling 
theories unified and economical period, it makes more sense to call them more or less 
unified and economical in comparison to other theories. Asserting the existence of set-
8 9Call this value the total explanatory value of a theory. 
^I'll assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that explanatory value is decidable 
(though it most likely isn't). 
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theoretic entities, and having to account for their existence and our knowledge of them, 
makes our theory of mathematics less economical than a theory which doesn't posit the 
existence of such entities, whose only ontological commitments pertain to the world of 
physics, chemistry and biology. Without an account of how set-theoretic realism fits into 
our total view — without an account of how it coheres with our already-accepted theories 
of, e.g., knowledge and the physical world91 — the former unifies less with our total view 
than a theory which doesn't assert the existence of obscure set-theoretic phenomena. 
Of course, unity and economy aren't necessary conditions on inference to the best 
explanation. We can imagine a theory which is neither unified nor economical but which 
still constitutes the best available explanation of a particular set of phenomena. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that amongst theories which are explanatorily equivalent 
(such as modal realism and Paradise on the Cheap) we should prefer the one that's most 
unified and/or most economical.92 Theories like modal and set-theoretic realism assert 
the existence of entities which are different in kind from the entities posited by our 
already-accepted bodies of theory. I use 'kind' in an intuitive sense here — we can regard 
phenomena like real sets and possible worlds as being 'of different kinds' than, say, 
medium-sized physical objects and sub-microscopic particles because (a) possible worlds 
9 lThis assumes, falsely, that we do have generally-accepted theories of knowledge and the 
physical world. At the very least, however, we should require that theories such as set-
theoretic and modal realism cohere with the epistemologies and physical theories which, 
generally speaking, we take seriously — i.e., which we entertain as candidates for truth 
(or sufficient closeness to truth) at our world. 
9 2 Fm assuming here that we have reasonably reliable measure of degree-of-unity and 
degree-of-economy. 
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are totally isolated, and (b) it's difficult to see how real sets could be so causally related to 
us as to allow us to have knowledge of them. Because the nature of real sets and possible 
worlds is radically different from the nature of things whose existence we already accept 
(or whose existence we entertain as serious possibilities for this world), the nature of the 
former may not be understood as easily as the nature of the latter. In consequence, the 
existence of other worlds and real sets, along with the truth of modal and set-theoretic 
realism, might be regarded as less plausible. On the other hand, theories which unify very 
well with our total view do not posit the existence of any entities different in kind from 
those posited by our already-accepted bodies of theory. Such theories are highly 
intelligible — we needn't extend the conceptual and terminological apparatus of our 
present total view very far (if at all) in order to understand and express them. Thus, their 
truth is generally taken to be significantly more plausible.93 Because poorly-unified 
theories are more likely to be considered, to some extent, less intelligible and less 
plausible, it seems that one is less likely to regard them as constituting a good, or the best, 
explanation of a certain set of phenomena. 
One respect in which modal and set-theoretic realism fail to unify with our total 
view, or conceptual scheme, is worth emphasizing: neither theory tells an epistemological 
story for its subject matter. Modal realism doesn't suggest how we come to know, or 
9 3In addition, because more-unified theories deal with entities which are more like the 
entities whose existence is already posited by out total view, the referents of the terms of 
the former are more like those of the latter. Hence, the truth conditions of more-unified 
theories are simpler than the truth conditions of theories which are less-unified — less of 
an 'ontological leap' is required to specify the truth conditions of more-unified theories. 
Thus, theories of the latter sort might be regarded as stronger candidates for truth, or 
truthlikeness. 
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form beliefs about, Lewis-phenomena; and, set-theoretic realism doesn't really indicate 
how we come to know, or believe things about, mathematics. Being so detached from 
any theory of knowledge or belief, these views look pretty bizarre in light of our total 
view. Indeed, it's evident that a unified account of possibilia must embody some account 
of how we come to be reliable judges of truths about modality, counterfactuals, &c. 
While modal realism lacks such an account, it is arguable that Paradise on the Cheap does 
not, given the apparently essential roles which similarity and imaginative recombination 
play in how we learn and use modal-counterfactual notions. 
Likewise, one might value theories which are more economical for their increased 
intelligibility and increased plausibility-of-truth. Modal realism asserts the existence of 
entities not already included in our total view (indeed, not of any kind already included in 
our total view)9 4 — Paradise on the Cheap doesn't posit the existence of any such entities. 
The former adds to the conceptual and terminological apparatus of our total view, while 
the latter does not. Because modal and set-theoretic realism make some very odd 
additions95 to our total view, they may be considered less intelligible and less plausible 
than theories which don't make such additions. Moreover, since modal realism and 
Paradise on the Cheap are explanatorily equivalent, the additions modal realism makes to 
our total view are in principle unnecessary. So, valuing greater intelligibility and greater 
94Indeed, if such things as non-actual worlds and non-actual individuals are at all part of 
our total view, they're positioned at the periphery of the latter, having relatively few 
connections to other components of our 'web' of belief and knowledge. 
9 SSuch additions are very odd in comparison to what was included in our total view before 
modal and set-theoretic realism came into the picture. 
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plausibility, one might prefer theories which don't makes such odd additions:96 more 
economical ones like Paradise on the Cheap and a less-ontologically-laden theory of 
mathematics.97 
However, the reasons, discussed just above, for preferring more-unified and more-
economical theories in our explanations are merely psychological. That idea that more-
unified and/or more-economical theories are more easily understood and are given greater 
plausibility of being true explains why a human subject might prefer such theories to less-
unified and/or less-economical ones. Indeed, increased intelligibility and increased 
plausibility seem important to what human subjects think of as good explanations — the 
more intelligible a theory is and the more plausible it appears to be, the more 'sense' it 
makes as an explanation of a certain set of phenomena. But despite their psychological 
appeal, factors like increased intelligibility and plausibility do nothing to link unity and 
economy up with truth. A theory may be highly unintelligible and highly implausible but 
may still express the objective facts of the matter, and an extremely plausible and 
extremely intelligible theory could be false, (or so we normally and naturally suppose). 
We might, in fact, account for the intelligibility and plausibility of particular theories by 
%Moreover, more-economical theories, because they specify fewer term-referents, have 
simpler truth conditions than theories which are less-economical. So, as with more-
unified theories (see note 93), it may be thought that theories of the former type have a 
greater plausibility of being true, or close to the truth. 
9 7
 As an example of a more economical theory of mathematics, take H. Field's account of 
pure mathematics, which appeals to stipulative systems of rules encoding schematic 
consequence relations. Being schematic, these systems are candidates for application to 
real-world properties and phenomena. (Thanks to Bryson Brown for this example.) See 
Field's Science Without Numbers. 
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citing the cognitive limitations of (at least some) human subjects,98 or simply by citing the 
nature of our presently-accepted bodies of theory. 
Throughout the history of science, there have been various, sometimes radical, 
changes in the theories (and kinds of theories) we find acceptable — changes in what is, 
generally speaking, more and less intelligible and plausible to people. What we consider 
to be intelligible and plausible now may well be subject to the same sorts of theoretical 
and paradigmatic changes which have occurred in the past. Therefore, the theories which 
we presently accept, or find intelligible and/or plausible, needn't reflect which entities 
actually exist and needn't be true. So, though the psychological appeal of theories which 
are more unified and/or more economical may cause human subjects to prefer such 
theories in their explanations, this appeal cannot, in itself, give us sufficient reason for 
believing that such theories are actually true.99 
There is a stronger reason for preferring more unified and/or more economical 
theories in our explanations. If we accept some sort of coherentism as our theory of 
98Cf. Frank Jackson, who, in arguing against reductionism in the philosophy of mind, 
says, "The wonder is that we understand as much as we do, and there is no wonder that 
there should be matters which fall quite outside our comprehension" (407). 
"In fact, theories which are more unified can even be significantly less intelligible and 
less plausible. As Hempel points out, we can use Craig's theorem to eliminate a theory's 
theoretical terms (i.e., those terms referring to unobserved entities) while preserving the 
deductive connections between the theory's observation sentences (i.e., the theory's 
inputs and outputs)—assuming, of course, that a division between the language's 
observational and theoretical terms can be drawn. However, without its theoretical terms, 
this theory would require an infinite set of axioms in order to maintain its deductive 
connections. Though the latter sort of theory presumably unifies very well, the size of its 
axiom-set seems to take away from its intelligibility and, hence, its plausibility (as well as 
from its economy). 
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epistemic justification (as I, along with many others, think we should), then we ought to 
value greater unity and greater economy.1 0 0 Generally speaking, a coherence theory of 
epistemic justification (or CTEJ 1 0 1) asserts that beliefs are justified to the extent that they 
cohere with our overall system of belief and knowledge (i.e., with our total view). 
Coherence is a vague notion — I've yet to encounter a specific definition of it. Still, I 
think we can identify certain elements to be included in a definition of coherence. 
Among these are unity and economy. Evidently, for a theory to cohere with our total 
view, it must in some sense unify with the latter. Both the concepts of coherence and 
unification suggest some sort of'fit' with our total view, a fit which goes beyond mere 
consistency.103 Indeed, it seems that the more unified a theory is, the more it coheres with 
— and adds to the explanatory coherence of — our total view. Since, according to a 
coherence theory of justification, justification increases with coherence, it follows that, 
other things being equal, the more unified a theory is, the more justified we are in 
believing that it's true. 
Economy, at least in the case of Paradise on the Cheap, enhances coherence 
1 0 0I won't argue for a version of coherentism here, but will assume that our beliefs are, in 
fact, justified by some coherence relation. In "Holistic Coherentism," BonJour gives a 
thorough characterization of a coherence theory of justification as well as a defence of its 
tenability. Even some epistemological foundationalists attribute to coherence an 
important role in justification. See also Robert Audi's "Fallibilist Foundationalism and 
Holistic Coherentism" for an account of the importance coherence can have in a 
foundationalist theory of justification. 
t o l This acronym derives from BonJour's CTEK, or coherence theory of empirical 
knowledge. See his "Holistic Coherentism." 
1 0 2In "Holistic Coherentism," BonJour argues that consistency is not, in itself, sufficient 
for justification via coherence. 
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because economical theories have Meaner' ontologies.103 Paradise on the Cheap doesn't 
have the peculiar and unnecessary ontology had by modal realism. The former coheres 
better with our total view and, therefore, we are more justified in accepting it than we are 
in accepting modal realism. So it appears that a CTEJ would warrant the use of Occam's 
razoriM in the present instance — we should, it seems, prefer Paradise on the Cheap to its 
less-economical rival. 
If we reject set-theoretic realism and, instead, accept a theory providing equally 
satisfactory explanations at less ontological and epistemological cost (the latter theory 
being more economical and better unified with our total view), the only room there is for 
set-theoretic realism in mathematics is as a heuristic device. Similarly, since the benefits 
brought to philosophy by modal realism can indeed be had more cheaply — in Paradise 
on the Cheap — then modal realism, as it asserts the existence of an extremely large 
number of possible worlds, possible individuals, and similarities between them, could at 
best serve as a device for heuristic convenience. 
One may also attack modal and set-theoretic realism by insisting that an ontology 
Bryson Brown has pointed out that mere leanness is not so important. "But," he says, 
"leanness in the sense of making do, metaphysically, with what is useful in an account of 
psychology of belief (i.e., what can actually have some impact on our beliefs, according 
to our best account of human psychology) is important, since otherwise our metaphysics 
is subject to serious skeptical worries." (This passage is quoted, with slight editorial 
adjustments, from some comments addressed to me over email.) See the discussion of 
semantic naturalism below for a more detailed exposition of the importance which the 
psychology of belief and learning has in metaphysics. 
1 0 4
 According to Ernest A. Moody, Occam employed the principle of parsimony "as a 
methodological principle of economy in explanation. He invoked it most frequently 
under such forms as Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity' and 'What can be 
done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more';..." (307). 
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is not viable unless it has an explanatory connection to our linguistic usage and our ability 
to use language. The idea was presented to me in some written comments by Bryson 
Brown, a portion of which I will now reproduce.105 
My own view is that ontology does no good here unless it has an 
explanatory connection to our usage/ability to use the language. Roughly, 
semantics that has no explanatory force with respect to our use of language 
is a kind of linguistic supposition that gains no credibility from its mere 
success as semantics. This means I'm defending some sort of semantic 
naturalism, and also means I'm unable to offer anything like the standard 
set-theoretical semantics for mathematics, except as a purely formal 
semantics which can provide a sort of extension of the language and a 
uniform linguistic resource by means of which we can link various areas 
of mathematics together. The 'real' semantics of mathematics, on such a 
view, is much more complicated, since it has to link up with the causal 
connections by means of which we can learn to do mathematics — here 
some sort of inferential approach to the fundamentals may be the root of 
things, since rule following and rule learning are fundamental human 
capacities, and learning mathematics involves learning certain rule-
governed procedures, from counting to calculating to proving. Similarly, 
when we think in modal or counterfactual terms, we do something that we 
have been taught how to do by the inculcation of certain claims, certain 
inferences, and certain patterns of reasoning. That the rules of both 
mathematical and modal/counterfactual discourse can be systematically 
captured by means of suppositional ontologies doesn't, in my view, 
provide any evidence, even prima facie evidence, for those ontologies 
unless they are given some role in grounding our learning/capacity to use 
these linguistic devices. 
In contrast, it is arguable that imaginative recombinations and judgements of suitable-
similarity do play a role in our capacity to reason about possibilia, i.e. that they are the 
means by which we gain cognitive access to many of the possibilities for p and p-
individuals. Therefore, semantic naturalism, if true, provides us with further reason to 
think that Paradise on the Cheap provides good explanations of Lewis phenomena. But 
I 0 5 r v e taken the liberty of making some very minor editorial adjustments to Brown's 
comments, which were conveyed to me via email. 
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to argue in favour of semantic naturalism is beyond the scope of this essay. I have given 
other theoretical considerations against accepting the truth of modal realism, and for 
accepting that of Paradise on the Cheap, and will rest content with them. I mention the 
present approach as just another route one might take to challenging Lewis. (However, it 
is also interesting to note that by naturalizing Paradise on the Cheap's ontology, we'd be 
doing more than pleasing proponents of semantic naturalism. By characterizing the 
ontology of second-order schematic structures, projection sets, and recombinations in 
terms of actual natural phenomena,'06 we would potentially make Paradise on the Cheap 
more unified and economical, not to mention more plausible. I won't pursue the 
naturalization of Paradise on the Cheap here.) 
Now, the question arises of whether we have sufficient reason to think that modal 
realism, as a heuristic device, is true, that the entities whose existence it posits actually 
exist. In "The Theoretician's Dilemma," Hempel discusses what he calls 
the paradox of theorizing. It asserts that if the terms and the general 
principles of scientific theory serve their purpose, i.e., if they establish 
definite connections among observable phenomena, then they can be 
dispensed with since any chain of laws and interpretive statements 
establishing such a connection should then be replaceable by a law which 
directly links observational antecedents to observational consequents. 
By adding to this crucial thesis two further statements which are obviously 
true, we obtain the premises for an argument in the classic form of a 
dilemma: 
If the terms and principles of a theory serve their purpose they are 
unnecessary, as just pointed out; and if they do not serve their purpose they 
are surely unnecessary. But given any theory, its terms and principles 
I 0 6For example, as suggested above, we choose to identify recombinations with particular 
kinds of brain states. 
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either serve their purpose or they do not. Hence, the terms and principles 
of any theory are unnecessary. 
This argument... will be called the theoretician's dilemma (186). 
By parity of reasoning, supposing that Paradise on the Cheap does everything which 
Lewis purports that modal realism does, then modal realism isn 't needed.107 We can, for 
example, work out the semantics of counterfactual conditionals and modalised statements 
by appealing solely to the features of this world, i.e., without having to assert the 
existence of phenomena like possible worlds and possible individuals. 
However, Hempel rejects the theoretician's dilemma, saying that 
the question posed by the theoretician's dilemma can be raised... in regard 
to the two alternative conceptions of the status of a theory [i.e., realism 
and instrumentalism]. Concerning Ramsey's formulation, we may ask 
whether it's not possible to dispense altogether with the existentially 
quantified variables which represent the theoretical terms, and thus to 
avoid the ontological commitment they require, without sacrificing any of 
the deductive connections that the Ramsey sentence establishes among 
VB-sentences [i.e., the sentences of a theory's observational language]. 
And in regard to theories conceived of as inferential devices, we may ask 
whether they cannot be replaced by a functionally equivalent set of rules 
— i.e., one establishing exactly the same inferential transitions among VB-
sentences — which uses none of the 'meaningless marks.' 
To both questions, Craig's theorem gives an affirmative answer by 
providing a general method for constructing the desired kind of equivalent. 
But again, in both cases, the result has the shortcomings mentioned in 
section 8. First, the method would replace the Ramsey-sentence by an 
, 0 7 It should be made clear that modal realism does not fit perfectly into Hempel's picture, 
as it is not a scientific theory. Scientific theories posit the existence of unobserved and/or 
unobservable entities which presumably stand in some causal relationship^) to what we 
do and/or can observe. However, as mentioned earlier, Lewis claims that every possible 
world is isolated from every other—neither other worlds nor their contents can exist in 
causal relationships with our world or any of its contents. Thus, modal realism is a 
metaphysical theory. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the fact that non-actual world are so 
isolated raises serious concerns about whether the standards of inference to the best 
explanation even apply to modal realism. 
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infinite set of postulates, or the body of inferential rules by an infinite set 
of rules, in terms of VB, and would thus lead to a loss of economy. 
Second, the resulting system of postulates or of inferential rules would not 
lend itself to inductive prediction and explanation. And third, it would 
have the pragmatic defect, partly reflected already in the second point, of 
being less fruitful heuristically than the system using theoretical terms 1 0 8 
(222). 
Hempel's first objection to the theoretician's dilemma would hold, in some form, for 
Paradise on the Cheap if the latter were somehow practically impossible to construct 
and/or use. 1 0 9 Were this the case, Paradise on the Cheap certainly would be heuristically 
deficient. It would in no way make our goals easier to achieve; rather, we couldn't use it 
to achieve our goals, practically speaking, and given that we can construct and use modal 
realism, the latter would be heuristically preferable to Paradise on the Cheap. In the 
absence of other heuristically-adequate rivals, modal realism would be heuristically 
necessary to achieving our goals. 
Hempel's second objection doesn't apply to the present discussion. We don't 
intend to use either Paradise on the Cheap or modal realism to make predictions; and, at 
least in principle, these theories both provide reasonably satisfactory accounts of the 
various sorts of phenomena we're concerned with (e.g., modality and counterfactuals). 
However, the third objection Hempel makes to the theoretician's dilemma does apply. 
According to Hempel, theoretical terms (referring to such non-observational entities as 
Cf. Hinckfuss, in which it is pointed out that we needn't 'economize' our theories in 
this way — we simply use our ontologically-lavish theories as useful suppositions for 
carrying out inferences. 
1 0 9
 As was demonstrated in Section B of the second chapter, Paradise on the Cheap can, in 
fact, be used on its own to carry out at least some analyses of Lewis-phenomena. 
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possible worlds) have "definite heuristic value because they stimulate the use and 
invention of powerfully explanatory concepts for which only some links with experience 
can be indicated at the time, but which are fruitful in suggesting further lines of research 
that may lead to additional connections with the data of direct observation" (206). Thus, 
one may claim that despite the fact that the Paradise on the Cheap can do everything 
Lewis wants modal realism to do (at least when the former takes advantage of modal 
realism's suppositional role), modal realism has the potential to lead to other theoretical 
benefits. For example, due to the notion of possible worlds and/or possible individuals, 
theorists may develop other plausible explanations of Lewis-phenomena or even plausible 
explanations of other things. Furthermore, future research on modal realism may lead to 
the conclusion that the latter theory can explain everything which Paradise on the Cheap 
can as well as some things that Paradise on the Cheap cannot explain. If, as things turn 
out, modal realism can explain all of these phenomena better than any combination of 
Paradise-on-the-Cheap-plus-other-theories can, then we certainly do have good reason to 
accept modal realism over Paradise on the Cheap, 1 1 0 to believe that the former constitutes 
the best available explanation of these phenomena and, so, that it is true.111 But it 
remains to be seen whether modal realism can explain additional phenomena which 
Paradise on the Cheap cannot, and whether it can do so in a way which is superior to any 
""Recall my assumption that the explanatory superiority of theory gives us good reason to 
think that it's true. 
I l l l f Paradise-on-the-Cheap-plus-other-theories and modal realism are explanatorily 
equivalent, we're still justified in accepting the latter provided that it's more unified and 
economical than the former. 
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Paradise-on-the-Cheap-plus-other-theories combination. Until it is shown that modal 
realism is, in fact, capable of performing the latter functions, we are neither justified in 
believing in its truth nor in asserting the existence of the entities it posits. Until such 
explanatory superiority is established for modal realism, we are left with no reason to 
accept the latter instead of Paradise on the Cheap." 2 Still, if modal realism has the 
potential to satisfactorily explain other phenomena, and if Paradise on the Cheap — and 
any Paradise on the Cheap-plus-other-theories combination — lacks this potential, then 
the heuristic fertility of modal realism is greater than that of Paradise on the Cheap in the 
present regard. 
Similarly, modal realism has a definite heuristic advantage over Paradise on the 
Cheap if the former is somehow easier to use than the latter (generally speaking). For 
example, it may well be that modal realism's conceptual apparatus is logically simpler 
and/or more intelligible; and perhaps modal realism is somehow easier to use 
psychologically than Paradise on the Cheap. 1 1 3 However, that modal realism is easier to 
use than Paradise on the Cheap is not sufficient reason to assert the former's truth. Even 
"
2But the potential for explanatory superiority may give us good reason not to dismiss 
modal realism, as we might have better reason to think that it's true given further 
evidence. 
1 1 3For example, subjects might construct truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals 
with greater ease if they believe that the statements' antecedents and consequents actually 
refer to phenomena in other worlds. (Of course, these modal-realistic truth conditions 
could then be translated, via false bridge laws, to truth conditions stated in terms of 
Paradise on the Cheap. I realize that, in this respect, I am going beyond what Hinckfuss 
requires of economical theories.) Likewise, it may be easier for a mathematician to carry 
out proofs and calculations if she believes that the symbols she uses refer to real 
mathematical objects. 
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if modal realism is the only theory which can, in practice, be used to achieve our goals, it 
doesn't follow that we're warranted in thinking that it's true. (As mentioned in Chapter 
2, one of Hinckfuss' lessons is that even false theories can be very serviceable and, 
therefore, that a theory's usefulness is not an adequate basis on which to commit to its 
truth. The same can be said for a theory's convenience.) Sufficient reason requires that a 
connection be made between the heuristic convenience of modal realism and its truth, 
such that the former logically implies the latter or, at least, that the former makes the 
latter very probable. There appears to be no reason to believe that such a connection can 
be established."4 Therefore, it's evident that the heuristic value of modal realism cannot, 
on its own, establish (or give us sufficient reason to believe in) the former's truth. The 
considerations which we derived from Hempel's objections to the theoretician's dilemma 
do not justify us in preferring the modal realism to Paradise on the Cheap on realist terms. 
However, the reasons discussed above for why modal realism may qualify as a 
valuable heuristic device, over and above Paradise on the Cheap, are reasons why 
instrumentalists about theories might prefer modal realism to Paradise on the Cheap. 
According to an instrumentalist conception of theories, "theoretical statements are not 
candidates for truth or reference, and theories have no ontological import" (Delaney 379). 
Hempel characterizes the instrumentalist position as follows: 
Those finally, who, like contemporary nominalists, reject such strong 
ontological commitments, may adopt a conception of scientific theories, 
"
4Indeed, if a form of Paradise on the Cheap is preferable, in my 'total-view' sense, then 
the argument that the convenience with which modal realism provides subjects in 
determining, say, the truth conditions of counterfactuals is best explained by the truth of 
modal realism cannot be made. 
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not as significant statements, but as intricate devices for inferring, from 
intelligible initial statements, expressed in terms of the antecedently-
understood vocabulary VB, certain other, again intelligible, statements in 
terms of that vocabulary. The nominalistically-inclined may then construe 
theoretical terms as meaningless auxiliary marks, which serve as 
convenient symbolic devices in the transition from one set of experimental 
statements to another (221). 
Put more simply, C. F. Delaney says that instrumentalism is "a kind of anti-realistic view 
of scientific theories wherein theories are construed as calculating devices or instruments 
for conveniently moving from a given set of observations to a predicted set of 
observations" (379). Instrumentalist theories and heuristic devices are used for similar 
purposes — with both, we aim to carry out certain tasks conveniently, i.e., to achieve 
certain goals. In its suppositional role, modal realism is used along instrumentalist lines 
— as a deductive tool for deriving Paradise on the Cheap's explanations of Lewis-
phenomena. 
In fact, it appears that the standards of acceptance for heuristic devices are the 
same as those for instrumentalist theories. Presumably, we judge the success of both 
heuristic devices and instrumental theories on the basis of how convenient, or effective, 
they are to use in performing particular tasks." 5 Presumably, we determine the 
instrumental/heuristic device which we are most justified in using for a given set of tasks 
by figuring out which device most successfully carries out these tasks. 1 1 6 For, if a theory 
l l 5 I recognize that the extent to which a device is convenient, and the device that is most 
convenient for a certain task, may vary from person to person. But, for simplicity, I'll 
ignore this difficulty here. 
"
6Moser, Mulder, and Trout state the following, rather 'rough and ready',principle of 
instrumental rationality. "If you intend that a situation, X, occur and you believe, in 
agreement with your evidence that another situation, Y, is the most effective means to X, 
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is not the best tool we have for success, then we evidently have greater reason to use the 
theory which is the best tool — relative to certain goals, there's no reason why we 
shouldn't use the most effective one — and there's obviously less reason to use a theory 
which isn't. So, to be acceptable from an instrumentalist's point of view, modal realism 
must be a more convenient means to Lewis' ends than any rival theory (including, of 
course, Paradise on the Cheap)." 7 In other words, the total heuristic value of modal 
realism must be greater than that of Paradise on the Cheap (and any other rival theory)."8 
Therefore, even though, according to our initial assumption, Paradise on the Cheap has 
the same degree of explanatory power as modal realism, it may be that modal realism, 
because of the conveniences it provides, is the more convenient tool for dealing with the 
relevant philosophical problems. This being the case, instrumentalists would prefer to 
derive alternative explanations of Lewis-phenomena by using modal realism and the 
bridge laws suppositionally, rather than by using just the conceptual apparatus supplied 
by Paradise on the Cheap. 
Regardless of where our instrumental preferences lie (or where they ought to lie), 
to Lewis, accepting modal realism just is to accept that there actually exists a world 
then you should rationally aim to have Y occur" (130). 
"
7 As an instrumental device, the role of the conceptual apparatus comprised of modal 
realism and the bridge laws can be paralleled to that of a function. Modal-realism-plus-
bridge-laws takes the Lewis-phenomena to be analysed as arguments and yields 
alternative explanations of these phenomena as values. 
t l 8 The overall heuristic value of a theory is obtained by comparing the degree to which the 
theory is convenient with the degree to which it is inconvenient. Let's assume, for the 
purposes at hand, that such values are decidable. 
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(among many others) at which Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in time. He intends his 
theory to be taken in a realist sense; and he wouldn't be satisfied by its being acceptable 
only on instrumentalist grounds. But, barring any further evidence indicating that modal 
realism is explanatorily superior to Paradise on the Cheap, we have no choice but to 
disappoint him. 
Much has been said in this chapter about inference to the best explanation. The 
following, final, chapter will focus on the question of what, if any, explanatory standards 
Lewis is permitted to employ in justifying his modal realism. 
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Chapter 4: Modal realism and the standards of inference to the best explanation 
Strong considerations have now been given in favour of the view that modal realism 
should be replaced by Paradise on the Cheap as our 'going' theory of possibility 
(assuming, of course, that modal realism was our going theory in the first place). In 
OPW, Lewis is more-or-less explicit about the strategy by which he argues in favour of 
modal realism, namely inference to the best explanation (or IBE). For one thing, he says 
that we should accept modal realism because it is serviceable, because it provides us with 
a plethora of theoretical benefits, in particular the analyses of modality, counterfactuals, 
content, and properties discussed in Chapter 2. Thus far I have been assuming that Lewis 
permissibly employs IBE in regard to modal realism, and I haven't given consideration to 
the question of what sorts of IBE, if any, are applicable to this theory. So, I'd like to 
finish with a discussion of whether any standards of IBE apply to modal realism and, if 
so, what those standards are. Moreover, I would like to compare modal realism to 
Paradise on the Cheap and, thereby, bring to light any discrepancies between the IBE-
standards which are acceptable for the former and those which are acceptable for the 
latter. 
One of the key morals to be drawn from the material presented in Chapter 2, 
Section C is that modal realism can be serviceable without being true — modal realism 
can be used suppositionally to carry out alternative analyses of Lewis-phenomena as well 
as inferences from premises concerning the entities cited by Paradise on the Cheap (e.g., 
p-features, recombinations, and schematic structures) to conclusions concerning the same. 
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In addition, Hinckfuss suggests a way in which modal realism may be used to perform 
inferences about Lewis-phenomena simpliciter — consider the following passage: 
Bridge laws which are regarded as semantically or logically true by some 
philosophers may be regarded as presupposed falsehoods by others to 
much the same effect. For example, given 'semantic' rules: 
(1) (3x) Possible world x 
(2) Op = (x)(Possible world x => p is true in x) 
(3) Op = (3x)(Possible world x & p is true in x) 
and the premise, say, 
(4) Dp 
(where proposition p is expressed by sentence p), 
we can proceed: 
(5) (x)(Possible world x o p is true in x) 
2,4, equivalence 
(6) (3x)(Possible world x & p is true in x) 
1, existential instantiation, 5, universal instantiation, modus ponens 
and existential generalization. 
(l)0p 
3,6, equivalence (607) 
Modal realism can be used as a means by which we can reason about modalities in clear, 
syntactically specifiable ways; and given further bridge laws," 9 it can also be used as a 
means by which to reason about all other Lewis-phenomena. In the present context, all 
such bridge laws — and, therefore, modal realism itself — are merely suppositional. 
Thus, Hinckfuss shows us yet another way in which modal realism can be at once useful 
and false. Hinckfuss concludes, then, that the fact that Lewis' plurality-of-worlds thesis 
u 9 For instance, "(A > C) = (3x)(Vy)(Possible world x & possible world y) & (A and C 
are both true in x & A is true in y & C is false in y) & (x is closer to p than y)." 
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is serviceable does not, by itself, give us sufficient reason to believe that it is true. 1 2 0 
More generally, Hinckfuss asserts that "even if the ontologicaUy-prodigal 
statements are useful in the provision of explanations of true propositions, their 
usefulness in this regard need not be regarded as evidence for their truth" (597). I find it 
interesting that Hinckfuss appeals to explanation here since, in the passage quoted just 
above, modal realism doesn't seem to have any explanatory function whatsoever (at least 
in the way Lewis understands the explanatory function of modal realism). Rather, it is 
merely a tool for deducing conclusions about unanalysed Lewis-phenomena from 
premises about the same. In such a capacity, modal realism is simply an instrument (and, 
as such, yields a kind of D-N explanation). The case is the same regarding the 
suppositional roles I specified for modal realism in Chapter 2 — Paradise on the Cheap 
plays the explanatory role, whereas the bridge laws derived from modal realism are, at 
best, mere expedients by which alternative explanations are made. If there is indeed 
anything explanatory about modal realism, it is the theoretical benefits which Lewis cites 
for it; and these theoretical benefits consist of modal realism's ability to analyse modality, 
counterfactuals, content, and properties. The fact that modal realism yields such analyses 
is the principal reason that, according to Lewis, it is serviceable. From these analyses 
follow various equivalence relations between Lewis-phenomena and items of the modal-
realistic ontology, e.g., that modality de dicto and de re are equivalent to (i.e., are 
explained in terms of) quantification over possible worlds and possible individuals, 
1 2 0But, as we shall see immediately, there are different ways in which a theory is said to 
be 'serviceable,' some of which may give us more reason to believe that the theory is true 
than others. 
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respectively. These equivalences constitute bridge laws on the Hinckfussian model 1 2 1 — 
taken suppositionally, they are what Hinckfuss regards as serviceable about modal 
realism. On the Hinckfussian model, the analyses yielded by modal realism are useful 
only in a derivative sense: from them, one can infer certain equivalences to be used as 
convenient deductive tools. However, on Lewis' account, it is the analyses themselves 
which constitute modal realism's usefulness.122 Therefore, the notion of serviceability 
appealed to in "SPO," and in my own arguments in Chapter 2, is evidently different from 
that appealed to by Lewis in OPW. 
So, there is an ambiguity in the notion of serviceability that Hinckfuss fails to 
recognize — Lewis' conception of serviceability is quite different from Hinckfuss'. 
Though the kind of serviceability Hinckfuss speaks of in "SPO" doesn't justify one in 
believing that modal realism is true, Hinckfuss' argument fails to establish that the type of 
serviceability Lewis has in mind fails to provide sufficient warrant for belief in the same. 
My point, then, in identifying the equivocation in Hinckfuss' reasoning is that assuming 
Lewis, in his appeal to serviceability, legitimately employs a form of IBE, it doesn't 
follow from anything said in Hinckfuss that his form of IBE cannot form at least some 
basis for believing in modal realism's truth and, so, in the existence of possible worlds 
'-'Of course, other equivalences — true or suppositional — can serve as bridge laws, like 
those between items in modal realism's ontology and items in the alternative ontology. I 
choose not to mention such laws in the present context because they are irrelevant to the 
task at hand. 
'"Indeed, Lewis' analyses are useful to the philosophical community, as we've been 
trying to give accounts of modality, counterfactuals, content, and properties for a long 
time. 
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and individuals. 
As suggested in previous chapters, Lewis' approach to IBE is essentially to appeal 
to the unity and economy afforded by his theory. In particular, with modal realism, our 
accounts of various seemingly-disparate phenomena are unified under one theory. 
Furthermore, modal realism promotes economy in the sense that it asserts the existence of 
a reasonably small number of entity-kinds.123 1 2 4 To be sure, modal realism cannot foster 
causal explanations of any Lewis-phenomena (where, roughly and briefly, to give a 
causal explanation of a phenomenon is to identify its cause). Because worlds are isolated 
from one another — and, therefore, because there can be no causal interaction between 
worlds or the parts of different worlds — it follows that no non-actual worlds or 
individuals can have a causal impact on the Lewis-phenomena of this world. (Generally 
speaking, the Lewis-phenomena of any world cannot be influenced causally by any other 
worlds or other-worldly individuals.) The truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals 
and modalised statements, for example, are given in terms of possible worlds; and these 
semantics are not about causation — they're about making things true in a very different 
sense than causing something to be true. For Lewis, it makes sense only to speak of 
123Indeed, in performing explanations of Lewis-phenomena, the modal realist's premises 
have only to do with possible worlds and possible individuals, certain of their key 
characteristics, similarity orderings between them, and counterpart and accessibility 
relations. 
1 2 4The fact that, as a consequence of its lavish ontology, modal realism affords less unity 
and economy than does Paradise on the Cheap (given a 'total-view' approach to unity and 
economy of theory) is presently beside the point. I am discussing the kind of IBE which 
Lewis puts to use and ignoring the question of whether or not, by the same BE-standards, 
a different theory is more successful. (See Chapter 3 for arguments to the effect that 
Paradise on the Cheap is more unified and economical than modal realism.) 
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causation relative to individual worlds — not as occurring across worlds. Modal realists 
explain Lewis phenomena by showing how the latter are subsumed under the general 
principles of the theory (i.e., under what modal realism says about possible worlds, 
possible individuals, and the relations between them). 
The question which must now be pursued is whether there are any non-causal 
approaches to IBE which Lewis may use permissibly.125 Let's take a look at some types 
of noncausal explanation in order to see which, if any, apply to modal realism. In 
"Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification," Wesley Salmon succinctly describes 
Hempel and Oppenheim's deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation, 
"according to which explanation consists in deductive or inductive subsumption of that 
which is to be explained (the explanandum) under one or more laws of nature" (4). 
(Salmon notes Hempel's insistence that causality does not play a crucial role in scientific 
explanation.) The D-N model is what Salmon calls a mechanical conception of 
explanation — "It involves achieving a knowledge of how things work" (Salmon 18). 1 2 6 
1 2 SNote that, in what follows, the kinds of IBE I discuss are generally considered to be 
approaches to scientific explanation. In my discussion, I shall ignore the view, considered 
by Salmon, that "perhaps it is futile to try to explicate the concept of scientific 
explanation in a comprehensive manner. It might be better to list various explanatory 
virtues that scientific theories might posses, and to evaluate scientific theories in terms of 
them. Some theories might get high scores on some dimensions, but low scores on others 
..." (Salmon 20). For simplicity's sake, I'll proceed on the assumption that there are, in 
fact, distinct breeds of IBE. 
1 2 6I should give a clearer account of D-N explanation. According to the latter, 
explanations are sets of sentences such that (a) they are true, (b) they include at least one 
lawlike statement — hence nomological — and (c) they deductively imply what is to be 
explained — hence deductive. See Hempel and Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation." 
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The D-N model is evidently not a strategy available to Lewis. Modal realism does not 
explain modality, counterfactuals, content, or properties by appealing to any of the 
nomological characteristics of this or any other world; and therefore, modal realism isn't 
a theory about the laws which this or any other world are bound to operate by. Moreover, 
though mechanistic explanations don't directly appeal to causes, the entities appealed to 
in such explanations (i.e., the things that laws of nature are supposed to be about), though 
perhaps unobservable, are taken to exist in some sort of causal relationship^) with 
explananda. But, as we already know, the entities appealed to in modal realistic 
explanations are, for the most part, not causally related to the things explained in terms of 
them. 
Furthermore, in Change in View, Gilbert Harman acknowledges that noncausal 
explanations can support inference to the best explanation.127 He says, for example, that 
Newton's explanation of Kepler's laws doesn't appeal to any prior events but, instead, 
shows how the approximate truth of Kepler's laws follow from more general principles. 
This example is thus a case of one set of laws being subsumed by another.1 2 8 However, 
such explanations pertain to the laws which govern the actual world; and so, as with the 
D-N model of explanation, it is inapplicable to modal realism. However, Harman 
Sometimes one explains 5 by citing some prior events that caused or brought about or 
led up to S. But other explanations are not like this" (Harman 73; emphasis added). 
>28However, according to Bryson Brown, there is a causal element in the explanation of 
Kepler's laws. The latter are 'explained' in the sense that, given certain initial conditions, 
they follow from Newton's theory. The initial conditions causally make it the case that 
Newton's laws lead to Kepler's. (If those initial conditions weren't credible for the solar 
system, to a good approximation, the 'explanation' would be no good at all.) 
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presents another kind of noncausal explanation. He asserts that some mathematical 
proofs are more explanatory than others, where the relevant kind of explanation is 
noncausal — these more explanatory proofs make it intelligible why their theorems hold 
in a way that other proofs do not.' 2 9 Notwithstanding that the epistemic significance of 
intelligibility is open to dispute, it would seem that modal realism is amenable to the 
latter sort of explanation. Such mathematical explanations have nothing to do with the 
causal-nomological ways of this or any other world — neither do modal-realistic 
analyses. We can say, therefore, that modal realism explains by making Lewis-
phenomena intelligible in certain ways. For example, it makes modal notions intelligible 
by giving an account of what must be the case for states of affairs to be contingent, 
necessary, possible, and impossible; and it makes the truth and falsity of counterfactuals 
intelligible by specifying their semantics. (I.e., modal realism provides appealing 
semantics for the modalities and counterfactuals.) Moreover, it provides an 
understanding of doxastic-state content and properties and relations by giving 
'•'Similarly, Salmon discusses Friedman's formulation of the unification approach to 
scientific explanation, according to which "we increase our scientific understanding of 
the world to the extent that we can reduce the number of independently acceptable 
assumptions that are required to explain natural phenomena" (Salmon 5). Friedman's 
approach to explanation is similar to the Harmanian conception presently being examined 
in that the former and latter share an important idea, namely that "[t]o understand the 
phenomena in our world requires that they be fitted into the general world-picture" 
(Salmon 17). However, in "Greater Unification Equals Greater Understanding?" Paul 
Humphreys gives strong reasons against the unification approach to explanation, arguing 
that the theories with the most unified axioms aren't always the easiest to understand. He 
says, for example, that a common problem in formalizations is that "sheer economy can 
be counterproductive in leading to an understanding of the formalization" (188). But 
perhaps when combined with other qualities, such as elegance, clarity, and simplicity, 
such theories are easier to grasp. 
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straightforward accounts of what these phenomena consist in. If mathematical proofs, 
in their ability to render theorems intelligible, have explanatory power then the same must 
be said of modal-realistic analyses in their ability to render Lewis-phenomena intelligible 
(provided, of course, that we allow that theories which explain may be false, as I think we 
must). 
It appears that, on Harman's account, the brand of explanation presently being 
discussed shares some more general characteristics with mechanistic explanation. 
Harman uses the term 'explanation' to refer to something one understands which makes 
phenomena more intelligible, comprehensible, or coherent.131 Such explanations, he 
adds, are always of the form R because P,and Q — they explain why or how it is that 
something is the case. I must stress here that to explain 'why' something is the case, or to 
use 'because' in citing an explanation, is not always to cite a cause for the explanandum. 
Our linguistic conventions are such that it's proper, for example, to say that a certain 
counterfactual is true because such-and-such worlds are closer to p than such-and-such 
other worlds in response to a why-question (assuming, of course, the we've accepted — 
or supposed — Lewis' semantics for counterfactual conditionals). Therefore, we have it 
> 3 0By contrast, it's important to note that, as part of suppositional models, modal realism 
does not yield any intelligibility, at least not intelligibility that's in any way similar to that 
considered in the present context. In suppositional frameworks, one isn't interested in 
modal realism's ability to furnish understanding of Lewis-phenomena; rather, one is 
simply interested in what it affords deductively. 
l 3 1For Harman, "[coherence in a view consists in connections of intelligibility among the 
elements of the view. Among other things these include explanatory connections, which 
hold when part of one's view makes it intelligible to one why some other part should be 
true" (65). 
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that the form of modal-realistic analyses can easily be made to coincide with that of 
Harman's explanations without any loss in the former's content. Hence, according to 
Harman's views on explanation, modal realism has bona fide explanatory power in its 
capacity to make Lewis-phenomena intelligible (regardless of whether the modal-realistic 
analyses are, in fact, correct). Furthermore, Harman says that inference to the best 
explanation occurs when one infers something that might explain the evidence — one 
starts by believing e and comes to believe e because h, where h is the best of competing 
explanations.132 Taking evidence to include, in the present context, things like Lewis-
phenomena,133 it's open for Lewis to claim that modal realism is the theory which makes 
Lewis-phenomena most intelligible and that, as such, it furnishes the best explanation of 
these phenomena. However, as I argued in Chapter 3, the kind of unity and economy 
afforded by Paradise on the Cheap, in comparison to that afforded by modal realism, is 
such that the former theory arguably makes Lewis-phenomena more intelligible than does 
the latter (given a 'total-view' approach to theories). This being the case, the IBE-
l 3 2
"At least, it should be the best among competing explanations at the same 'level.' 
There might be a competing explanation that is better but that involves an improved 
version of some theory which one could not have been expected to think of. That would 
not keep one from being justified in reaching the conclusion one reached" (Harman 68). 
133Although Lewis-phenomena aren't 'observable' in the traditional sense that yellow 
birds and green grass are observable, it's arguable that they still count as evidence. We 
all have a fairly strong, though rather unarticulated, grasp on what's possible and 
impossible and on which counterfactuals are true and which are false. Modal realism 
articulates these possibilities, impossibilities, truths, and falsehoods — it makes them 
intelligible and, so, explains them (if only in a very limited sense). Similarly, a vast 
majority of us accept that we have systems of belief and knowledge and that there are 
items known as properties and relations (never mind their ontological status). Again, 
modal realism is a means by which to make these things intelligible and, thereby, to 
explain them. 
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standards which I've derived from Harman's account imply that Paradise on the Cheap, 
not modal realism, constitutes the best explanation of Lewis-phenomena. Still, we have 
established that there is a type of IBE which Lewis may permissibly employ. 
Despite the explanatory function which Harman's account allows modal realism 
to have, it's evident that Nancy Cartwright wouldn't regard modal realism's ability to 
make Lewis-phenomena intelligible as explanatory. In "The Born-Einstein Debate: 
Where Application and Explanation Separate," Cartwright distinguishes between 
explanation, on the one hand, and "the descriptive completeness of [a] theory, or its 
ability to subsume and describe the models that it should" (272), on the other hand. In 
other words, she distinguishes a theory's explanatory power from its covering power. 
Accordingly, she says that "explanatory power is no guide to covering power. The laws 
of a theory can cover a lot more phenomena than they can explain" (272). Consider the 
point she makes about quantum mechanics: 
So long as any phenomena can be fitted into the Schroedinger equation, 
and no single situation requires incompatible representations, quantum 
mechanics will be a consistent descriptively powerful theory. But it fails 
to be explanatory in a critical respect: it does not answer "the fundamental 
question, 'Why does light act in some respects like an assemblage of 
corpuscles and in other respects like a spreading wave phenomenon?'". ... 
It is important to realize that a theory like this may have considerable 
covering power and yet remain forever explanatorily inadequate (275). 1 3 4 
As established above, modal realism's analyses can be given in response to why-
questions — modal realism can tell us why, for example, certain counterfactuals are true 
I 3 4It 's interesting to note here that Hempel and Oppenheim's D-N model allows some of 
the mere 'coverings' of which Cartwright speaks to count a real explanations. See note 
126. 
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while others are not in a useful, non-circular way. However, Cartwright says that, for a 
derivation to be a genuine explanation within a theory, every one of the premises in the 
derivation must be nomologically licensed, i.e., each premise "must be tied by bridge 
principles of the theory to accurate physical descriptions of the situation" (280). As 
argued above, modal realism lacks causal-nomological relevance and, for this reason, 
does not satisfy Cartwright's standards for genuine explanations. Therefore, Cartwright 
would deny modal realism an explanatory role and, so, conclude that the standards of IBE 
aren't available to Lewis. 
Still, modal realism has definite covering power. Via its analyses of Lewis-
phenomena, modal realism manages to 'fit' a great deal of seemingly-disparate 
phenomena into its principles and, to that extent, it is a descriptively powerful theory. 
Besides, that modal realism isn't explanatory is not among the theory's shortcomings in 
Cartwright's eyes — she believes that explanation is a false goal. (One might charge 
Cartwright with having too narrow a view of what explanation consists in and, so, argue 
that there are forms of explanation which needn't appeal to the laws which govern this or 
any other world. However, because there are those like Harman who believe explanation 
of the latter kind is legitimate, I shall rest content and refrain from arguing against 
Cartwright here.) 
Bas C. van Fraassen raises further questions concerning whether IBE is a strategy 
available to Lewis. In "The Pragmatics of Explanation," a chapter of The Scientific 
Image, he says the fact that a theory allows us to explain—that it has explanatory power 
— is a pragmatic virtue, "albeit a complex one that includes other virtues as its own 
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preconditions" (97). Furthermore, "[t]he word 'explain' can have its basic role in 
expressions of the form 'fact E explains fact F relative to theory T" (van Fraassen, 
"Pragmatics" 101). van Fraassen claims that to say of a theory that it explains some fact 
is to assert a relationship between the theory and the fact, where this relationship is 
independent of the question of whether the real world, as a whole, fits the theory. 
Furthermore, he argues that 
explanation is not a special additional feature that can give you good 
reasons for belief in addition to evidence that the theory fits the observable 
phenomena. For 'what more there is to' explanation is something quite 
pragmatic, related to the concerns of the user of the theory and not 
something new about the correspondence between theory and fact. 
So 1 conclude that (a) the assertion that theory T explains, or provides an 
explanation for, fact E does not presuppose or imply that T is true or even 
empirically adequate, and (b) the assertion that we have an explanation is 
most simply construed as meaning that we have 'on the books' an 
acceptable theory which explains (100). 1 3 5 
Of course, all of van Fraassen's remarks in "The Pragmatics of Explanation" are limited 
to scientific explanation, which raises the question of whether or not what van Fraassen 
says can be applied to a metaphysical theory like modal realism. Lewis-phenomena are 
not 'observable' in the same way as the observable entities dealt with by the physical and 
, 3 5 In "Is the Best Good Enough?" Peter Lipton suggests another way in which IBE can be 
accommodated by van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. Lipton says that "[i]n its 
simplest form, the account [i.e. inference to the best explanation] claims that scientists 
judge that the theory which would, if correct, provide the best explanation of the available 
evidence is also the theory that is likeliest to be correct" (91). Contra van Fraassen, 
Lipton argues one may have a constructive empiricist version of IBE. To derive the 
latter, we must simply understand 'correct' (in the quote immediately above) as 
empirically adequate, and we must allow that false theories may explain. "I [Lipton] see 
no special barrier to the former, and van Fraassen's own account of explanation allows 
the latter" (91-2). 
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natural sciences. But, still, it might be argued that the notion of empirical adequacy does 
apply to modal realism in that the consequences of the latter 'tit' with our 
modal/counterfactual talk and judgements (though followers of Kripke would object in 
some cases). 
But even if we deny that the notion of empirical adequacy, along with van 
Fraassen's views on explanation, are inapplicable to modal realism, we can, as suggested 
in my discussion of Cartwright, regard modal realism as a descriptive theory, as a theory 
which provides descriptions of Lewis-phenomena. In note 133,1 suggested that we have 
intuitive understandings of what's possible and impossible, of which counterfactuals are 
true and which are false, and of what consequence relations govern these things. 
Similarly, we have certain intuitions about doxastic and epistemic states and properties. 
We may choose to measure the success of modal realism, in part, by how well it fits with 
our intuitions about Lewis-phenomena (where our intuitions are characterized by our 
knowledge of Lewis-phenomena uninfluenced by theories which provide explicit analyses 
of them — such as modal realism and Paradise on the Cheap). For example, we might 
consider modal realism to be successful because, among other things, it asserts that 
certain things we take to be possible are in fact possible (or so I shall assume since, really, 
modal realism says little if anything about specific modalised claims), accounts for why 
some people disagree about whether certain situations are possible or impossible (by 
appeal to certain counterpart and accessibility relations), and attributes to us the beliefs 
and knowledge which, intuitively, we take ourselves to possess. To so measure the 
success of modal realism, i.e., on the basis of how well it fits with our intuitions of 
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Lewis-phenomena, is to appeal to what I shall call modal realism's descriptive adequacy. 
According to van Fraassen, a theory's empirical adequacy gives us good, but not 
conclusive or rationally compelling, grounds for believing that it's true. We might say, 
then, that on account of its descriptive adequacy, we have the same kind of grounds for 
believing in modal realism. 
And, just as van Fraassen insists that a claim of empirical adequacy doesn't 
amount to a claim of explanation, that there must be more to explanation, we may insist 
that an appeal to the descriptive adequacy of modal realism does not qualify as 
explanation. The analyses carried out in terms of modal realism constitute the theory's 
descriptive power. However, modal realism's descriptive power is not the same thing as 
its explanatory power; and only the former can give us good (though not conclusive or 
rationally settling) reason to think that the thesis of a plurality of worlds is true. 
van Fraassen holds that explanation is a three-term relation — between theory, 
fact, and context — instead of just a two term relationship between fact and theory, like 
the one which pertains to descriptions. Some important features of his theory of 
explanation are summed up in the following passage: 
Being an explanation is essentially relative, for an explanation is an 
answer.... Since an explanation is an answer, it is evaluated vis-a-vis a 
question, which is a request for information. But exactly what is 
requested, by means of the question "Why is it the case that FT, differs 
from context to context. In addition, the background theory plus data 
relative to which the question is evaluated, as arising or not arising, 
depends on the context. And even what part of that background 
information is to be used to evaluate how good the answer is, qua answer 
to that question, is a contextually determined factor. So to say that a given 
theory can be used to explain a certain fact, is always elliptic for: there is a 
proposition which is a telling answer, relative to this theory, to the request 
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for information about certain facts (those counted as relevant for this 
question) that bears on a comparison between this fact which is the case, 
and certain (contextually specified) alternatives which are not the case 
(156). 
So, according to van Fraassen's view, scientific explanation is an application of science, 
not pure science. (He stresses that calling an explanation 'scientific' says nothing about 
its form or the kind of information presented. Rather, the label 'scientific' indicates only 
that "the explanation draws on science to get this information (at least to some extent) 
and, more importantly, that the criteria of evaluation of how good an explanation is, are 
being applied using a scientific theory" (155-56).) Explanation, he says, is a use of 
science to satisfy certain desires; "and these desires are quite specific in a specific 
context, but they are always desires for descriptive information" (156). So, the precise 
content of such desires, and the evaluation of how well they're satisfied, varies from 
context to context, van Fraassen thus concludes that "there can be no question at all of 
explanatory power as such.... Nor can there be any question of explanatory success as 
providing evidence for the truth of a theory that goes beyond the evidence we have for its 
providing an adequate description of the phenomena" (156-57). In all cases, the success 
of an explanation is just the success of an adequate and informative description. "And 
while it is true that we seek for explanation, the value of this search for science is that the 
search for explanation is ipso facto a search for empirically adequate, empirically strong 
theories" (157). But van Fraassen argues that, because a satisfactory explanation of a 
given phenomenon can differ from context to context, even two theories which are 
strictly empirically-equivalent "may differ in that one can be used to answer a given 
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request for an explanation while the other cannot" (154). 
So, on van Fraassen's view, explanations just are descriptions, where the relevant 
descriptions are selected and evaluated by contextual factors. For example, a description 
of the circumstances surrounding an automobile accident may include the presence of 
shrubbery which obscured the driver's vision and the faultiness of the automobile's 
breaks. The factor(s) appealed to in an explanation of why the accident occurred depends 
on the context, on the interests of the person who requests the explanation: 
[t]he civic planner 'keeps fixed' the mechanical constitution of the car, 
and gives his answer in the conviction that regardless of the mechanical 
defects, which made a fast stop impossible, the accident need not have 
happened. The mechanic 'keeps fixed' the physical environment; despite 
the shrubbery obscuring vision, the accident need not have happened if the 
brakes had been better (van Fraassen, "Pragmatics" 126). 
Furthermore, the interests of the person requesting the explanation will determine 
whether the descriptive factor identified is satisfactory. Likewise, the descriptive material 
cited in a modal-realistic explanation depends on the context in which the explanation is 
made, as does whether or not it's acceptable. For example, the appropriate explanation to 
give in response to "How is it possible that a?" will involve giving a description of either 
restricted or unrestricted quantification over possible worlds, depending on the context in 
which the request is made. So, because explanation doesn't assert anything beyond what 
is already asserted by a theory's descriptions (i.e., because the former simply 'rehashes' 
different parts of the latter, depending on context), van Fraassen concludes that 
explanation does not provide any reasons, over and above a theory's descriptive 
capabilities, to believe that the theory is true. 
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So far, so good. Though van Fraassen's arguments imply that modal realism's 
explanatory capabilities don't, on their own, give us reason to believe in the theory's 
truth, they at least allow that, regardless, Lewis may use BE . In '"World' is Not a Count 
Noun," van Fraassen makes no such allowances. In this article, van Fraassen criticizes 
the view that theory choice as practised by philosophers is legitimate and authoritative 
provided that it parallels science in regard to the criteria for theory choice. According to 
the latter view, scientists infer to (or at least accept) the best explanation, i.e., they weigh 
all the virtues and limitations of rival theories and believe the best of these to be true — 
philosophers are to be regarded as scientific and rational if they, like scientists, believe 
the best ontology to be true. In response to this position, van Fraassen points out that 
"'best' [in philosophy] does not refer to more accurate empirical predictions or control of 
nature but to theoretical virtues alone: answering philosophical questions, solving 
conundrums, resolving paradoxes" (146). Moreover, van Fraassen brings to light some 
important differences between philosophy and science in the following passage: 
The legitimacy of audacious postulation in science derives exactly from 
what is at stake in science but not in philosophy. The gleam in the 
scientists' eyes is the prediction and control of nature.... If scientists 
come to believe a new postulate, then one of the bad consequences that 
may happen is that they contract a false belief. But the disvalue of that 
consequence pales into insignificance beside the values and disvalues of 
other possible consequences. 
Is it so with philosophy? Adoption of an ampliative method of audacious 
postulation in ontology may or may not lead to good philosophical 
theories, whatever 'good' in this context means. It comes most certainly 
with the risk—a risk not easily assessed — of giving us false beliefs 
about what there is. Are these risks outweighed somehow?... As far as I 
can see, benefits we can hope to gain from metaphysics-played-well pale 
into insignificance beside the disvalue (small as it may be from a practical 
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standpoint!) of falsely believing in the existence of unreal entities dreamt 
of only in our philosophy ("Count Noun" 147). 
Evidently, then, van Fraassen believes that there is so little contact between philosophical 
theories and the world that IBE is not a legitimate method by which to choose among the 
former. To van Fraassen, there is no good reason to suppose that the accomplishments of 
philosophical theories — i.e., answering questions, resolving paradoxes, and solving 
conundrums — are broadly indicative of truth. Assuming that he's correct here, and 
given that philosophical theories are judged to be best explanations on the basis of how 
well they achieve their goals, it follows that the standards we use to judge best 
explanations in regard to philosophical theories have nothing to do with whether these 
theories are true. On the other hand, scientific theories are linked-up to the world in 
significant ways, and judgements as to which of these theories is a best explanation will 
be based on how well they foster the prediction and control of nature. Therefore, 
according to van Fraassen, a mode of theory-choice in ontology which is of the same form 
as a mode of theory-choice in science does not have the same status as the latter. Hence, 
"'World' is Not a Count Noun" leaves us with two conclusions concerning metaphysical 
theories like modal realism. First, the fact that modal realism constitutes the best 
explanation of Lewis-phenomena (assuming that it does), does not give us reason to 
believe that it's true. Second, even if IBE is a mode of theory-choice which we may 
legitimately pursue in science (in some circumstances) — i.e., if the goals of science set 
the standards of IBE — IBE is never a legitimate strategy to pursue in ontology. This 
being the case, IBE is unavailable to Lewis from van Fraassen's point of view. 
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Overall, then, it has been shown that Lewis doesn't fare very well when it comes 
to the standards of inference to the best explanation. The main reason for modal 
realism's poor success in the present regard is easily identifiable: the entities it deals with 
are, for the most part, completely causally and nomologically isolated from p. There's 
simply not enough contact between the entities of modal realism and the actual world. In 
contrast, the items whose existence is posited in Paradise on the Cheap are obviously not 
so isolated (save maybe the second-order schematic structures and similarity-projection 
sets; but perhaps we can avoid such isolation by naturalizing the ontology of these 
phenomena). Still, in its present state of articulation, Paradise on the Cheap is scarcely 
more amenable to the standards of [BE than modal realism. Paradise on the Cheap does 
not attempt to subsume Lewis-phenomena under laws of nature, nor does it cite causes for 
Lewis-phenomena. Furthermore, though Paradise on the Cheap enjoys a much greater 
degree of connection with p than modal realism does, the former's analyses have no 
relevance to prediction and control of the natural/physical world. Therefore, the goal of 
Paradise on the Cheap, which is to unify our analyses of modality, counterfactuals, 
content, and properties in an economical fashion, does not coincide with the goals which 
van Fraassen specifies for science. So, neither modal realism nor Paradise on the Cheap 
can, according to van Fraassen, take advantage of any of the forms of IBE available to 
science. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the entities with which Paradise on the Cheap is 
concerned are, at least in large part, among the features of p gives us reason to think that 
Paradise on the Cheap can perhaps be transformed into a more scientific theory. In other 
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words, maybe the entities dealt with by Paradise on the Cheap — such as recombinations, 
schematic structures, and similarities—can be organized into a nomological structure. 
For example, we might assert psychological laws to the effect that people at least 
implicitly engage in imaginative recombinations and that it is through reasoning about 
these recombinations, and judging their similarity (or dissimilarity) to actual states of 
affairs, that they deem that certain states of affairs are possible, others impossible, that 
certain counterfactuals are true, and others false. Thus, we might be able to reconcile 
Paradise on the Cheap with a mechanistic account of explanation like Hempel and 
Oppenheim's D-N model. Perhaps Paradise on the Cheap could even be unified with 
other scientific theories and, in this way, play a role in the prediction and control of the 
natural/physical world. This being the case, any IBE standards which van Fraassen 
deems legitimate for scientific theories would also be legitimate for Paradise on the 
Cheap. All of this speculation about what Paradise on the Cheap could be made into is 
very interesting; but it's material for another project. 
For now, I'll leave the metaphysician to her free meal. 
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